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GERMAN REARMAMENT AND THE OLD MILITARY ELITE

By HANS SPEIER

I

AMERICAN policy toward postwar Germany has gone through two major phases from the standpoint of military affairs. Until 1950 Germany was kept disarmed; since 1950 the United States has sought the rearmament of Western Germany. The problems of information policy raised by the change, and the attitudes of the old German military elite in the face of this *volte-face*, have considerable interest for the student of political communication.

In the general endeavor to reeducate the Germans after the war, the policy of disarmament was elaborately justified, although the defeat of the country was so incontrovertible that it was perhaps unnecessary to add the pleasures of pedagogy to the glories of victory. Rearmament, however, is another matter; it needs persuasive justification in order to succeed fully.

There are several reasons why such a justification is important. In contrast to the demands for disarmament, those for rearmament cannot be imposed. The Germans have the reputation of being good soldiers, but it is possible that, as forced soldiers, they would not live up to their reputation. Moreover, public information is necessary not only in the interest of a viable rearmament effort, but also in order to safeguard the frail democratic institutions of Western Germany. On both grounds assent, not compliance, is needed.

The Germans have not had to be persuaded that freedom and democracy are preferable to the Communist way of life. The Socialist opponents of Adenauer's policy of rearmament were, after all, anti-Communist long before the United States adopted containment as its policy. Public information is needed rather for the purpose of gaining acceptance of the premises of Ameri-

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can policy: its estimates of Soviet military capabilities and intentions, its views of the relation between negotiation and military power, and of the role which national values and interests can be permitted to play in global planning for security.

Certain attitudes must develop among the Germans before they can accept these premises. They must gain confidence in their comrades and leaders. They must be convinced that resisting aggression is more advantageous and more honorable—or at least one or the other—than collaborating with the prospective conqueror in the event of war. Finally, they must believe that the alliance which they are to enter into will be militarily efficient and provide for a fair distribution of risks and burdens among the participants. Their interest in Europe cannot be expected to absorb all rational and self-centered doubts. For the European Defense Community is not, after all, a community, but a contractual arrangement shaped in large part by conflicting national interests. And, characteristically, this arrangement includes the provision that the soldiers of the six nations concerned shall swear no common oath of allegiance.

Certain obstacles to the development of these attitudes are obvious. The effort to persuade the people of Western Germany that it is necessary to rearm has to be made against a background of disarmament and reeducation in the immediate past; it has to refer to perils which, strictly speaking, lie in the future; and it faces the problem of explaining plausibly how rearmament will enhance the prospects of unifying the divided country.

In the circumstances, the attitudes of the former German military elite have gained a special importance. As possible leaders of the new army, as social representatives of Germany's military tradition, and as persons potentially competent to discuss the military implications of EDC, its members have been in a position to exert considerable influence on the character and acceptability of rearmament. How have they exercised this influence?

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II

Of the 450,000 men that Germany would contribute to the European Defense Community, 27,000 would be officers, many of them, of course, of junior grade. The German authorities seem to be inclined to regard as the main problems of German rearmament (1) the recruitment of junior officers, and (2) the political orientation of the 320,000 draftees and 130,000 volunteers.[1]

Junior officers will have to come from age groups that are depleted and lack the required military experience. The enlisted men are likely to include many persons with objections to German rearmament and to the old forms of military drill. Today's German youth has been described as "politically unemployed,"[2] unwilling to make political commitments, opposed to military service, and without confidence in the old military elite. On the basis of intimate knowledge acquired in many lectures throughout Western Germany, two former German officers have recently written about this subject: "Among many elements of our people, especially in the generation that will be called upon for future military service, the soldier has become a dubious social type."[3]

This statement is probably a rhetorical exaggeration, but the fact must indeed not be overlooked that, despite Adenauer's sweeping political victory in the September 1953 elections, West German postwar society lacks the cohesion and political self-respect which result from national independence and unbroken traditions. German society still is, by and large, a synthetic structure erected upon the debris of National Socialism, defeat and disillusionment, accommodation to foreign powers, and feelings of guilt or defiance. Germany's new institutions command little popular respect. The new military establishment will be as good or bad as its new leaders. For this reason, the selection of senior

[1] According to statements by the Bonn government, 130,000 applications for volunteer service have been received.

[2] Gernot Gather, *Die Stunde der Jugend*, Stuttgart, 1953, p. 21.

[3] Erich Dethleffsen and Karl Heinrich Helfer, *Soldatische Existenz Morgen*, Bonn, 1953, p. 20.

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officers for Germany's new military contingents presents a politically important problem.

A large pool of experienced older officers exists, so that it should be possible to find men who combine military competence with a sense of political responsibility. Very few former officers who now are over fifty-five years of age will be taken, which means that few persons who occupied a rank higher than that of colonel at the end of the Second World War will have a chance of serving again. However, the few former German generals who will be needed could determine the political complexion of the German armed forces by default or by design.

Western Germany will now suffer again from the consequences of Hitler's purge after July 20, 1944, in which many of the morally strongest and politically most valuable men of the old military elite were executed or committed suicide.[4] The leaders who participated in and survived the conspiracy will compete for positions in the new armed forces with other German officers who were competent in their profession and whose past political record is not distinguished by conspicuous political actions. The danger that the new military elite will include men who once were convinced Nazis is probably smaller than the danger of infiltration by experts who do not see any need for departing from old traditions. Military expertness is no guarantee of firm political loyalty and may, in fact, be combined conveniently with politically opportunistic behavior. This combination, rather than a resurrection of German militarism, represents the political hazard of German rearmament, in the long run.

The influence of the old German military elite will not be exercised solely by those few who will return to top positions in the new German contingents. Former German general officers who are now too old to serve again can make their influence felt

[4] Twenty generals and one admiral were executed and five other generals committed suicide after the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Hitler. No *Luftwaffe* generals were murdered, but a few of them and a larger number of generals in the army took their own lives because of conflicts with Hitler earlier in the war. The number of younger officers who participated in the conspiracy and were killed thereafter is, of course, many times larger than that of the generals. See Josef Folttmann, *Opfergang der Generale*, Berlin, 1952.

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either through the advice which they may be called upon to give, through veterans' organizations in which they have power, and through their publications, or, less conspicuously, through their informal contacts with the political, economic, and military leaders of the country.

III

As they lost the war, the German generals lost also the power and status of a subsidiary elite, which they constituted as Hitler's military functionaries. Some of their best-known leaders were tried for war crimes. Others had difficulties finding a new place in society after 1945. It is impossible to obtain reliable data on the present economic status of the old military elite, but it seems that many of them now have higher incomes than they had when they wore uniforms. This fact is sometimes mentioned by former officers, who point out, with satisfaction, that the most capable men may not return to military positions and cannot be expected to renounce part of their incomes for an honor which so recently was denied them. From 1945 to 1950, both American information specialists and German journalists licensed by the occupation authorities engaged in propaganda against the German military class. These facts are well remembered and much resented by former German officers; they speak of the unprecedented "defamation" which they have suffered.

German officers as a class are no longer subjected to social criticism. Even the deputies to the Bundestag once more find it expedient to mention their military careers when they edit their biographies for the *Handbook* of the Bundestag. Since 1950, many things have happened to restore the prestige of the German officers.

Fortunately, no special propaganda effort has been made by the United States since 1950 to assure the German soldier and the old German military elite that their political and military virtues are respected once again. However, the US policy of German rearmament carried this message by implication and obliterated more tellingly than mere words could have done the

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earlier theme of guilt by association and collaboration with the Nazis.

Of great importance in this respect was General Eisenhower's report to Congress after his flying trip to the capitals of Western Europe as newly appointed commander of the NATO forces early in 1951. In this speech General Eisenhower expressed the opinion that Germany deserved political equality and that revision of Western policy toward Germany would have to precede discussions of incorporating German contingents into a European army. Even more important perhaps was Eisenhower's admission to former German generals in Bad Homburg that he no longer held the derogatory opinions about the German nation and its *Wehrmacht* which he had entertained in 1945 and expressed in his book.[5]

Other measures presumably of great relevance to an alteration of the image of the old military elite in the minds of the Germans were the release of various high-ranking German generals from prison camps and the agreement reached about the new procedure for the future treatment of the war crimes issue. On July 20, 1953, the Allied High Commissioners announced that in each of the three Western zones consultative boards would be set up to make recommendations for clemency or parole of the prisoners to appropriate authorities in that zone and that Germans nominated by the Federal government would be members of those boards.[6]

As the negotiations about EDC proceeded, official and social contacts between Allied officials and former German officers appointed to the Blank office inevitably became closer. Finally, many veterans' organizations have been formed and some military journals have reappeared. All these developments have contributed to a change in the popular image of the old military elite and to a partial restoration of its prestige.

[5] See Heinz Guderian's *So geht es nicht*, Heidelberg, 1951, p. 86. General Eisenhower's previous opinion was, of course, widely resented, as is evident in many German postwar publications.

[6] "The purpose of the three-power decision was to relieve the pressure being exerted by West German veterans' associations on Dr. Adenauer to obtain the release of military war criminals and in so doing help the Chancellor win the forthcoming general elections" (*New York Times*, July 21, 1953).

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IV

Some of the former German senior officers who have no direct connection with the Blank office have participated in the debate on rearmament. Most of them, but not all, have favored Adenauer's policy. Those who have not done so and have expressed their views in public have thereby reduced or renounced their chance of being called upon to perform governmental or military functions in the foreseeable future. Many members of the old elite have not broadcast their opinions.

Among the military opponents to Adenauer's policy one must distinguish between Nazi diehards like General Remer and the more intelligent military critics. The former have been given a refurbished ideology by a university professor writing under the pseudonym of Backhaus. Among the latter, Heinz Guderian is no doubt the outstanding figure.

At the beginning of the debate, in November 1950, when German equality was not yet assured as a price for German participation in Western defense, Guderian rushed into print, pointing to the bankruptcy of "Yalta and Potsdam" and insisting on freedom and equality for Germany. He advocated a Western European Union to include Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, and the expansion of the Western European "base of operations" by "the integration of the African space into European defense." He reminded his readers that despite terrible mistakes and errors Hitler, too, had fought for Europe against Communism. Guderian ridiculed the military posture of the West, which in his opinion did not even merit being called defensive.

In his next pamphlet, published in 1951, Guderian attacked Adenauer and the licensed political parties as revivals from the Weimar Republic, and insisted that the reestablishment of a free, unified, neutralized Germany was more urgent than the formation of West German contingents for European defense.[7] Many of Guderian's political arguments have been repeated by

[7] Heinz Guderian, *Kann Westeuropa verteidigt werden?*, Göttingen, 1950; see also Guderian, *So geht es nicht.*

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the German opposition to EDC ever since, while his military criticisms have found less attention than they deserve.

The book by Hugo C. Backhaus[8] is a wild, resentful attack on the Western occupation powers and the new political leaders in the Federal Republic. It is at the same time a plea that the former conflict between the Nazi Party and the military leaders be resolved by the formation of a common front against liberalism, Socialism, Catholicism ("the fifth occupation power"), the evangelical academies, and the torturers of Germany—i.e., the occupation powers and their stooges, the members of the German resistance, returned emigrés, and the new licensed politicians.

Backhaus, too, favors the defense of Europe. But, in his opinion, which happens to be shared by most Germans, the defense of Europe is not possible under French tutelage; nor can Europe be defended so long as Germany is being abused by the victors as an instrument of their power policy. Backhaus presents the Western powers as morally inferior to the Germans: today, the vanquished are the conscience of law and justice that has been lost by the victors.

Backhaus says that National Socialism advanced a revolutionary principle in German history, while the armed forces represented a conservative tradition. Unfortunately, the two leading groups, the party functionaries and the military leaders, did not cooperate harmoniously, but developed a fatal rivalry which led to defeat and foreign domination. The military leaders maintained aloofness from National Socialism despite the proof given by National Socialism in 1934 (by murdering Röhm, the leader of the SA) that it was resolved to silence its own radical elements in order to gain the support of the *Wehrmacht*. Harmony between the army and party leaders existed only during the period of German successes in 1939 and 1940.

There is also what may be called a small group of reformers among former German officers. They support EDC, but distinguish themselves from the bulk of its military supporters by candid criticisms of the past military tradition in Germany. Nor do they shrink from condemning the conduct of the old mili-

[8] *Wehrkraft im Zwiespalt*, Göttingen, 1952.

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tary elite under the rule of the Nazis. They criticize the undemocratic traits of German militarism before Hitler, its hostility to labor, its bureaucratization, the social conceit of its leaders, their faith in "drill," their narrow outlook on world affairs, and their land-bound strategic thinking.

These critics have acknowledged that the moral collapse of the German military elite began in the last decades of the nineteenth century and merely reached its climax with Hitler's rule. They have declared that German generals were responsible for Hitler's success in corrupting and dominating the *Wehrmacht*. The reformers are not organized, but share the conviction that past mistakes must be avoided in the future lest German rearmament lead to a revival of military efficiency without regard for German democracy and the political enlightenment of the new republic's European soldiers and officers.[9]

While efforts toward a reformed army have been supported by younger officers and by civilians,[10] some of whom criticize French and American manifestations of "militaristic" ritual, the majority of the former military elite is disinclined toward self-criticism. The sizable library of German military memoirs that have been published in recent years consists mainly of self-righteous books and pamphlets. In them, the German military tradition has been accepted as good and sound, and no need for reform is conceded.

The political and military errors which Hitler committed are

[9] As at the time of the great military reform after the Napoleonic victories over Prussia, Southern Germany again seems to be a better vantage point than Prussia from which to recognize clearly the faults of the old military tradition and advocate a new beginning. The most important and most radical recent reformist writings are Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, *Gebrochenes Schwert*, Berlin, 1952; Frido von Senger und Etterlin, "Von Schlieffen zur Europa Armee," *Aussenpolitik*, March 1952; and Robert Knauss, "Von Geist eines deutschen Kontingents," *Europäische Sicherheit*, March 1951.

[10] A poor slogan for such a reformed army, *Armee ohne Pathos*, was provided by the title of a book by Adelbert Weinstein, Frankfurt, 1951. The response of the more conservative elements of the old military elite may be gauged from the critical discussion of that book by Georg von Sodenstern, "Bürgersoldaten," *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, June 1952. See also *Bürger und Landesverteidigung*, Frankfurt am Main, 1952, and the preliminary reports (mimeographed) on the conferences in Andernach, March 19-20, 1952, on military structure, and in Wiesbaden, June 18-19, 1952, on problems of education, organized by the *Institut zur Förderung Öffentlicher Angelegenheiten*, Frankfurt am Main.

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mentioned, but any charge of immorality laid against him is usually confined to his unfairness to generals who deserved no demotion. In this literature, many instances are cited in which Hitler's military advisers realized the *hazards* of his foreign policy, but cautions and warnings against the hazards are now treated as though they were tantamount to moral rejection of aggression. Either military cooperation with Hitler is presented as a matter of course, or the moral and political issues that were involved in such cooperation have been swallowed up in accounts of the circumstances that surrounded the issues. One searches in vain for cases of the conversion with which the contemporary political scene is so replete in the Communist and anti-Communist camps. Presumably, there are many explanations for this stability of moral opinions, including fear of injuring the present self by criticism of one's past conduct and defiance of early Allied postwar propaganda. But it is difficult to escape the conclusion that many members of the old military elite who now have written about the past have spent their time since Hitler's downfall reminiscing rather than reflecting. From these memoirs the old military elite emerges as a group of experts with a great but long-faded humanistic tradition—experts in the orderly administration of violence who permit its abuse, provided their expertness is respected or at least rewarded, and who, like many other experts in modern civilization, do not care about the political function of their skills.

There are also accounts which are more openly critical of Hitler, though not of his military functionaries, and search more deeply into the reasons for Hitler's success and the generals' failure. They help us understand more fully the relations between the Nazi elite and the subsidiary elite, but in the end it is Hitler and what these experts like to call "fate" to which are now attributed all the misfortunes that overtook the world, the Germans, and their military leaders.[11] With the downfall of Nazi rule and the change in American policy, the way is thus

[11] The more searching books include Adolph Heusinger, *Befehl im Widerstreit*, Tübingen and Stuttgart, 1950, and Siegfried Westphal, *Heer in Fesseln*, Bonn, 1950. For contrast, compare the memoirs by Kesselring and Rendulic.

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open for a return to military traditions and institutions without any major reforms.

In relating the attitudes of the various political-ideological groupings among the former military elite in Germany to US policy, it is important to note that some of that policy's basic values are shared by a large number of former German officers, including persons on the extreme right. "Anti-Communism," "Europe," "Defense of the West," "German Rearmament," "German Equality"—all these are slogans which are subscribed to not only by the supporters of EDC and the reformist military critics of German militarism, but unfortunately also by those who express disdain for German democracy and in the summer of 1952 were said to have passed the word that induction orders should be torn up upon receipt. Thus, these symbols or slogans are not very useful as means of discriminating between different political groupings in present-day Germany.

By contrast, those military supporters of rearmament who are critics of German militarism and proponents of military reform go beyond the concern of US policy proper. In fact, the interests of German and American experts in efficient and quick organization of German contingents may come to conflict with reformist views, since such views are shared neither by all the German political parties that support EDC nor by all those members of the old military elite who are likely to be regarded as suitable for military reemployment. It is understandable that on the "left wing" of the old military elite the possible domestic repercussions of German rearmament are viewed with apprehension, although rearmament and EDC are supported for reasons of foreign policy. The true democrats among the old military elite fear that the United States has put its interest in German rearmament above its concern for the future of German democracy.

V

One might ask what particular contribution the former generals were able to make to furthering Adenauer's policy in the

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German debate on rearmament. To begin with, the very fact that some of them demonstrated by their public support of EDC that they had decided to let bygones be bygones and forget about the earlier "defamation" of the military elite presumably lowered the level of resentment against the United States in Western Germany. This is likely to have been true in groups having strong bonds with their former military leaders. The support of EDC by former SS generals[12] may have been especially important as a means of swaying the opinion of potential right-wing opposition and of arresting the influence of men like Backhaus in their circles. It may be doubted, however, that German rearmament will continue to be supported by the members of the former *Waffen SS* if they should be discriminated against as volunteers or draftees.

Presumably, former German generals supporting EDC in public have not been successful in making converts among the Social Democratic and neutralist opposition to Adenauer's policy. Military officers were, of course, especially competent to point out the military risks of a neutralized Germany and her need for powerful allies. Quite a few former officers have written on these subjects.[13] Neutralist sentiment is likely, however, to be rather impervious to rational arguments, and most of all to military ones, since it is nourished by religious feelings and fear of war. Quite probably, members of the former military elite were not instrumental in winning Socialists over to support Adenauer's EDC policy, particularly where its advocates were generals whose anti-Nazi record is unimpressive.

The question may be raised as to whether American specialists in communication should have encouraged, in appropriate ways, stronger participation of former German officers in polemics against the Socialist opposition. The answer must be in the negative. A series of interviews with former German gen-

[12] For example, Felix M. Steiner, *Die Wehridee des Abendlandes*, and the booklets published by *Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde* in which Steiner played a leading role—especially *Ja oder Nein zum Verteidigungsbeitrag*, Munich, 1952.

[13] For example, Erich Dethleffsen, *Das Wagnis der Freiheit*, Stuttgart, 1952; Günther Blumentritt, *Deutsches Soldatentum im Europäischen Rahmen*, Geissen, 1952; H. Müller-Brandenburg, *Neutralität?*, Berlin, 1952.

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erals in the summer of 1952 gave me the impression that members of the old military elite were especially impatient with, and indignant about, the delay in obtaining international agreement on German rearmament and the ratifications of the EDC Treaty. These attitudes did not seem to be inspired by a sense of urgency with regard to the danger of Soviet aggression. To any of the generals with whom I talked, war with the Soviet Union did not appear to be imminent. I am inclined to believe that their impatience about the slow progress of Western defense was indicative of broader negative attitudes toward the democratic procedure of discussing issues prior to reaching a decision on them.

Similarly, the German generals who favor European integration might easily become reconciled to progress in German rearmament at the expense of France if the United States were to make use of its imposing power to get things done despite the procrastinations of the French. For, whatever resentment the German generals may still harbor about the early postwar policies of the United States, their respect for power is great. Many of them complain that the West has no great idea to oppose to the pernicious message of Communism. While it can indeed be argued on some grounds that this complaint is justified, the old German military elite has contributed its share to the ideological and moral impasse which it now deplores.

The attitude of the German military elite toward the Social Democrats is influenced by old prejudices which the elite shares with other top groups in the social hierarchy.[14] If one disregards the early, impetuous, and absurd proposals by Schumacher for a strong American defense of Germany at the Elbe and the Vistula, the Social Democrats have failed to put forth any constructive proposals for a foreign military policy as an alternative to Adenauer's policy. Nor have they shown much appreciation of the international balance of power and Germany's role in it. But they are oriented toward the West; they are anti-Communist, and their current policy is influenced by their past strug-

[14] The members of the reformist military opposition differ, of course, in their attitudes toward labor and Socialism.

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gles against German reaction after the First World War. It is these latter views which many German generals are apt to overlook when they criticize the Socialists for their opposition to EDC. Instead, former German generals are readily inclined to regard this opposition as rooted merely in a drive for power in Germany and as attributable to Communist infiltration. Some of them compared indulgently the practices of the Socialists with those of the Nazis, as if to suggest that fundamentally all political parties are alike. Thus, in their impatience about the slow progress of German rearmament, as in their opinions on other matters, they invariably appeared to reduce domestic disagreements to matters of power pure and simple. Little would have been gained, therefore, for the better communication of US policy, had the old German military elite been more active as public polemicists against the Social Democratic Party; in fact, doubtful gains would probably have been made at the price of subtly injuring democratic values in the process.

German generals certainly recognize the danger of Soviet aggression, which they are inclined to attribute to traditional Russian expansionism rather than to Communist intentions: they prefer geopolitical to "ideological" arguments. But in 1952, as we have said, they were not alarmed about imminent danger, holding the weaknesses of the Soviet Union and the deterrent power of the American war potential (rather than the US Strategic Air Force) primarily responsible for the relatively peaceful situation. This diagnosis was influenced possibly by the fact that many of the weaknesses in the Soviet Union are chinks in the Soviet armor produced by the German *Wehrmacht*.

On the controversial issues of reunification, and of EDC as a means of achieving unification by peaceful means, the members of the old military elite could not have functioned as persuasive proponents and interpreters of official US policy. They were inclined to think that the hope of attaining reunification by means of diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union was very small indeed. Given this view, it was difficult to sustain hope for reunification by anything save predictions that the Soviet empire would peacefully disintegrate, or that a war of

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liberation would be initiated. None of the generals to whom I talked in the summer of 1952 spoke of such a war, and if they entertained secret thoughts on this subject they were realists enough to know that EDC could not wage a war to liberate the Soviet satellites or Eastern Germany. Thus the military value of the European Defense Community was viewed by them as a defensive achievement: once in being, i.e., about two years after ratification by all powers concerned, it would increase the security of Western Germany and Western Europe against military incidents leading to war.

German generals have not made many public contributions to the defense of EDC by military analysis. Only a few strategic comments on the defense of Europe have appeared in print. They all center around the idea that the EDC would be strong enough to force the Soviet Union, in case it embarked upon war, to conquer the deep flanks of Central and Western Europe —i.e., the Scandinavian peninsula and the Mediterranean—simultaneously with, or prior to, a deep advance to the Atlantic through Germany and France; and, further, that in view of other commitments of the Soviet ground forces to possible theaters of war outside of Europe, the risks of failure would be great enough to deter a Soviet attack upon Germany.

It is to be doubted that this discussion reached more than a small number of persons interested in the military aspects of rearmament. The same is unfortunately true of the few sane statements that have been made on the subject of German participation in determining the strategy of Western defense. On this subject the generals realized, of course, that in the event of a global coalition war, the national interests of an exposed ally in its own protection could not be expected to determine the plan of war, and that neither popular anxieties nor notions of national "equality" in a particular country could be permitted to do so. Rather, the strategy for defense and victory would have to be determined in the interests of the coalition as a whole. For example, Blumentritt assured his readers that the supreme commander of the Western forces would try his best to avoid an evacuation of West Germany if he possibly could, simply be-

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cause any unnecessary withdrawal would be in violation of the military interests of the West. But Blumentritt added with characteristic *sang-froid* that, in case of withdrawal according to a plan, not only German territory but "also other areas" would be lost.[15] Similarly realistic views were expressed by Georg von Sodenstern.[16] In my opinion, it would have been desirable to utilize the superior insight which the old military elite has in these matters in order to silence some of the less intelligent comments on strategic planning that have been made in Germany as well as in other European countries.[17]

VI

On the whole, former German generals have not played a conspicuous role in enlightening the German public about the military implications of EDC, the requirements of Western defense, and especially the possible strategies of a war in Europe. There are three major reasons for this failure.

(1) The old military elite is aware of the fact that public discussions of the strategy of a war in Europe may create the impression that the establishment of EDC increases the probability of war and that the generals are not alarmed by such a trend. It was, of course, politically undesirable for the success of the Adenauer government that such impressions should gain currency. Prior to the ratification of the EDC treaty by the Bundestag, the Socialist opposition attempted to create precisely this impression. Had their arguments been supported by the authority of German generals, the latter would in fact have reduced the chances of ratification and invited political attacks upon themselves. In the Bundestag some supporters of Ade-

[15] *Op.cit.*, pp. 37ff.

[16] "Strategische Gedenken zur Gegenwart," *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, May 1951.

[17] For example, the CDU Deputy Strauss said in the July 1952 debate, "What we must demand, if we are willing to say 'yes' to the treaty on the European Defense Community, is a clear European strategy with especial regard for the conditions in Germany as the last partner." Again, "We expect of the Federal Government that it will press successfully for a strategic conception in which Germany cannot become the theater of a conflict." (*Deutscher Bundestag Record*, p. 9,858.) Similar views on the strategy of European defense have been expressed occasionally in public by spokesmen of smaller NATO powers which fear being the first victims of a Soviet attack.

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nauer's policy went so far as to belittle the SPD argument that rearmament would lead to war by the disarming counterargument that EDC would be too cumbersome an organization ever to be used for aggressive purposes. The politically interested generals hoping for German rearmament were reticent on the strategic issues for military and personal reasons.

(2) The German military elite believes in the need for secrecy. Repeatedly it was pointed out to me by German generals that their notions of military security are superior to ours, since they are more fully aware of the intelligence value to the Soviets of public discussions in the West dealing with military issues. It is readily seen that this attitude also serves the injured self-respect of the old military elite, since it implies the claim of superior understanding and discretion on their part. This attitude is further nourished by the traditional aloofness of the professional officers from the civilian sector of society, and especially from those elements in it who are professional talkers or writers on political issues. As a group, the German military elite has never felt an urge to enlighten civilians on military affairs. These have always been regarded as matters of command rather than of discussion. Needless to say, the "reformers" in the elite do not advocate secrecy, but criticize it. These dissenters regard unnecessary secretiveness as a traditional trait of the old military elite and as another proof of its undemocratic orientation.

(3) The third reason for the failure of the old German military elite to discuss more fully and competently in public the strategic significance of US foreign policy and German rearmament is the halting American effort to help them do so. The US information program has not equipped German military writers with requisite background information so that they could function as expert opinion leaders in Germany on certain important aspects of military affairs. No attempt has been made to utilize their services in a way corresponding to the use that was made of German licensees in the first phase of the occupation. Public support of the policy of German rearmament has been regarded primarily as a political issue within a range of considerations indicated by the words "Soviet threat—deterrence—

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German equality—reunification." The need for a greater understanding on the part of the German people of the strategic significance of EDC in case of war has not been met fully. The issue of German rearmament has been dealt with at the level of diplomats and military experts in the first place, and it has apparently been felt that public support of Adenauer's policy would hinge primarily on anti-Communist sentiment and on an appreciation of the progress Germany would be permitted to make toward political equality and independence. Perhaps it has appeared more important to secure the support of the veterans' organizations and of potentially anti-American groups for the idea of "European integration" than to risk stimulating latent anxieties by more enlightened discussions of strategy.

It might have been difficult to encourage the German mass media to devote more attention to the military premises and implications of US foreign policy, but despite the indirect methods such encouragement would have had to employ, a more enlightened discussion would have been the consequence. Certainly, the distance between the decision-makers and those who must carry out the decisions would have been shortened. This distance exists, of course, in modern political society in general, and is especially great wherever momentous military issues are at stake.

The US library program in Germany might have been utilized more effectively as a means of providing German military writers with basic information. The library catalog of the US Information Centers in Germany lists very few books in any language on military affairs. The subject index does not even include the category "military affairs." While some of the memoirs of US generals have been translated into German and are available in the Information Centers, there are no studies listed in the catalog on subjects like atomic warfare, strategy, civil defense, military organization and psychology. Nor do the libraries include any publications put out by the US Government Printing Office. The debates on the B-36, the MacArthur hearings, the testimony by General Gruenther on European defense, to mention but a few items, are not on the shelves of the *Amerika* Houses.

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The most important German historian of the Second World War, a former general who lives on his pension, told me that he is giving French lessons in order to be able to subscribe to *Le Monde*, which in his opinion contains more current military information than any German newspaper. Former General Hans Rumpf, the chief historian of the effects of the air war upon Germany, writes in the preface to his book which appeared in 1952 that he was unable to obtain copies of the US Strategic Bombing Survey.[18] A similar remark is to be found in the most important German psychiatric monograph on the psychological effects of the air war.[19] Nor is it possible to read any of the standard military periodicals in the Information Centers.

The American failure to make available to German students of military affairs some of the more important recent publications in this field contrasts with the familiarity of the former German generals with the writings of British authors, especially J. F. C. Fuller and Liddell Hart. Both of them publish articles frequently in German periodicals, and Liddell Hart, who interviewed many of Germany's most prominent generals while they were in prison camps after the war, has maintained personal contact with them and provided for many of them a literary outlet for their professional writings in the magazine *Cosentoir*.

What might be called the popularity of J. F. C. Fuller and Liddell Hart in Germany is not only due to their own efforts, but is also a consequence of their views on tank warfare and their sharp moral and military criticism of strategic bombing. When former German generals deal with the subject of the bombing of German cities, they unfailingly cite British opinion on its cruel wastefulness and the very strong condemnations to be found in the writings of these two Englishmen.[20] Fuller and Liddell Hart may be said to be the most important foreign authorities on this subject in Germany today.

Furthermore, the views of these British writers are such that

[18] Hans Rumpf, *Der hochrote Hahn*, 1952.

[19] Friedrich Panse, *Angst und Schreck*, Stuttgart, 1952, p. 189.

[20] Similarly, critical British writings by Paget and others on the issues of war crimes and unconditional surrender are popular in Germany. Paget's book on Manstein was serialized in a German newspaper.

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they can easily be reconciled with the tradition of land-bound strategy cultivated in the General Staff of the German Army. Both Ludendorff's advocacy of total war and Douhet's doctrines of strategic bombing were unpopular among German General Staff officers between the two World Wars. In addition, service rivalry between the German Army and the *Luftwaffe* was intense, partly because the German air force became less and less effective after the Battle of Britain and the first campaign in Soviet Russia. When Hitler began to build up his air force, he had to draw upon officers of the ground forces for staff and command positions. Later, special *Luftwaffe* divisions were formed for ground warfare in the Soviet Union! Despite this fact, however, the *Luftwaffe* was more Nazified in its top positions than was true of the army, a fact which Hitler recognized and held against the leaders of the army.

Thus, in a rather interesting way, military conservatism among former German generals is tied up with political animosities dating back to the expansion of the German *Wehrmacht* and with popular feelings among large elements of the population that the bombing of cities is an atrocity. This view was publicly expressed with much applauded resentment by General Ramcke in a famous incident in 1952.

With inadequate sources of information, and traditional conceptions of strategy, it is small wonder that former German generals are particularly naïve and misinformed when they venture to express in public their opinions on atomic warfare. The few comments on atomic weapons to be found in the writings of high-ranking German generals or in German military periodicals betray a degree of ignorance which is truly astonishing.[21] By

[21] For example, General Halder is of the opinion that A- and H-bombs cannot be used in areas one wants to occupy (Peter Bor, *Gespräche mit Halder*, Wiesbaden, 1950, p. 248); General Steiner suggests that the effectiveness of atomic bombing of Soviet targets has been rendered negligible by the vastness of the area to be attacked and by dispersion (*op.cit.*, p. 46); General Guderian states that A-bombs are not usable in the vicinity of one's own troops because of radioactivity (*So geht es nicht*, p. 23). The best discussions that have appeared on the subject in Germany have not come from generals: Günter Bertrand, "Die H-Bombe," *Frankfurter Hefte*, January 1953; *Bericht über die Erste Wissenschaftlich-Technische Tagung der Total Kom. Ges. Foerstner Co.* (August 10-11, 1951), Ladenburg-Mannheim. The Christmas issue, 1952,

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contrast, the development of long-range rockets is followed much more keenly. This, of course, is an area in which Germany excelled during the war, and it is appreciated in Germany that many German experts are now working for the Soviet Union.[22]

It should perhaps also be noted that the lack of concern with atomic weapons which the German generals betray not only fits in with their traditional thinking on airpower as a tactical weapon for the support of ground forces and for purposes of interdiction, but also supports their opinion that the German contribution to EDC in ground forces and tactical air units is of even greater importance than it actually is.

The strategic significance of atomic and thermonuclear weapons seems to be lost on the old German military elite, and the possibility of the "tactical" use of these weapons in repelling aggression, discussed in public by General Alfred M. Gruenther[23] and General Sir Richard Rale,[24] had caused no stir among them in 1952.[25]

In short, the strategic issues related to German rearmament on which the old military elite could presumably have functioned best as a group of sober opinion leaders have been dealt with most inadequately in the public debate. The members of that elite have been silent on these issues or dealt with them primarily as *political* writers, revealing in the process that mod-

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of the *Deutsche Soldatenzeitung* contained an article by J. F. C. Fuller arguing that possession of the A-bomb by both sides was likely to lead to its use by neither side in a future war and might render war impossible. The November 1953 issue of *Aussenpolitik* contained a German translation of the *Foreign Affairs* (July 1953) article by J. Robert Oppenheimer under the title, "Atomwaffen und die Politik Amerikas," and an essay by Paul Scheffer, "Das Thema der Atombomben," in which the development of atomic weapons was discussed. *Der Flieger* (September 1953) published a report on a lecture by General B. G. Nordenskjoeld, Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Air Force, on changes in land warfare to be expected in consequence of the tactical employment of atomic bombs.

22 For a good survey, see Volursus, "Die Geheimwaffen der Soviet-Union," *Flugwelt*, November 1953.

23 Testimony of General Alfred M. Gruenther, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, April 1, 1953.

24 See *New York Times*, February 25, 1953.

25 The first test of a "tactical" A-bomb at Yucca Flats, Nevada, April 22, 1952, was widely reported in the United States. In more than thirty of the most widely read West German newspapers that reported the news briefly, only one (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*) carried an editorial—only because it wished to stress the fact that the test had been televised in the United States.

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ern experts on violence can lose their competence quickly. But they have displayed no mean propagandistic skills in discussing those aspects of the past which in the somewhat synthetic society of West Germany today still dominate political thinking.

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ORIGINS OF THE WINTER WAR:
A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy

By ALBIN T. ANDERSON

THE origins of the Winter War cannot be explained solely by reference to the hectic days which followed the Nazi attack upon Poland in September 1939. Issues then debated in both Helsinki and Moscow had deeper historical roots. Neither country could forget the bitter days of revolution, counter-revolution, and civil war in 1917-1918. Neither party had been fully satisfied with the Treaty of Dorpat (1920) which drafted the territorial lines of demarcation and specified mutual rights and obligations. Weakness at that time had forced ardent Finnish nationalists to concede more than they wished, and weakness forced the fledgling Soviet government to agree to terms otherwise unacceptable. The legacy of suspicion from these early days persisted throughout the interwar period, augmented on the one hand by periodic outbursts of reaction or irredentism in Finland, and, on the other, by recurrent evidence of Soviet interference in Finnish internal affairs—manifested in speeches and public pronouncements, if not in deeds. Relations continued on a formally correct plane, but the deepening world crisis of the late thirties led the Kremlin to reassess her relations with a number of powers, not least her nearest neighbors. Thus it was that Finland was ushered into the wings of the stage on which big-power diplomats were currently enacting a drama of death.

Shortly after the Austro-German *Anschluss* of March 1938, the Soviet government initiated informal talks with leading Finnish statesmen. Boris Yartsev, second secretary of the Soviet legation in Helsinki, secured an audience with Foreign Minister Holsti and confided that his government had empowered him to discuss ways and means whereby Soviet-Finnish relations might be improved.[1] His government, he said, was deeply con-

[1] He asked that the talks be kept in strictest confidence, since not even the Soviet minister was aware of them! Cf. Väinö Tanner, *Finlands Väg, 1939-40*, Helsingfors, 1950, p. 9.

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cerned about the aggressive intentions of Nazi Germany. It was assumed that Hitler had in mind an eventual multi-pronged attack upon the Soviet Union. One of these attacking wings would undoubtedly seek to pass through Finland. Such an eventuality would force the USSR to anticipate the Germans in Finland and that country would then become an area of hostility. Yartsev's government felt it prudent, therefore, that the two countries begin discussions relating to mutual defense.

Holsti, perhaps not sensing that this was a positive feeler by the Kremlin, made the observation that conversations of this kind were a departure from normal diplomatic practice, and that Yartsev's analysis of the situation rested on purely speculative grounds. Finland, he insisted, intended to avoid involvement with any big-power bloc. But this answer did not satisfy the enterprising young Soviet secretary. Through one of the secretaries in Prime Minister Cajander's office he managed to get two audiences with Cajander, one in late June and the other on July 11. Once again he proved to be so vague in stating just what his government had in mind that Cajander finally requested Finance Minister Tanner to meet with Yartsev and seek to draw him out further. Meanwhile, several months had passed.

Only at the fifth meeting with Tanner, which took place on August 18, was Yartsev prepared to specify what the Soviet government wanted. Moscow, he said, wished a secret military alliance or, in lieu of that, a written promise from the Finnish government that the country would oppose any German attack and that Russian military help would be solicited in carrying out that obligation. Furthermore, the Soviet government wished to install air and sea defenses on the Finnish island of Suursaari (Hogland) so that the approaches to Kronstadt and Leningrad might be guarded. In return, the Soviet government would guarantee the integrity of the present Finnish frontiers, and would extend military aid as needed. Then—as obvious bait—Yartsev said that his government would not object to the Finnish fortification of the Aaland Islands, providing that a secret Russian observer were permitted to check the installations and to see that they were under sole Finnish control. Finally, Moscow

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proposed that a new and inclusive commercial treaty be negotiated between the two states.[2]

The Soviet proposals, with an account of their background, were then laid before the government in a secret session. They could not help but give pause for thought. For months, responsible Finns had viewed with alarm the rapidly changing international picture. There was a traditional fear of the big neighbor to the east among most Finns, except for avowed Communists, but there was also growing disillusionment with Hitler's Germany.[3] The *Anschluss* in the previous March had created something of a sensation in Finland.[4] That lesson in big-power voracity had finally induced the leftists in Parliament to support an extended military program. And yet, with that understandable ambivalence frequently exhibited by other governments at this time, many Finns continued to think of Germany as the only possible ally in case of trouble with Russia. They could not lightly forget the warning given to an earlier prime minister, Kivimäki, by the Soviet envoy, Assmus: "In case of war, Russia could not avoid occupying Finnish territory."[5] The Finns were divided in their views as to which power constituted the greatest threat to Finland, but there was no disposition to begin an orientation in one direction or the other.

The answer delivered to Yartsev by Tanner on August 29 was thus a restatement of Finland's position. Any military agreement, or any commitment regarding the Aaland Islands or Suursaari, would limit Finnish sovereignty and would run counter to the Finnish policy of neutrality and Scandinavian orientation. It was an answer which fell far short of what Yartsev had been instructed to obtain.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 14-17; also Gustaf Mannerheim, *Minnen*, II, Helsingfors, 1951, p. 76; and John H. Wuorinen, ed., *Finland and World War II, 1939-1944*, New York, 1948, pp. 44ff. (The anonymous author of the Wuorinen manuscript is a respected and responsible Finnish scholar.)

[3] This situation was fully understood by the German minister in Helsinki. Cf. his report of August 1, 1938, to the German Foreign Office, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, Vol. V, Washington, 1953, pp. 589-93 (hereafter cited as *DGFP*).

[4] For the observations of the German envoy in Helsinki, cf. Wipert von Blücher, *Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie*, Wiesbaden, 1951, pp. 91-93.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 67, in which the source given is former President Svinhufvud.

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During the next few weeks of the Czech crisis, Yartsev continued to press his case with Tanner, Holsti, and finally, Voionmaa, who functioned as interim foreign minister between the retirement of Holsti on November 16 and the appointment of Erkko. In one of his talks with Holsti, Yartsev requested permission to abandon the careful language of diplomacy and talk as man to man.[6] Both countries, he said, had mutual interests. On the one hand, Finland was too small to defend herself adequately; on the other, the USSR had a real problem in the exposed position of Leningrad. Mutual security could be achieved only by friendly cooperation. His argument, however, that the Czech crisis constituted an example of the dangers involved was subject to Finnish qualifications. It was true that the Finns had been extremely nervous over the Sudetenland dispute, but they were disposed to rationalize Munich as a triumph of British diplomacy which had kept the peace and, not least, had isolated the USSR from Europe.[7] No responsible Finnish statesman was prepared to concede that the country's security could be enhanced by joining any big-power bloc. Furthermore, there was considerable confidence that Finland, together with Sweden, would be able to agree upon a plan for fortifying Aaland without the concurrence of the USSR. The only concession which the Finns would grant at this time was to promise that conversations would be resumed in Moscow on the occasion of the dedication of the new Finnish legation early in December.

Political and economic talks were resumed in Moscow on December 7, 1938, with Foreign Trade Commissar Mikoyan as the Soviet spokesman. Finland was represented by members of the Foreign Office, the Finnish minister in Moscow, Yrjö-Koskinen, and spokesmen for Finnish trade and industry. Mikoyan went through the routine of expressing Soviet eagerness for increased trade with Finland, but explained that any eventual

[6] Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 20.

[7] Cf. Blücher, *op.cit.*, pp. 115-17. The sharply critical, almost tragically toned articles of the left-wing Social Democrat, Atos Wirtanen, in *Arbetarbladet*, were exceptional in their specific indictment of Hitler's program and their implied criticism of Western diplomacy. Articles for September 28-30, 1938, reprinted in his *Ofärd och Gryning*, Helsingfors, 1946, pp. 91-93.

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treaty should be part of a general agreement, covering both political and military questions. He then went on to reiterate Yartsev's earlier arguments about the defenselessness of Finland and the exposed position of Leningrad. He assured his auditors that the Soviet Union harbored no ill will toward Finland—had not the great Lenin often found asylum in that friendly country?—but the Soviet government had grave doubts that Hitler would respect her neutrality.[8] The untenable strategic position of Leningrad, he hinted, could be improved greatly if Suursaari in the Gulf of Finland were in Soviet hands. He implied further that the Russians would then withdraw their objections to the fortification of Aaland, as well as grant the Finns a favorable trade agreement.

Speaking on behalf of the delegates, Urho Toivola, a representative of the Foreign Office, stated that the Finnish government had faith in the various treaties which now regulated Finnish-Soviet political relations. He assured Mikoyan that should any third power seek to violate Finnish neutrality the country would defend itself. He shrewdly hinted that the problem of defense would be eased if no opposition developed to plans then underway for fortifying the Aaland Islands. Meanwhile, no changes could be made in the demilitarized status of Suursaari, which was regulated by the Russo-Finnish treaty of 1920, but should the treaty be changed the Finns would be willing to provide the island with the necessary defenses.[9] It was on this plane of friendly disagreement that the Moscow talks ended without any tangible results.

The next three months saw no change in the status of Russo-Finnish relations, but at least one outside development was destined to affect the Soviet attitude when talks were again resumed in March. This was the matter of the Aaland Islands. The possible fortification of these islands had been a topic of conversation for many years, but only in 1938 was the subject pursued to an advanced stage. On January 7, 1939, the so-called

[8] This is paraphrased from a confidential Finnish source, which in turn is based upon archival research.

[9] Wuorinen, *op.cit.*, p. 46.

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"Stockholm Plan" for the remilitarization of the islands was signed by representatives of Sweden and Finland in the Swedish capital.[10] Under the terms of the agreement Finland was to assume the responsibility for fortifying the islands, but Sweden reserved the right to consult with Finland on the common defense of the islands in case war should threaten. The two states undertook to obtain the concurrence of the seven other powers who had signed the Aaland Convention in 1921.

Other signatory powers to the Aaland Convention expressed their satisfaction with the "Stockholm Plan," but the USSR, who was not an original signer, registered strong objections both publicly and privately.[11] Soviet objections harked back to Chicherin's statement of October 2, 1919; namely, that any decision on the status of the Aaland Islands made without Russian participation would be considered null and void.[12] Maisky expressed this same viewpoint to the League Council on May 27, 1939, and went on to point out that the islands were of vital concern to the USSR because they dominated the entrance to the Finnish Gulf. What he did not mention was that the Soviet Union had already intimated to Finland that Soviet objections to the remilitarization of Aaland (under certain conditions) would be withdrawn in return for Finnish concessions on Suursaari and elsewhere. This renewed pressure on Finland had begun in March.

The month of March 1939 marked a turning point not only in European affairs, but also in Soviet foreign policy. Perhaps the attitude of the USSR can best be defined as manifesting a new spirit of independence and self-reliance. In his speech of

[10] Cf. Carl-Fredrik Palmstierna, *Ålandsfrågan, 1918-1951* (Världspolitikens dagsfrågor, No. 4), Stockholm, 1951, pp. 18f. Although these islands were a part of Finland, Sweden had peculiar interests there because she was a signatory to the "Guarantee" of 1921, the vast majority of the population was Swedish-speaking and looked to Sweden as a kind of "protector" of its minority status, and the islands lay in waters which were of strategic importance to Sweden.

[11] It is noteworthy that Germany gave its assent despite the categorical warning from Minister Blücher in Helsinki that the remilitarization was directed primarily not at the USSR but at Germany. See *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. v, pp. 607-9.

[12] Chicherin to foreign ministers of France, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, in Jane Degras, ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, I, London, 1951, p. 169.

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March 10 to the Eighteenth Congress of the party, Stalin let it be known that the Soviet Union would not simply act as a fireman in Europe for other powers, nor would it try henceforth to draw any hairline distinctions between the various imperialist powers. He charged the Western powers with neutralism, which could only be expiated by some more positive demonstration of sincerity. At the same time he hinted broadly that there were no insurmountable obstacles to a better understanding between the Soviet Union and Germany. Meanwhile, the USSR would build up its own military might in order to meet any eventualities.

While announcing publicly what Soviet policy would be, the Kremlin busied itself also with a series of bilateral talks, including a renewal of those with Finland. As early as March 5, Litvinov presented a memorandum to the Finnish envoy, Yrjö-Koskinen, containing the suggestion that the question of Aaland as well as the matter of improved Soviet-Finnish trade could be settled easily if Finland would be willing to turn over to the USSR, for a period of thirty years, the Gulf islands of Suursaari, Lavansaari, Tytärsaari, and Seiskari.[13] This was an obvious effort to wring practical concessions from the Finns in return for a favorable reply on the Aaland question. When the Finnish government replied negatively three days later, Litvinov —not without some evidence of annoyance—suggested that Finnish objections to an alienation of territory could be obviated by an exchange. He proposed that these islands in the Finnish Gulf be turned over to the USSR in exchange for some 183 square kilometers of territory in Eastern Karelia.[14] When this suggestion, too, was refused, Litvinov stated bluntly that it was now up to the Finnish government to propose some acceptable alternative. In order to expedite a decision he instructed Boris Stein, the Soviet ambassador in Rome who was on a visit in Helsinki, to intervene personally with the Finnish government.

The discussions in Helsinki lasted nearly a month, and availa-

[13] Tanner, *op.cit.*, pp. 22-23; and Wuorinen, *op.cit.*, p. 46.

[14] Erkko "confidentially" kept the German government informed of these proposals. Von Blücher to Ribbentrop, March 14, 1939, *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. v, pp. 628-29.

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ble sources indicate that the final negative decision was not unanimous among the few who participated. President Kallio, Prime Minister Cajander, and Foreign Minister Erkko argued that an exchange of the proposed territory would be politically hazardous and impossible to justify to the Finnish people. Mannerheim, on the other hand, felt that such a deal might bring an end to Soviet suspicion—and at a price Finland could afford, when viewed strategically. He argued ". . . that the islands were of no real use to the country and in their neutralized condition we had no chance of defending them. . . . For the Russians, on the other hand, they were of practical significance because they guarded the entrance to their marine base in Luga Bay. We should therefore use the few trumps that we held."[15] He went even further and suggested that any agreement should include an adjustment westward of the Karelian frontier. That would be a good-will gesture which would relieve Soviet sensitivity in respect to Leningrad. And then, taking cognizance of the avowed political timidity of the government, he said that should the government take such action he would personally defend the decision in the political arena. None of these arguments, however, were strong enough to sway the decision of the majority. Silence from Helsinki once again indicated that Soviet hopes for a satisfactory settlement had been frustrated.

During the summer of 1939 the Finns discovered how difficult it was for a small power to retain freedom of action in the face of big-power maneuvering. As early as the end of April she had to refuse a non-aggression pact proffered by Germany, which did not improve her standing in Berlin. On June 2, the Swedish government, prompted by Soviet opposition, abandoned its support of the "Stockholm Plan" for fortifying Aaland. Failure to achieve even this measure of Northern cooperation tended further to isolate Finland and weaken her power of resistance. And, finally, her independence of action was threatened in the summer of 1939 when Anglo-French-Soviet negotiators discussed

[15] Mannerheim, *op.cit.*, II, p. 85. Blücher, *op.cit.*, p. 142, furnishes the information that Erkko knew the islands were so located that they were defenseless, and "One rightist politician went even further and conceded that the [Karelian] isthmus lay in the Russian sphere of influence."

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the inclusion of Finland among the "guaranteed" states of a proposed multilateral assistance pact.[16] In this instance the Finnish government had to inform the British categorically that "The Finnish Government cannot admit the right of any Power to come to their assistance for the purpose of resisting an alleged direct or 'indirect' aggression on Finland, in any other cases than when they themselves have asked for such assistance." The anxious summer days of 1939 were finally climaxed by the announcement of the signing of the August 23rd pact between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.[17]

The Nazi-Soviet pact constituted an open invitation to Hitler to deal with Poland, but it also gave the USSR a free hand in pursuing her own objectives. The political and military collapse of Poland enabled her to occupy and annex the eastern portions of that country, and the Baltic states were forced to conclude defense pacts with the USSR. Renewed pressure upon Finland was soon forthcoming. On October 5, Molotov informed Yrjö-Koskinen that the USSR wished to resume trade talks and to discuss more concrete political questions. Molotov expressed the hope that the Finnish foreign minister himself would come to Moscow. He left little doubt that the Kremlin was conscious of its improved tactical position.[18]

Several signs, however, pointed to the fact that Finland would not capitulate without resistance. When the Soviet minister in Helsinki, Derevyansky, tried to expedite the Finnish reply, Foreign Minister Erkko retorted warmly that the matter was being handled in the normal order of business.[19] He warned Derevyansky that ". . . Finland could never consider approving such

[16] The Finnish minister in London, Gripenberg, made several informal protests to Halifax, stating that any common guarantee of Finland by the three powers would tend ". . . to drive the Finnish Government into the arms of Germany." Halifax to Snow, minister in Helsinki, July 8, 1939, *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, III: 6, London, 1953, p. 308. Wuorinen, *op.cit.*, p. 50, says that Sweden supported this Finnish protest.

[17] Earlier Mannerheim had told the English envoy, Snow, that it was his opinion that such a pact would be the most dangerous of several alternatives for Finland. Snow to Halifax, June 20, 1939, *DBFP*, III: 6, p. 121.

[18] Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 32.

[19] This seemingly casual handling of such an obviously important matter subsequently came in for sharp criticism by other Finns. See C. O. Frietsch, *Finlands Ödesar*, Stockholm, 1945, p. 59.

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an arrangement as that which had just been concluded with the Baltic states."[20] Furthermore, the foreign minister was determined not to make the trip to Moscow himself, and thus give to the Russians an advantage which they had undoubtedly exploited in the case of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Instead, the Finnish envoy in Stockholm, J. K. Paasikivi, was recalled and briefed for the visit to the Soviet capital. Finally, the instructions which were prepared for Paasikivi fell far short of what the Finns, through previous experience, had reason to think might be required. Paasikivi's responsibility was limited to a reiteration of the oft-stated Finnish viewpoint, and he was expressly forbidden to discuss the alienation of any Finnish territory except a few islands of secondary importance in the Gulf of Finland.[21] In addition to these diplomatic preparations, new reserves were called up and military maneuvers extensive enough to amount to general mobilization were begun.[22] All of these preparations undoubtedly represented actions commensurate with the seriousness of the situation, and that they reflected the popular mood could be judged by the stirring demonstration at the Helsinki station when Paasikivi and his aides left on the evening of October 9.

The first meeting in Moscow took place on October 12. Paasikivi was accompanied by Yrjö-Koskinen, plus representatives of the Foreign Office and the military. Across from them sat men in whose hands rested most of the responsibility for Soviet foreign policy—Stalin, Molotov, Deputy Foreign Commissar Potemkin, plus the Soviet minister in Helsinki, Derevyansky. The outbreak of war, the Russians said, had intensified the insecurity of Leningrad. Recent agreements with Esthonia had given some protection to the south coast of the Gulf, but the north coast was still exposed. In the interest of mutual security they proposed: that Finland relinquish a group of major islands in the Gulf, including Suursaari and Koivisto (Björkö); that the USSR be leased a naval and air base on the Finnish

[20] Source as indicated in note 8 above.

[21] Paasikivi's instructions are included in *The Finnish Blue Book*, New York, 1940, pp. 46-49.

[22] Mannerheim, *op.cit.*, II, pp. 100-3.

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coast, preferably Hanko; that the Karelian border be moved west to a line approximating Kuolemajärvi-Kyyrölä-Muolaa-Lipola; that the Russians be granted a bit of territory on Petsamo in the far north; and, finally, that the Finns agree to a limited pact of mutual assistance designed to guarantee the security of the Finnish Gulf.[23] For the areas specified above, the USSR would provide double compensation in Eastern Karelia.

The delegates met again on October 14, and Stalin himself reiterated the Soviet position. It was the fault of neither party, he said, that geography made the relations of the two states so awkward. Meanwhile, the Soviet government had the responsibility of closing the Finnish Gulf to all possible intruders, and that could not be accomplished from the south shore alone. There was always the danger of what some adventurist power might do. And, tipping his hand slightly, he opined, "To be sure, we have good relations with Germany, but everything in this world can change."[24] As to Leningrad, there was nothing that could be done about its location; the border could be moved, but not the city, and Leningrad would have a minimum of security only when the frontier ran seventy kilometers to the west rather than the present thirty-two.

To all of these proposals Paasikivi could answer only in terms of his instructions, which bound him to very limited concessions. He requested the Russians to prepare a written memorandum of the proposals, and then stated that it would be necessary for him to discuss them with his government in Helsinki.[25] Before leaving, he stressed that Finnish concurrence to such sweeping terms would be very difficult to obtain.

Paasikivi returned to a city where feeling was running high. Although the specific matters under discussion had not been made public, the experience of the Baltic states provided an unmistakable hint. The result was a welling-up of national sentiment unique in Finnish history,[26] an understandable manifestation of patriotism, but one that hardly provided the best climate

[23] For all of these proposals, cf. Tanner, *op.cit.*, pp. 38-39.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 40-42, for this and others of Stalin's statements.
[25] The Russian memorandum is available in *Finnish Blue Book*, pp. 51-54.
[26] For one observer's comments, cf. Blücher, *op.cit.*, p. 154.

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of opinion in which to assess soberly the grave questions now posed to the government. Seasoned politicians who normally had to adjust their actions and their speech to the fine nuances created by divisions among socialistic, bourgeois, and Swedish elements now suddenly seemed to feel that no such restraint was necessary. At least Foreign Minister Erkko appeared to be smitten by the new spirit. In the secret government deliberations over the new Soviet proposals he was adamantly opposed to any but minor concessions, and he was disposed to dismiss much of the Russian pressure as political bluff.[27] He seemed undismayed even when the Swedish government informed him categorically that no Swedish help should be counted upon if Finland got involved in hostilities.

There were some, however, who were less optimistic, notably Paasikivi, Yrjö-Koskinen, Mannerheim, and, to some degree, Tanner. Mannerheim felt that every effort should be made not to relinquish Hanko, but since he was convinced ". . . that the Soviet Union, if it so desired, would not hesitate to impose its will by force of arms,"[28] he believed some alternative should be proposed by the Finnish government. His own suggestion was to offer the offshore island of Jussarö in lieu of Hanko. Then, speaking as a military man, he acknowledged the weak defensive position of Leningrad and reiterated his arguments of the previous spring that several islands in the Gulf could be exchanged, as well as a section of the Karelian coastline extending at least to the fortified point, Ino. An adjustment of this kind would give the Russians effective control of the inner passage to Kronstadt and Leningrad. This, however, was a minority viewpoint. Erkko's new instructions merely authorized the delegates to offer the Russians some thirteen kilometers of territory on the Karelian coast.[29] Paasikivi, now accompanied by Finance Minister Tanner, had only this concession to offer when he began his return trip to Moscow on October 21.

[27] Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 47. He was supported in large part by the Minister of Defense, Niukkanen. Cf. Juho Niukkanen, *Försvarsminister under Vinterkriget*, Helsingfors, 1951, pp. 78-79.

[28] Mannerheim, *op.cit.*, II, p. 108.

[29] *Finnish Blue Book*, pp. 51-54.

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Two successive meetings on the evening of October 23 gave both Molotov and Stalin an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with the new Finnish proposals. Stalin reiterated the previous Soviet arguments and then drew, free-hand, a line on a large military map showing where the Karelian frontier should run. Tanner noted, "It was obvious that he was well oriented in the geography of the area."[30] The Soviet leader was willing to modify slightly the initial demands on the isthmus, and he suggested that the lease on Hanko could be limited to the duration of the war, but otherwise the Soviet demands remained the same. He urged the Finnish delegates to impress upon their government the need of greater concessions. A written memorandum of the modified Soviet proposals was presented to the Finns.[31] There seemed no alternative but to return again to Helsinki. Both delegates felt helplessly bound by the instructions that they had received.[32]

The consultations in Helsinki lasted a full week and for the first time the government now sought the opinion of representative party people within the Parliament. Party chairmen then submitted their reports to the cabinet.[33] There was general approval of the handling of the negotiations to date, and there was almost complete agreement on the draft of a new memorandum, although some questioned how much of the Karelian Isthmus might safely be exchanged. All accepted the government's position that Hanko should not be leased. Strangely enough, only the chairman of the Conservative Coalition Party, Pekka Pennanen, complained that a matter of such grave importance had to be decided on such short notice. Foreign Minister Erkko interpreted this wide unanimity of opinion as a vote of confidence and the new memorandum which he prepared, in consultation with Premier Cajander and Tanner, reflected only minor concessions to his earlier point of view.[34] The delegates

[30] Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 58.

[31] Dated October 23, *Finnish Blue Book*, pp. 54-56.

[32] In a personal talk with the present writer in June 1952, Tanner expressed the view that a compromise could have been achieved had the delegates been fully empowered to act.

[33] These reports are summarized in Tanner, *op.cit.*, pp. 75-80.

[34] *Finnish Blue Book*, pp. 61-66.

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were empowered to discuss the exchange of several mid-Gulf islands; if necessary, they could propose the joint occupation of Suursaari; an additional stretch of Karelian coastal territory—amounting to some fifteen kilometers—could be exchanged for territory farther north; and the western part of Fisherman's Peninsula in the north might be exchanged, but Hanko was not to be relinquished. Obviously, this was again far short of what Molotov and Stalin had insisted were minimum terms. Perhaps most puzzling was Erkko's conviction that the Russians would not permit the differences to lead to open conflict. He was aware that Paasikivi did not share this conviction, and prior to the departure of the delegates on October 31 he enjoined Tanner not to permit Paasikivi to show any weakness in the face of Soviet pressure.[35]

That night, as the delegates were proceeding slowly eastward by train, the silence out of Moscow was broken in a way which was a startling departure from normal Soviet practice. In a lengthy speech to the Supreme Soviet Molotov gave a complete summary of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations, with an analysis of the issues which still remained to be resolved.[36] He stated that the primary problems revolved around the Soviet request for a base at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, and, second, the exact location of a new frontier on the Karelian Isthmus. With candor he remarked that the uncertainties of the times had made it ". . . not only the right, but also the duty, of the Soviet Union to adopt serious measures for strengthening its security." And there was more than the hint of a veiled threat in his words when he said, "We feel certain . . . that the Finnish statesmen will not allow themselves to be influenced by any pressure or anti-Soviet instigation, from whatever quarter it may come." The whole procedure suggested that Soviet leaders had now made the settlement of these issues on their terms a

[35] Cf. his note, in Tanner, *op.cit.*, pp. 81-82. Tanner himself confesses, "I have never learned what motivations Erkko had for his self-confidence. Under any circumstances they dominated his handling of the affair." Blücher, *op.cit.*, p. 153, also indicated Erkko's low opinion of Paasikivi's powers of resistance.

[36] For the full speech and its proper context, cf. *Pravda* and *Izvestia* for November 1, 1939. Selections are reprinted in *Finnish Blue Book*, pp. 56-60.

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matter of prestige.[37] Such a public disclosure of the negotiations, on the other hand, implied that the Politburo was confident that its demands would be construed by public opinion in the USSR, in the outside world, and perhaps even in Finland as just and reasonable.

The immediate effect in Helsinki was consternation and confusion. Erkko managed to get members of the government together in the middle of the night, but no one seemed to know how best to proceed. Their delegates were well on the way to Moscow with instructions formulated for one set of circumstances. Should they be permitted to go on or should they be recalled for new consultations? The decision was finally left up to Paasikivi and Tanner, who were contacted by telephone as their train halted in Vipurii. This was, noted Tanner, ". . . a strange way for the government to decide such important questions."[38] It seemed useless for the envoys to proceed with their limited instructions. On the other hand, they were already long overdue in Moscow, and any hesitation at this point might be construed as evidence of weakness. Swayed by this latter consideration, they decided to go through with their mission.

Once in Moscow, Paasikivi and Tanner were not long in sensing the incongruity of their position. Molotov's speech and the more solemn tone of the press indicated that the Kremlin was now priming for a decision. On the other hand, the Finns had returned with only a minimum of concessions to offer. On the morning of November 3 *Pravda* stated bluntly that "The Soviet Union does not only have the right, but the duty, to take measures which will guarantee the security of the sea and land approaches to Leningrad. . . ." And that evening, when the Finnish delegates presented their new memorandum to Molotov and Potemkin, the annoyance of the former was altogether too evident. "It is apparent," he concluded, "that we civilians can get no further with the matter; it is now time for the military to have its say."[39] Did he mean that military experts should be consulted, or that force would now be employed?

[37] That opinion was general among many critics of Soviet policy. See, for example, Rütger Essen, *Den Ryska Ekvationen*, Stockholm, 1940, p. 185.

[38] Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 84. [39] Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 93.

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Hope was revived on the morrow when the delegates were again called to the Kremlin. This time Stalin was present and assumed the burden of the conversation. As on previous occasions, he called to mind the various manifestations of Soviet friendship for Finland, and assured his auditors that the lease of Hanko would obviate future unpleasantness. Then he inquired suddenly if the Finnish government would, alternatively, be willing to turn over a number of small islands just east of Hanko. "Do you need these islands?" he queried.[40] Here, finally, was an intimation that the insistence upon Hanko might be abandoned, and it opened up the possibility of a compromise which some Finns—including Mannerheim and Paasikivi—had felt might be tolerable. The Finnish delegates had the feeling that Stalin was personally anxious to find an acceptable settlement. They promised to consult their government immediately, and that night they wired a request for permission to offer the Russians a slightly enlarged area on the Karelian Isthmus, as well as the island of Jussarö to the east of Hanko in lieu of that peninsula.

On November 7 the Finnish cabinet, with President Kallio and party leaders present, debated the new proposals. Seemingly they interpreted Stalin's exploratory question as a sign of Soviet weariness and resignation. New instructions forbade the delegates even to discuss the cession of any new islands in the Gulf, and only if the demand for Hanko were dropped entirely could they give a slight territorial concession on the Karelian Isthmus. In a supplementary note Erkko advised the delegates, "If agreement cannot be achieved on the proposed terms, you had better break off the negotiations."[41]

Thus, when the Finns met with Stalin and Molotov for the last time on November 9, they had nothing new to offer, and they could not comment on other alternatives hinted at by Stalin. This final conference lasted hardly more than an hour. All parties now realized that a real deadlock was at hand. Paasi-

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 94.

[41] Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 103; Tanner is the only available source for the Helsinki conversations and communiqués of November 7-8.

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kivi and Tanner delayed their departure for several days, but an almost total silence from the Kremlin made it clear that the Soviet leaders had said the last word. If more was to be accomplished the initiative would have to come from the Finns. This situation lasted until November 13, when word came from Helsinki advising the envoys to return home. They left Moscow that night and arrived in Helsinki on the morning of the 15th. The mission to Moscow had now come to an end.

The next two weeks provided a contrast in the tale of two cities. Up to this time the Soviet press had exercised considerable restraint, but that policy was now abandoned. Anti-Finnish statements—in marked contrast to the moderation of Stalin, and even of Molotov—became a daily feature. The technique was employed of portraying leading Finnish statesmen as both anti-Russian and anti-Soviet. Foreign Minister Erkko was described as an impudent politician who reflected his disdain for the USSR by referring to it always as "Russia," or, "the country with which we are conducting negotiations."[42] One bitter article condemned the aristocratic clique in Helsinki who still persisted in referring to Leningrad as "St. Petersburg."[43] *Pravda* complained about the perpetuation of a myth in Finnish schools; to wit, the thesis that "Finland became independent only as a consequence of war against Russia."[44] This myth had then been transformed into an arrogant assertion that Finland was a barrier to the barbarism of the East—a claim bolstered by generous support from unnamed Western powers. Every effort was made to establish the idea that reactionary Finnish leaders, bolstered by malefactors of the West, were frustrating the conclusion of a just and amicable settlement of outstanding issues. Moscow, and hence the whole of the USSR, seemed to be preparing for some new crisis. But of what kind?

Helsinki, meanwhile, had begun to relax after the nerve-straining weeks of negotiation. The various party groups, as well as the cabinet, gave Paasikivi and Tanner a vote of confidence after they had made their reports and there was a general feeling

[42] *Izvestia*, November 14, 1939.
[43] *Ibid.*, November 29, 1939.
[44] *Pravda*, November 16, 1939.

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of optimism that Finnish firmness had hamstrung Soviet action. In a meeting of a few cabinet members on November 20, Erkko went so far as to say that though he felt that Russia wanted to regain her 1914 frontiers, she would not attack. Then he went on to say, "It would therefore be to our advantage, diplomatically and economically, to release about one half of the mobilized troops."[45] This was suggested in the face of the fact that the Finnish embassy in Moscow was flooded with reports of Soviet troop movements toward the frontier.[46] Mannerheim became so alarmed about the prevailing optimism and the consequent lack of attention to defense preparations that he stated he could no longer assume responsibility for what might ensue. In a letter of November 27, he addressed himself personally to President Kallio with an indictment of the self-satisfied, bureaucratic, torpid manner in which the government had handled military requests. "Even today," he wrote, "the most urgent matters concerning defense are being handled in routine fashion as though we lived in normal times."[47] Nothing, however, seemed to disturb the lethargy which prevailed—nothing, that is, until alarming news arrived from Minister Yrjö-Koskinen in Moscow late on the night of November 26.

On the afternoon of that same day, Molotov had sent a note to Yrjö-Koskinen charging that Finnish artillery on the frontier near Mainila had fired upon bivouacked Soviet troops, killing three soldiers and one non-commissioned officer, and wounding nine others.[48] He stated that he had earlier warned the Finnish envoys, Paasikivi and Tanner, of the danger from the concentration of Finnish troops on the border. This troop concentration now ". . . not only constitutes a menace to Leningrad, but is, in fact, an act hostile to the USSR which has already resulted in aggression against the Soviet troops and caused casualties."[49] To avoid such "provocative acts" in the future, the Soviet gov-

[45] From Defense Minister Niukkanen's notes of the meeting, *Försvarsminister under Vinterkriget*, p. 96.

[46] Source as given in note 8 above. This source also intimates that only the English minister, Snow, had any real fears of imminent hostilities.

[47] Mannerheim, *op.cit.*, II, pp. 112-14.

[48] *Finnish Blue Book*, pp. 70-71.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

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ernment proposed that Finnish troops on the isthmus be withdrawn twenty to twenty-five kilometers.

Upon receipt of this message from Moscow the Finnish government launched an immediate investigation. Yrjö-Koskinen was provided with a reply, which was handed to Molotov on the following day.[50] On the basis of border observations which were made—and logged—at the time, the note stated that shots had indeed been fired, but on the Soviet side of the frontier. It went on to say that the shots had been fired from a distance of 1½-2 kilometers, and came from a direction southeast of Mainila. "In consequence . . . Finland has committed no hostile act against the USSR such as you allege to have taken place."[51] For that reason the Finns could not accede to the withdrawal of their troops, although they would be willing to discuss the eventual withdrawal of both Finnish and Russian soldiers from the frontier. It was further proposed that a joint committee of inquiry be appointed to study and report on the "incident."

Molotov's response to this note was a mixture of calumny and shrewd sense.[52] The Finnish reply reflected, he said, ". . . the deep-rooted hostility of the Finnish government toward the USSR"; and he went on to say that Finland's refusal to withdraw the border troops ". . . reveals clearly the hostile desire of the Finnish government to expose Leningrad to danger."[53] A withdrawal of Soviet troops, he suggested pointedly, would put them in the suburbs of Leningrad. That would be an absurd way to provide security for this teeming Soviet metropolis. Obviously the Finns did not intend to abide by the existing treaty of nonaggression—in fact, the violation was already an accomplished fact. Hence the government of the USSR would have to consider this pact as null and void.

On the following day, the 29th, the crisis deepened as Soviet

[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 71-73.

[51] Mannerheim, *op.cit.*, II, p. 115, states that he had been assured a month earlier by General Nenonen that no Finnish batteries had been so placed that they could shoot over the frontier.

[52] See his note in *Finnish Blue Book*, pp. 73-74.

[53] An indication of the confidence with which the Soviet government played this game is that *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, on November 29, printed both the Finnish note and Molotov's reply in full on the front page.

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newspapers and other propaganda media attacked the Finns for continued border provocations. Late that night Yrjö-Koskinen was called to an urgent conference with Potemkin, who handed him a note from Molotov curtly stating that the continued border violations by the Finns had forced the Soviet government to recall her political and economic representatives from Finland. Just at that moment, Potemkin's secretary came in and announced that the Finnish legation wished to talk to Yrjö-Koskinen. A summary of the new note from Helsinki was given to him over the telephone. It included an offer to submit current disputes to a conciliation commission and to withdraw the bulk of Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus ". . . to such a distance from Leningrad that it can no longer be claimed that they threaten the security of that city."[54] Despite the Soviet renunciation of the non-aggression pact, and despite the termination of diplomatic relations of which he had just been informed, the Finnish minister asked Potemkin to arrange an audience with Molotov. He left the Kremlin with the promise that he would be contacted by telephone. When no word had arrived by one o'clock in the morning, he sent the last Finnish note by special messenger. A few hours later Red army troops crossed the frontier in several places. War was now a reality.[55]

The evidence now available supports the conclusion that the Soviet government, in her relations with Finland, was primarily motivated by long-range calculations of security.[56] In this connection, it is important to recall that the proposals made by the Soviet government in October 1939 were essentially the same as those presented to the Finns months earlier. At that time they were clearly prompted by fear of Nazi intentions. There seems no reason to assume that the motivation had been altered by the pact of neutrality with Germany in August 1939, although the

[54] *Finnish Blue Book*, p. 76.

[55] Some of the information in this paragraph comes from the source indicated in note 8 above.

[56] Paasikivi reported, after his final return from Moscow, "It is my belief that Russia's interest in Finland has always been of a strategic nature, and that other considerations . . . have never been of any significance." Source as indicated in note 8 above.

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pact had given the Kremlin greater latitude in dealing with the Finns. The preposterous Soviet claim that it was the American and British governments which provoked "Finnish reactionaries" to attack the USSR as an initial step in converting the European war into a crusade against the land of socialism is a pathetic example of cold war propaganda.[57] On the other hand, the fact that the Soviet Union, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, recognized the Kuusinen regime as the "legitimate" government of Finland is far from conclusive evidence that it was the Soviet intention from the start to reincorporate Finland into the Russian patrimony. Obviously, a regime which could, in some desperation, perpetrate the "Mainila incident"[58] would not hesitate to utilize any political means to serve its purposes. But it does not follow from this that those purposes initially were the destruction of Finnish independence.

Perhaps the one opportunity for compromising the differences arose on November 4, when it seemed apparent that the Soviet government would have accepted Jussarö or Russarö in lieu of Hanko, and simultaneously have accepted a reduced area on the Karelian Isthmus. Paasikivi and Tanner regarded this concession as clear evidence that Stalin was anxious to settle the issue short of war. Erkko failed to view it in that light. He had allowed himself to be swayed by his own predilections and by prevailing public opinion, a public opinion that was of necessity emotional, largely uninformed, and in some quarters tainted by chauvinism.[59] The unenviable choice was between a humiliating concession or a possible conflict. Here was the real test of statesmanship. Despite the stern Soviet demands, it cannot be said that Erkko acted with the kind of prudence which small powers perforce must exercise when living under the shadow of a big neighbor.

[57] Cf. a recent work by "Candidate of Historical Science" I. F. Ivashin, *Nachalo vtoroy mirovoy voiny i vneshnaya politika SSSR*, Moscow, 1951, pp. 9-10. (The present writer is grateful to Professor Arvi Korhonen of Helsinki University for bringing this monograph to his attention.)

[58] Mannerheim, *op.cit.*, II, p. 115, states, "During the war of 1941-44 a number of prisoners were taken who described in detail how that clumsy provocation had been arranged."

[59] For some suggestive reflections on Finnish social psychology, cf. Frietsch, *op.cit.*, pp. 57-78.

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THE VULNERABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO ENEMY ATTACK*

By CARL KAYSEN

I. Introduction

WARS and rumors of wars are always with us. Today, and for the foreseeable future, they include the prospect of heavy enemy attack on the cities of the United States, a prospect which creates problems in public policy never before faced. It is the purpose of this article to sketch some lines of research which will be useful in understanding and dealing with these problems, and which are of a character that can be undertaken by academic social scientists and discussed in public.

We are concerned chiefly with attacks from the air using nuclear weapons—A and H bombs. While the near future, and perhaps even the present, holds the possibility of attacks by chemical and bacteriological weapons delivered by air and other means, we shall ignore these possibilities here. Our concern is with two questions: What methods are available for estimating the effects of attacks—in economic, political, and broad social terms? What measures can be taken to reduce these effects, and at what costs?

The effect of an air attack or campaign is a function of three sets of variables: the attacker's capabilities, the defender's countermeasures, and the nature of the "target." The enemy capabilities include the nature and number of weapons at his disposal, and the means of delivery available. Our countermeasures can be divided into those which can be put into effect before an attack, and those which come into play during and immediately after one. The first class can logically be viewed as alterations in the character of the target, and thus assimilated to

* The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments he received at a meeting of the Social Science Research Council's Military-Civil Relations Research Committee from W. T. R. Fox, Gordon A. Craig, John P. Miller, Harold Stein, Pendleton Herring, Bryce Wood, James Perkins, Harold Barnett, William Capron, and Ansley Coale. Of course, he and not they are responsible for what appears here.

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the nature of the target. The second class can be further divided into active defense—detection and shooting-down of enemy aircraft or missiles—and passive defense—sending people to shelters, fire-fighting, etc. The target can be characterized in terms of geography, vulnerability to physical damage by available weapons, and "value" in some economic, political, or social scheme.

It is clear that examination of enemy capabilities and our active defensive countermeasures are outside the scope of this article: they are largely problems of technology and military intelligence rather than of social science, and they involve matters which are classified and not open to public discussion. Passive defense measures, such as the provision of extra fire-fighting equipment or the organization of emergency hospitals, also raise questions which fall outside the scope of social science for the most part, although they do involve important problems of governmental organization which will be considered here. In the main, then, this article will be concerned with research on characteristics of the target, both as they are now, and as they might be in the future if subject to planned change.

II. Availability of Information

While much information in the sphere of US vulnerability is and probably will remain classified, this restriction need not impede academic research too severely. Information on enemy capabilities and on the effectiveness of our active defense will almost certainly continue to remain highly classified under any likely governmental policy in respect to security classification. Yet some general order-of-magnitude notions on the net delivery capabilities of an attacking force are necessary as a basis for analyzing US vulnerability. In part, this need can be met by an intelligent "guesstimation" process based on the public statements of officials; in part, it can be met by using a wide range of alternative assumptions as to enemy capabilities. More information would be desirable, but it is not a necessary prerequisite to useful work.

The state of public knowledge on the power and effects of

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various atomic weapons is much more satisfactory. Full descriptions of the power of the 20KT A-bomb are available in the Strategic Bombing Survey.[1] The National Security Resources Board and the Atomic Energy Commission have also published studies of the effects of atomic explosions.[2] Various statements by military and AEC officials make it clear that American weapons at least are presently several times more powerful than the types exploded over Japan. It appears safe to assume the same is true of the enemy's weapons. Well-known physical laws connect increases in nominal size (equivalent tons of TNT) of explosions with increases in the radius of blast damage, although this is not the case for fire damage and casualties. All this is less than enough information for use in a military planning study, but it can serve for the kind of research to which this discussion is addressed; more information, of course, would serve even better.

III. The Target Today

The first problem which needs study is the character of the United States as a target today. Excluding military installations, which for this purpose we take to be air bases, naval stations, army camps and forts, and the atomic energy production industry, we can say that there are at most two distinct types of targets which the Soviet Union could attack in the United States: cities and specified industrial installations. Cities contain within themselves several types of targets; or, put differently, the Soviets could attack American cities for different purposes: to cause casualties, to destroy housing, to destroy industrial capital in general, to disrupt centers of leadership and communication, to attack symbolic images of national power. To a crude first approximation, all these purposes coincide in an industrial society when air attack with nuclear weapons is used, since cities

[1] US Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, US Govt. Printing Office, 1946.

[2] National Security Resources Board, *Damage from Atomic Explosion and the Design of Protective Structures*, US Govt. Printing Office, 1950; and *Fire Effects of Bombing Attacks* (NSRB Doc. 132), US Govt. Printing Office, 1950. US Atomic Energy Commission, *The Effects of Atomic Weapons*, US Govt. Printing Office, 1950.

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are centers of population, of manufacturing, transportation, distribution, and many services, of government, of general social communication and organization. And while different combinations of these purposes may lead to the selection of different target lists of cities—given less than infinite capabilities—it is also crudely true that population size is a fair index of the relative importance of other city functions as well.

Neither the gross anatomy nor the functioning of American cities can be said to be well-explored subjects. Certain basic facts are known, or could be readily assembled. These include the distribution of population, industrial capital, housing, commercial and other business property, government offices, and so on among cities or metropolitan areas as these are defined in the Census. Population figures are of course already compiled; housing figures exist in city records and in the Census; industrial capital figures can be computed by applying capital coefficients[3] to Census of Manufactures figures of output; other business capital might prove more difficult to distribute among urban areas, but some estimates could be made on the basis of local tax rolls. All these figures, however, are totals, referring either to the area enclosed by a political boundary, or to a Census metropolitan area. What is further needed is an intensive analysis of the internal distribution of population, capital, and centers of communication and control within these areas.

To complete such a task for the 168 metropolitan areas with more than 50,000 inhabitants would be a large order. Perhaps a sample study which examined representative cities of various sizes and various geographic configurations—e.g., port cities and inland cities, compact cities and spread-out cities—is all that would be necessary. For each city studied, a basic tabulation or series of maps of population, housing, industrial capital, utilities and services, commercial building, and government centers in terms of, say, a quarter-mile grid could be made. Population, ideally, should be distributed by age, sex, and occupation; industrial capital by industry; commercial buildings by industry

[3] Capital per unit of output. See W. W. Leontief, *et al., Studies in the Structure of the American Economy*, New York, 1953, chs. 3, 6, and 7, Appendix 1 and Table a.

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or major function. From basic data of this type it would be a straight computation problem to estimate the impact of damage caused by weapons of different sizes exploding at different ground zeros. Questions on the "bonus" casualty effects of bombs aimed at major industrial targets in or near cities, or the capital destruction accompanying attacks aimed at maximum casualties, could readily be answered.

The physiology of American cities is even less well-studied than their anatomy. Regional and city planning studies have tended to concentrate on traffic problems, and information on the temporal pattern of traffic flow is available for many large American cities.[4] These studies are also important as a source of information on the temporal distribution of population. The pattern of movement of different occupational groups and of the labor forces of specific factories, office buildings, and commercial establishments must be established, as well as the aggregate flows. Individual firms sometimes have made such studies for their internal use, but published examples are rare. The spatial pattern of the flow of consumption goods and the location of stocks, the specific import-export patterns of inputs and outputs for industrial establishments, the flow of communication from the city to outside locations—all are aspects of the functioning of a city which would require systematic study in order to answer the question: What impact on a city would atomic attack be expected to have? Studies of this kind are useful for wider purposes than the analysis of our vulnerability to air attack. The whole area of urban planning and redevelopment, local government and finance also needs more material of this sort.[5]

The studies sketched above should be extended to consider the interrelatedness of different cities, as well as the functional relations of various parts of a particular city. Thus, for example, a study of New York should show not only how much of the inputs of each major industry come from and how much

[4] See, for example, G. W. Breese, *The Daytime Population of the Central Business District of Chicago*, Chicago, 1949.

[5] See, for example, Coleman Woodbury, ed., *The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment*, Chicago, 1953.

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of the outputs are consumed in New York, but also how much of each come from or go to other metropolitan centers as against the balance of the country. One of the major end-products of this type of study might be an input-output type table showing for, say, the fourteen metropolitan areas with populations over one million (1950), the other 164 metropolitan areas, and the rest of the country, the patterns of imports and exports by major industry groups.

Our discussion of the investigation of cities as targets has so far proceeded at the level of fundamental data collection. Important as this is, there are even more important conceptual problems which are largely unexplored. A city may be viewed simply as a collection of economic resources, and damage to it may be assessed in terms of destruction of resources—demolition of buildings and machinery, wounding and killing of workers. On this level, a fair amount of work by economists was done in World War II[6] and more work, most of it classified, is going on today in the Defense Department and under contract to it. But a city is also a social organization, or a series of social organizations with many complex interconnections: attack on a city may affect the functioning of the social organization in such a way that the normal relations between resources and economic activity no longer hold. Many past prophets of air warfare from General Giulio Douhet to Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris held the view that the social organization was indeed the target par excellence, and destruction of physical facilities was incidental to attacking the "morale" or "will to resist" of the enemy. The major lesson of strategic bombing in World War II —leaving aside Hiroshima and Nagasaki—was that these prophets had prophesied falsely. With the weights of attack and the types of weapons used in that conflict, social organization appeared not to suffer any but immediate shock damage, from which it quickly recovered. The effects of attacks were more or less proportional to the actual physical destruction they accomplished, especially destruction of industrial capital. However, with the weapons now available and in prospect, there is reason to believe

[6] See, especially, the publications of the US Strategic Bombing Survey.

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that this relation will no longer hold. In particular, the probable level of killed and wounded, both absolutely, and relative to damage to physical facilities, will be so high as to make likely new effects not hitherto observed. At present, there appears to be no conceptual framework for the analysis of damage to the functioning capacity of organizations resulting both from casualties among members and leaders and from damage to physical facilities on which they rely at all comparable in utility to the conceptual framework provided by economic theory for the analysis of the impact of damage to capital and labor force casualties on the stream of outputs. A major task for social science research in this area is the fashioning of a framework of analysis suitable to this task. This involves fundamental work in sociology, social psychology, and political behavior. Perhaps a useful introduction to the whole job could be provided by a survey of the present state of thought in these fields from the point of view of our particular problem of the vulnerability of social organization to air attack.

When we turn from cities to specific industrial installations as targets, we turn from an area in which information and conceptualization are both poor to one in which both are relatively good. The strategy of bombing specific industrial installations—sometimes called "vertical" bombing, as opposed to "horizontal" bombing, in which the target is capital in general—aims at depriving the economy of nearly all of some product or service which is essential to its war potential. Thus, for example, the steel industry might be selected as a target for vertical attack, since steel is basic both to munitions production and the creation of capacity to produce munitions. The characteristics of industries which determine their suitability as target systems for vertical attack are reasonably well understood, although little of this understanding is recorded in the form of publicly available documents.[7] The chief elements on which the target value

[7] The basic conceptions in this field were developed during World War II, chiefly in the Office of Strategic Services and the Board of Economic Warfare for the use of the Air Force. The concepts as such are not classified, and at least one public, though unpublished, account of them exists. This is the doctoral dissertation of Joseph D. Coker, "Economics of Strategic Target Selection," George Washington University, 1949.

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of an industry depends are: the direct and indirect use pattern in military production and civilian consumption, the possibilities of substitution of other products for the products of the industry in use, the possibilities of technical substitution of other facilities for the facilities of the target industry in producing its products, the level of inventories of the industry's products in the economy, the number of targets, and the physical vulnerability of the targets. To a first approximation, the difference between general capital bombing and the attack of specific industries can be put in economic terms as a difference in the price-system in terms of which capital is valued. For horizontal bombing, the aim is to maximize the value of capital destroyed when capital is valued in terms of prewar "normal" replacement costs. For vertical bombing, the aim is to maximize the value of capital destroyed when capital is valued according to the costs of reproducing it under wartime conditions in the post-attack situation. Thus a study of the target presented by specific industries begins as a study of what a future wartime economy would be.

The study of the future mobilized economy runs into many classification difficulties, and is probably inappropriate for academic research. But some elements of the problem do not present the same difficulties, and these should be studied. In particular, a group of industries which appear to be likely targets, or at least reasonable targets which are not now engaged mainly in military end-item production, and about which there is much public information, could be examined in some detail. A suggested list of such industries is steel, aluminum, oil refining, electric power, machine tools, and electrical machinery. For each of these, information on the distribution of outputs among plants for major products is more or less readily available in published sources. What most need further study are the substitution possibilities in both use and production, and the factors on which the rate of reconstruction after bomb damage would

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There is also some discussion of the problem in the SSRC-sponsored study by Ansley Coale, *The Problem of Reducing Vulnerability to Atomic Bombs*, Princeton, N.J., 1947, pp. 25-36, 102-4.

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depend. Investigation of possibilities for substitution in use of other products for the products of a target industry is partly a technical and partly an economic problem. In general, though not invariably, use substitution will lead to lowered efficiency in an economic sense. The problem is to devise some usable measure of the reduction in efficiency, and estimate its magnitude with respect to specific kinds of likely substitution for the major products of the sample target industries. The same things can be said for the possibilities of technical substitution—the production of particular outputs by alternative, second-best techniques, where attack has made the specialized facilities needed for the best techniques unavailable. In both these areas the conceptual frameworks of input-output analysis and linear-programing are particularly appropriate. Beginnings have already been made on the analysis of industries into sequences of processes, many of which are common to several industries.[8] These studies lead into a systematic analysis of "convertibility" of industries to the production of products which are normally produced in other industries. A natural extension of this type of analysis leads to an examination of second-best vs. best practice techniques, and makes possible some estimates of the losses of efficiency and, ultimately, the reductions in total output involved in such substitutions.

The study of industrial recuperability can also begin in terms of the conceptual framework of input-output analysis. The first problem which needs examination is how much of what kinds of outputs of what other industries are required per unit of capacity (for specified products) of the damaged industry. While, conceptually, the same kind of framework could be used to analyze labor requirements for repair or replacement per unit of capacity in occupational and skill terms, there has been as yet no systematic effort at empirical study comparable to the studies of capital coefficients by Leontief, *et al.*, cited above. A large field of investigation exists here. Moreover, since conversion of one labor technique into another—through upgrading,

[8] See Leontief, *et al.*, *op.cit.*, ch. 8 (Chenery) and ch. 10 (Grosse), and material cited there.

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dilution, training programs, etc.—is feasible on a huge scale and in fairly short periods of time, this study can take into account a wider range of alternate techniques than can a parallel study of capital coefficients.

Recuperation of an industry when it alone is under attack is a problem of a different order than recuperation in situations of widespread attack on many industries. Again, the input-output technique, and generalizations of it into linear programing techniques which take account of possible alternative production methods not actually in use, could be fruitfully applied to analysis of the variations in recuperative powers of particular industries with the extent of damage to other industries. Especially important might be the examination of industries reciprocally related so that important fractions of the outputs of each would be required to rebuild the other; simultaneous damage to such industries would be far more serious than the sum of the effects of separate damage to each. Widespread damage to industry could conceivably lead to important organizational effects: although general capacity to supply some product might exist in the economy, the breakdown in ties between particular suppliers and particular customers might be important in hindering transactions. This is especially so in capital goods industries where products are made to order. It may therefore be worthwhile to study, for one or more of the sample target industries, the actual character of customer-supplier relations in respect to capital inputs, with emphasis on the extent to which particular customers are or are not in contact with the whole range of potential suppliers, and vice versa. Such a study would be of general economic interest to students of industrial organization and market structure, and therefore may more readily be undertaken by academic economists.

IV. Changes in the Target Through Time

The research program suggested in the preceding section would lead to a fairly good picture of the United States as a target as of the current date. Some examination of major changes in

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this picture to be expected in the future is needed in addition. This should consist of two parts: first, a study of the forces making for change in the recent past, and a projection—to the extent possible—of the likely future effects of their continued operation; and, second, an examination of possible measures for influencing the direction and magnitude of future change. Each part would be further divided into consideration of metropolitan areas and specific industrial capital as targets.

For the metropolitan areas, the analysis of recent and probable future changes would examine both the general growth of large cities relative to the population as a whole, and the changes in the internal structure of large cities, as suburbs grow and centers decline. In particular, the growth of suburbs raises the question of the internal redistributions of population, housing, industrial and non-industrial capital that are taking place in the city, and the extent to which, relative to any given size of weapon, a process of dispersion is taking place.

Examination of trends in the target characteristics of the sample target industries would involve analysis of their rate of growth in capacity, the locational pattern of new capital, the size of distribution of increments to capacity, and the projection of these into the future. In this connection, it would be important to study past and present lower limits on the size of efficient units, and the character of recent and expected changes in technology as they have affected and may affect this minimum efficient size. On the basis of such studies, it may be possible to see to what extent new plants are constructed at larger sizes than the efficient minimum, and to inquire into the forces which are leading to this result.[9] Thus, for example, present blast-furnaces and rolling techniques probably make integrated steelworks and rolling mills of less than one million tons ingot capacity per annum uneconomical, and generally make non-integrated rolling mills uneconomical. Possible future developments in iron-ore reduction and the perfection of the continuous casting proc-

[9] The character of a long-run plant cost curve implied in these remarks is one which slopes down to some minimum level, after which it remains horizontal over a fairly wide size range. Such information as is available for the steel, oil refining, electric power, and rayon industries bears out this view of the shape of the cost curve.

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ess for blooms and billets may make disintegrated steelworks and rolling mills of half or even a third this size economical.[10]

In order for the studies sketched above to have a concrete form, they might well attempt projections of the future states of the sample metropolitan areas and the sample target industries to 1960 and 1968, assuming that forces presently discernible continue to operate. Thus the target would be pictured as of the present, and as of seven and fifteen years in the future, provided no special measures were undertaken to change its character in the interim.

The next problem is the consideration of what special measures might be undertaken to change the character of the target over the future. Several possible approaches to the set of problems presented by such planned change are possible. Some minimum change in the target as against what would otherwise be expected might be set down, and the costs of achieving that degree of change calculated. This technique could be extended to measure costs for several levels of prescribed change. Thus, for example, suppose the projections suggest that in 1960 an attack of a certain size with a certain set of weapons would cause fifteen million casualties. Then the costs of rearranging populations over the interim so that the same attack would cause only ten or only five million casualties could be computed. These costs might be small or large. Suppose, for example, the projections of expected city growth showed that concentration in cities is expected to increase over the interim 1953-1960, and that as a result the total cost per family of dwellings, utilities, local transport, police and fire protection, etc., is expected to rise. Then some measure which prevented this growth from taking place and instead put the increment of population in smaller towns outside metropolitan areas might actually result in negative costs of increasing dispersion in resource outlay terms, although at the cost of restricting the freedom of householders in choosing their place of residence. Of course, the op-

[10] See Celler Committee *Hearings* (Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power, House Judiciary Committee, 81st Congress, 2nd Session), Serial 14, Pt. 4a, pp. 413-18, 750-53.

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posite might also be true, and local utilities, transportation, local government services, etc., may be provided more cheaply per dwelling unit in large cities, even over a range of substantial increase in their sizes and population densities, than these services would be provided in smaller towns. In that case, of course, relocation would involve large positive resource costs as well as the restriction of householders' freedom of choice.

Applied to a specific industrial target, this technique would lead to answering questions of the type: If an attack of N-bombs of specified type could, in 1960, destroy 65 per cent of the capacity in the industry, what would the cost over the period 1953-1960 be of achieving such changes that the same attack would destroy only 35 per cent of the industry's capacity? This might involve questions of costs of unfavorable locations, costs of less than optimum-size plants, and costs of building more capacity than would otherwise be built.

A more general approach to the same goal might inquire into alternative methods for changing the vulnerability of the target, and construct cost schedules for applying each method. The methods which might be examined are many: increasing active defense, moving plants underground—either literally or by building new plants—building many shelters combined with an efficient early warning system, dispersing industrial capital in general or the capital of specific industries, dispersing population, stockpiling industrial materials and finished goods, including finished armaments, in dispersed and invulnerable locations. Many of these are outside the limitations of technique and classification set in this paper: this is especially true of those involving active defense, early warning, underground construction. Therefore, in what follows, only dispersal and stockpiling are considered.

Building up a cost schedule for achieving various amounts of dispersal of population, industrial capital in general, or specific industrial capital starts from the projections of growth already discussed. To make the next step requires consideration of the techniques which will be used to achieve dispersal. One possible technique is that of direct controls, presumably imposed at the

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federal level under the national defense powers of Congress. Thus, it could be supposed that no new residential building in any present metropolitan area would be allowed and some radius around present metropolitan areas would also be proscribed. On this basis, some estimate of the amount of doubling-up in the proscribed areas which would be likely, and of the consequent demand for new buildings outside them, could be calculated. A further step would involve estimating the costs of rehousing 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 per cent of the present metropolitan residents outside the banned areas. All these calculations could be put together to show a cost schedule for changing population density in large cities over the next ten or fifteen years by decree. While this technique, especially when applied to population, is fanciful and quite unlikely to be practicable or politically feasible, the calculations might have some interest. And, in particular, a small part of such a program, which would involve the non-rebuilding of metropolitan blighted areas after slum clearance, might be realistically worth considering.

A more promising technique for achieving dispersal of both population and industrial damage might be some kind of scheme of war damage insurance with premiums adjusted to risks.[11] If this scheme were compulsory, and the social valuation put on the risks high, so that the premiums were a not insignificant cost item to the factory owner, the real estate owner, and the real estate developer, it would have, over the long period, a significant effect in moving industry and population away from high-risk areas. The premium rates on any specific installation would reflect both the average risk of the area in which it is, depending on the density of population and capital within that area and the specific character of the capital in the area, and the extra contribution to the risk of the area made by the specific installation. Thus a war-important plant locating in metropolitan New York would pay a high premium not only because of the character of its surroundings, but also because of the added risk to

[11] See J. Hirshleifer, "War Damage Insurance," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XXXV (May 1953). The proposal summarized here corresponds substantially to Hirshleifer's, but differs in that a compulsory program is suggested where Hirshleifer expresses himself in favor of a voluntary one.

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these surroundings created by the presence of the new plant. In some areas, either no or very small premiums would be charged. Premium differentials would also reflect differences in physical vulnerability of structures, the existence or non-existence of special precautionary measures in construction, in stocking of spare parts, in providing personnel shelters, and so forth.

Two sets of problems needing much study are raised by the potential use of this technique: the efficient design of a system of insurance, including the methods of finance involved and the methods of calculating premiums;[12] and the likely effects of putting such a system in operation over a period of ten or fifteen years. The second of these depends on the first, since some schedule of premium differentials must be used to make an analysis of locational impacts. Of course, part of the effect of the system would lie in its educational character, since it would make real for businessmen and others making locational decisions the threat of enemy air attack, which today is often unreal in the context of practical decisions. The examination of effects of different premium levels could lead to the construction of a dispersal cost schedule similar to the cost schedule discussed above for moving population by order.

There may be some industries of sufficient potential target importance to make reliance on the cumulative effect of an insurance scheme risky because of the slowness with which it works. Perhaps steel and aluminum are both examples of such industries. For them, more direct methods of vulnerability reduction may be necessary. One such direct method which deserves examination in some detail is the combination of a stockpiling program with a program of constructing new dispersed production capacity. In both these industries, a large proportion of the output consists of relatively standardized products, which are in turn consumed by fabricators who produce much more specialized products. Frequently, although not universally, the fabricating industries are much less vulnerable to air attack than

[12] Hirshleifer, *op.cit.*, says something about both of these problems. His discussion of finance is a good beginning, but more can be said. His suggestion of using fire insurance premiums as a beginning for the war damage premiums seems inadequate, and more thought on this point is needed.

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these two primary producing industries. This is so because they have larger numbers of producers, relatively less capital, intensive techniques, and use more unspecialized equipment which is present in a large number of firms in the economy. Therefore, one way of reducing the impact of potential damage to steel and aluminum producers is to build up a stockpile of their outputs which could be used in time of war when producing plants were damaged, because the further fabricators would be much less damaged, in all likelihood. This stockpile would have to be purchased by the government, as a defense expenditure. Under appropriate arrangements, with a long enough purchase contract, the stockpile program could also lead to the building of more steel and aluminum capacity to fill government orders. The purchase agreement could so restrict the location and size of these plants as to secure the optimum contribution to further dispersal of steel and aluminum capacity. A cost study of such a program, for various stockpile sizes and rates of accumulation, would be the necessary basis for examining such a program. This study could examine government experience in World War II and since in setting up and administering programs of a similar nature.

In every case discussed above in which attempts to change the characteristics of the target over time were examined, the ultimate aim of the analysis would be the construction of some kind of cost schedule. This would show the costs of achieving various amounts of change over various time periods; and thus would summarize and bring together all the particular information on specific aspects of the target: population, city functioning, industrial vulnerability, and so on. For purely economic measures designed to bring about change, costs would be chiefly economic costs, in terms of some dollar measure. But for many measures which would have to be examined, non-dollar costs in terms of increased centralized control, or increased restrictions on particular kinds of decisions which are now "free," would also be important. While such costs are not measurable in any dollar sense, they are susceptible of arrangement in rank order of intensity; e.g., measures requiring the least increase in federal

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relative to local governmental powers, to measures requiring the greatest such increase; measures imposing the least restriction on the freedom of the householder to choose his residence location, to measures imposing the greatest such restriction, and so on. These political and social costs cannot, it is true, be measured in a single dimension, as all economic costs can, at least conceptually. But even so, some orderly array of such costs with respect to each particular relevant dimension can be used as an analogue to the economists' cost schedule.

V. The Effects of Air Attack

On the basis of the studies proposed in sections III and IV, it should, in theory, be possible to analyze the effects of a given air attack—given in terms of number and characteristics of weapons and their distributions on US targets. Such studies are important; in particular, the estimate of some "critical size" attack is a subject which has attracted much discussion. But, on the whole, given the studies assumed above, the important difficulties in an analysis of effects would center on the items outside the scope of academic social scientists—the probable kind of targets, the size, number, and characteristics of enemy weapons, their delivery capabilities, etc. While it would be possible to assume values for these variables, the reliability of an analysis based on such assumed values as are likely to be available in unclassified discussion is probably low. Nonetheless, a synthesis of studies outlined above might in this way have high educational value in political discussion, and might therefore be worth while.

One aspect of the problem of the "critical size" attack which is of great importance and which lies squarely within the scope of this proposed research program has not been considered above. This is the minimum level of output which would be required in a war situation for the sustenance of the civilian population. The most important economic defense against air attack is the defense of a large national output which can suffer a sharp reduction without impairing the ability of the nation either to sustain itself or to maintain its fighting forces. A good study of the per

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capita requirements for minimum civilian consumption, and the industrial output required to sustain it, would be a major contribution in this area. Such a study could examine historical experience to show to what levels other nations under pressure were able to reduce consumption standards, as well as investigate the American consumer budget directly for items which could be considered luxuries in time of war. This would involve such things as examination of the rate of turnover of stocks of consumer durable goods under peacetime conditions, and the possible reductions therein under wartime conditions; examination of the growing processing element in American food consumption, and the degree to which this might be reduced, and so forth. Thus a thorough study of minimum civilian requirements would consider not only the consumer budget and how it could be changed, but the resources used at intermediate stages in producing that budget and what scope for economies there were at that level.

VI. The Administration of Passive Defense

In addition to altering the target that we present before enemy attack takes place, we can reduce our vulnerability to air attack by various passive defense measures which are put into effect during and immediately after actual attacks. As indicated above, the examination of actual measures is not a task for social scientists, but rather for engineers, doctors, fire experts, and other technical specialists. But the use of all these measures raises a common problem which social scientists should study—the problem of the finance and administration of civil defense in our federal system. At present, the chief responsibility rests on the states and cities, and the Federal Office of Civil Defense is without effective power. Some analysis of both the political factors underlying this situation and its probable consequences is important. This is a field in which little has been done.[13] The

[13] One study which has come to the author's attention is Robert Marden, "The Organizational and Operational Principles of Civil Defense," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard College Library, 1952. There is a Civil Defense Research Association, Inc., in New York City, a private organization which acts as a clearing house for information on the organization and techniques of civil defense.

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study of the problems of organizing and financing civil defense ties into the general study of the financial problems of large American cities and the federal-state-city relationships connected with these problems. Some political science study in this general area which is focused on the specific problems of civil defense is needed. Since Great Britain has had previous significant experience in the organization of civil defense, and now faces problems equally as grave as those facing the United States, a comparative study of British governmental organization and policy in this area appears especially useful.

A particular problem of politics and administration which deserves study is the problem of total evacuation of our large cities. A very large enemy capability could create a situation in which total or near-total evacuation of major urban areas would be the optimum short-run response in the event of war. Such a strategy would be possible only if it had been thoroughly prepared beforehand. The possibility of such preparation requires considerable study. In particular, we would have to ask these questions: Is such preparation possible without a drastic increase in the powers of the federal government, and their extension to areas in which that government now operates but little? And would such preparation for evacuation be either feasible or desirable, politically, so long as a reasonable hope of peace remained?

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THE UNITED NATIONS IN A DISUNITED WORLD

By KENNETH H. DAWSON

I. Diagnosis

EXAMINING the literature relating to the United Nations Organization is, in a way, like reading a doctor's case-book on a remarkably sick patient. There are references to serious pathological disorders, to teething troubles, and so on, and a number of remedies are recommended, ranging from a major surgical operation such as removing the "veto" to aids such as "sticking teeth" into the Charter. The analogy is useful if it impels us to make an accurate diagnosis. But much of the advice of interpreters of the UN is of a contradictory character, and one is led to suspect that it is based on a serious misapprehension of what the UN is really capable of doing. This contradictory advice may be reduced to one of two distinct arguments. The first regards the indispensability of the UN as varying in inverse proportion to its failings and, hence, contends that it should be given further wholehearted support. The second holds that the UN's failings are proof of its inherent deficiencies and therefore argues for its final abandonment. Perhaps we sympathize from time to time with both points of view; and if we do, it is a measure of the confusion in our minds that we should insist on the perpetuation of the organization and yet ask at the same time whether it is, after all, worth keeping alive.[1]

The problem is not new. It was one of the dilemmas of supporters of the League of Nations. There is a very common tendency nowadays to attribute the failure of the League to some defect in the original machinery rather than to a lack of adequate support from its members. Indeed, it is a means of salving the consciences of those who did not give the organization adequate support; and the "debunking" of the whole League machinery

[1] Sir Alexander Cadogan, "Is the United Nations Worth Keeping Alive?", *Sunday Times*, October 22, 1950, p. 4.

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was one of the ways by which the idea of having a new international organization was "sold" to the peoples of the world, particularly to those in the United States.[2] The shoe now appears to be on the other foot. Having achieved what was believed to be a more perfect organization derived from the "lessons" of the past, we are apt to attribute its shortcomings to deliberate devilment on the part of one or more of its participants. We might sleep more soundly if both Russia and China were buried under the deepest ocean from this very night; but what would happen then to that fine show of unanimity between the countries of the Western Hemisphere, all that cooperation induced by the threat of immediate danger? Can we be sure that the terms of our predicament would not merely be transferred by a regrouping of the remaining states? To be sure, the predicament could not be worse, and it might be much less severe. But if we entertain the possibility of its continuance, a much more penetrating analysis is called for than commentators are prepared to give, on why the UN has to deal with a world that is rent from top to bottom.

The problem could be tackled in all sorts of ways. One could take each Article of the Charter in turn and assess its relevance in a disunited world. Or one could give a résumé of events since 1945 and criticize the various ways in which the UN attempted to come to grips with them. The result would be interesting and valuable. The present article is an essay in ideas which does not aspire to completeness. It is a kind of perambulation of the critical faculties across the enormous field covered by the UN, stopping to consider certain anomalous situations and to ask certain questions. It is above all an exercise in the imagination, in the belief that imagination is nine-tenths of statesmanship.

What is the UN and what is it meant to do? It is necessary to ask this question since there is at the present time a widespread reaction from the exaggerated hopes of 1945 that denies the UN a chance to fulfill the high purposes for which it was created. The UN is not an international government—as many people

[2] See Leland M. Goodrich, "From League of Nations to United Nations," *International Organization*, 1 (February 1947), pp. 3-4.

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seem to suppose—nor was it devised to work miracles. It is an association of sovereign states bound together by mutual promises to mitigate the inconveniences of not having an international government. The major inconveniences are insecurity and war; and the Charter seeks to dispel them by entrusting the preservation of peace and security to a Council whose permanent members are the five most powerful of the Allies that were united in overthrowing mutual enemies between 1940 and 1945. Once victory was assured, the common vital interest which had bound the Allied Coalition vanished. It was not to be expected that this unanimity would persist in its existing form. That is precisely why the UN was created. Were there perpetual unity, the need for it would not arise. What, then, was to be the basis of the new relationship? The peoples of the world and, through them, their governments were sufficiently united in mutual horror of war to make a universal declaration of loyalty to a Charter in which the right of a state to go to war was virtually abrogated. It was hoped that this universal moral purpose would provide a sturdy foundation for the young organization, whatever else might fail. Despite the tragic character of this age, with its worldwide insecurities and efforts to forge armaments and alliances, there is no evidence to show that this revulsion of feeling against war has in any way abated. Even the main protagonists of the "cold" war rule out a "hot" world war as a rational means of settling their differences (as opposed to the Fascist view, which glorified war). Therein lies the greatest potential strength of the UN and its hold on men's loyalties.

It is necessary, however, to distinguish between the loyalty of a government to the UN and the loyalty of the ordinary citizen. The latter tends to idealize and emphasize the peace-preserving functions of the UN to the exclusion of other considerations. His loyalty is an unsophisticated sentiment. The loyalty of a government, however, is a diplomatic orientation decided upon the basis of a particular scale of priorities—upon its foreign policy, in other words. By a foreign policy is meant a program designed to achieve the best possible position for a state. By a disunited world is meant a world of sovereign states pursuing foreign poli-

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cies that may be mutually conflicting. It is not enough to say that the aim of a foreign policy is peace. Such was the aim of many Englishmen in 1914 and in 1939, but England deliberately went to war to forestall the threat to certain interests and values implicit in the expansion of a potential enemy. Since practically everyone, upon serious reflection, cherishes certain values more highly than peace, it is inadequate to say that the aim of the UN is peace (this may be a basic defect of the whole organization). It has a program designed to safeguard security, life, liberty, independence, religious freedom, human rights, and justice.[3] And the mechanism of collective security deliberately envisages the possibility of war and of employing the forces of the nations against what is technically termed the "aggressor."

Yet all governments identify themselves with the universal emotion in favor of peace; they protest that peace lies at the very core of the Charter and insist that they support the Charter to the limit. The natural inference for the ordinary citizen is that peace is the be-all and end-all of the UN. This makes people more disappointed with the UN than they should be. So long as well-intentioned politicians make extravagant claims for what the UN is supposed to do, the UN will never receive any appreciation of its difficulties or full support from the peoples of the world.

So it is unfortunate that when the UN was created there was an overemphasis on "peace" and a lack of serious consideration of those conditions under which peace was to operate. It was in part a reaction from the days of the League, when the tying-together of the Covenant and the subsequent peace treaties was felt to be a fundamental error. This lack of consideration did mean that the Charter which emerged at San Francisco meant all things to all men. The Soviet Union looked upon the UN primarily as an organization through which the victorious Great Powers could impose their will on the rest of the world, and not as an instrument that might be turned against itself. The United Kingdom and the United States were not unmindful of the necessity of conferring privileges on those whose power would be

[3] United Nations Declaration, Washington, D.C., January 1, 1942.

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needed to make the organization a success. In fact, the protection which members of the Security Council were presumed to offer to the smaller members of the organization was to reconcile these latter to its hierarchial structure. But, in addition—and this was chiefly due to the insistence of the United States—a faith, an ideological content we would probably now say, was grafted onto the Charter direct from the American Constitution, and a wide field of endeavor was to be opened up by the establishment of a number of specialized agencies. The Soviet Union was very little interested in a program of action along these lines, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that she was persuaded to accept the American proposals. The result was that the eventual Charter meant one thing to the United States, and something entirely different to the Soviet Union. The short history of the UN security system is a melancholy illustration of this fact.

II. The Pathology of Collective Security

To what extent may the policies of the Soviet Union and those of the Western Powers be said to conflict? Upon the answer to this question will hinge our conclusion as to the role which the collective security system of the UN can be expected to play.[4] The policies of the Soviet Union are characteristically described as an "enigma," but it is a fact that of all states her policies have been the most openly proclaimed and the most consistently adhered to. Lenin and his heirs tell us that the aim of the Soviet Union is peace: but peace is compatible only with a world united by the bonds of Communism. Hence Soviet policy must aim at maintaining "friendly" governments in the countries on her borders and in extending areas of Communism. The aim of the Western Powers is peace: only in an atmosphere of peace can the freedom and independence of small nations be realized. But must they not repel Communist attempts to encroach upon areas of freedom? This is the core of their dilemma, and it is compli-

[4] The term "collective security" is used throughout to mean that system of universal sanctions envisaged by the League and the UN which requires every member to join collectively and automatically against *any* aggressor *anywhere* in the world, on the principle that limited security arrangements such as pacts or alliances are a cause of anarchy rather than an answer to it.

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cated for them by the fact that Soviet policy can occasionally secure the extension of areas of Communism not by the traditional means of sending armies across frontiers, but by *coups d'état* organized within the capital city of a state. The Charter gives no ruling on the action to be taken in such an event.

However, the dilemma was already acute enough for the Western Powers when, at the end of the late war, Russian troops straddled an axis extending from the Elbe to the Yellow Sea. The whole object of the war—and it was somehow forgotten in the hour of victory—had been to prevent one Great Power from dominating Europe. Much of the criticism of Allied policy centers on the fact that Russia should never have been allowed to advance so far westward, but how she could have been stopped, short of the West making a separate peace with Germany, is uncertain. The dilemma might well have been just the same in 1919, had it not been for the fortunate fact of a Russian revolution which temporarily put Russia out of the running as a Great Power. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 a similar problem arose—and was met by invoking the aid of the Power against which the Allied coalition had been directed, namely, France. With this threat, Russia was obliged to give up any designs she might have had on Central Europe. In other words, the essential factor in the situation which has hitherto prevented Russia from dominating the continent has been the existence of a continental power outside the orbit of the potential menace, ready to provide the base of resistance and the stone of attrition. But today France can no longer play such a role. Germany is already half in Russian hands. And Britain is too weak to be a real counterweight to Russia. There is no longer, in fact, a "balance" in Europe. The United States is the only Power left in the world that can take on the Soviet Union with any prospect of success.

A few remarks on the so-called "balance of power" may be apposite here since the expression is used in so many contexts to mean so many different things.[5] It is used here to describe a general equilibrium which comes into play when there exists a con-

[5] For an analysis of the different meanings of "balance of power," see Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power," *World Politics*, v (July 1953), pp. 442-77.

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stellation of independent states, more or less comparable in power. Examples of such constellations are the city-states of Italy up to the time of Machiavelli, and the nation-states of Europe up to the end of the nineteenth century. The balance operates in this way: any state which threatens to increase its power above the prevailing average becomes subject, almost automatically, to pressure from all the other states within the same constellation. States change partners as their interests shift—as in quadrille. The balance can only operate in terms of a particular constellation of states which are more or less comparable in power. If a new and more powerful state forces its way into the constellation, the latter collapses like a house of cards. The constellation of Italian cities, for instance, was knocked sideways by the French invasion of 1494 and by the emergence of what seemed to be "Super Powers," such as Spain and Turkey. Visible evidence of the ending of the European constellation came in World War I when troops from the New World came to aid the Old. Thus, to invert a famous phrase, Europeans have had to call the New World into being not to "redress" but to "upset" the balance of the Old.[6]

It may be asked, "What has all this got to do with the United Nations?" The point is that with the disappearance of a viable European constellation of states, one of the fundamental assumptions of collective security has fallen to the ground. Although collective security is usually regarded as being contrary to balance of power principles, it is, in reality, based upon the assumption of a constantly shifting configuration of friction and cooperation between a number of Great Powers of comparable strength. Such a multiple power pattern, by means of its unpredictable alignments, ensures that any Great Power that attempts to upset this pattern is faced by a superior coalition and deterred or defeated accordingly. The fact, for instance, that Europe was no longer mistress of the Asiatic continent was quietly overlooked by League enthusiasts who wanted the European members of the League to apply sanctions against Japan in the early 1930's. The

[6] Canning: "I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old" (December 12, 1826). See H. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning*, London, 1925.

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UN attempted to overcome this defect by including within its organization a much greater number of non-European Powers. Unfortunately, the UN still does not comprise a multiple constellation. There are only two "heavyweights" left: the US and the USSR. Either, therefore, could commit an act of aggression without inevitably being completely overwhelmed by a superior coalition.

Once the problem is posed in these terms, it becomes evident that "collective security" is really a misnomer for any military action that happens to be taken in the name of the UN today.

The "collective" action taken by the majority group of the UN in Korea is generally instanced as a vindication of the principle of collective security. It showed how fifty-three nations, divided on many political and ideological issues, could be united in a condemnation of aggression. Twenty-six nations offered aid of some sort; and sixteen of these actually dispatched troops to Korea. For those with long memories of Manchukuo or Abyssinia, the really great achievement was that collective action was taken at all. It seemed to demonstrate the great progress that an idea like collective security can make and the great impact that it can produce on the conduct of nations. The old idea of competing national interests was being replaced by a universal moral principle whereby each nation put the prevention of aggression at the very pinnacle of the scale of national priorities, on the assumption that the prevention of aggression is a collective responsibility and that the only true security is collective security. The achievement in Korea is all the more remarkable in that the severest challenges to collective security are apt to arise in the very places where they stand the maximum degree of success, i.e., in those "borderline" areas which are not easily accessible to the forces of other nations and which do not ordinarily justify the dispatch of vast armies at enormous cost and difficulty. The Powers that choose to intervene in the name of collective security do so with only a very problematical chance of success. Furthermore, success will bring no clear-cut national advantage, while failure will be sure to involve a loss of national prestige.

Nevertheless, we ought to examine the situation more closely,

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if only to show how many factors that may not recur contributed to its success in this particular instance. Let us put a hypothetical question. Supposing that South, and not North, Korea had been responsible for the aggression, and that the South Koreans had chased the North Koreans up to the Chinese border, would the United States and her Western friends have gone to all the trouble of landing in Korea and pushing them back again? If our answer is in the negative, then this leads us to suspect that a fundamental difficulty of collective security is that powerful states will not commit themselves to a universal and automatic obligation in the name of an abstract principle under unknown circumstances. The importance of this was seen in the League of Nations when the American Senate refused to allow the United States to join on the grounds that she was being called upon to take up commitments which she could not reasonably meet. The essential principle of a foreign policy may be described as a process of bringing the nation's commitments and the nation's power into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve. If collective security means anything, it means universal as opposed to limited commitments, because every state which signs the UN Charter promises to help meet aggression *anywhere,* not just where its national interest, narrowly conceived, may happen to lie. It involves asking the most powerful states, i.e., those which have been most successful in the "game" of the balance of power, to forego concrete advantages for a "twilight" system in which one state assumes that collective security exists and another counts on taking advantage of the fact that it does not. The most powerful states, by definition, do not know the futility of a balance of power system. Hence none is willing to renounce the right to use its own power as it thinks fit unless it can count on 100 per cent effective collective protection from everyone else. A vicious circle operates.

Let us suppose that Communist China, in the hypothetical event of a South Korean attack, had been represented on the Security Council together with the Soviet Union. Then, it might be argued, the Western Powers would have abstained from repelling the South Koreans, and the task would have been jointly

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undertaken by China and the Soviet Union. We would thus arrive at the curious spectacle of the minority bloc in the UN championing the principles of the organization against the majority bloc. Those who support the principle of collective security to its logical conclusion could do no other than accept the consequences of this action. The difficulties of the Sino-Soviet armed force would begin to arise once it crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel. China and the Soviet Union would have to define their political aims in Korea and submit them to the UN for approval. If these aims envisaged the unification of Korea as a Communist state, we can be sure that they would be vetoed by one of the Western Powers. And if the Sino-Soviet force persisted in advancing down the Korean Peninsula, we would probably find the Western Powers hastily dispatching an armed force of "volunteers" to help the South Koreans. The upshot is that "collective" action in a disunited world is something quite different from the overwhelming superiority which the original concept of collective security was supposed to demonstrate.

These difficulties are accentuated by the acute tension between the US and the USSR. This tension is so great that even a minor accession of strength to one or the other side is regarded as a substantial victory or defeat. The grand dialectical jam can be seen at work in Germany. The Western Powers feel that they cannot afford to allow defeated Germany to be drawn into the orbit of the Communist system. Russia, on the other hand, must feel that the balance of strength is tilted against her forever if Germany is enlisted in the non-Communist group. Hence the "Super Powers"—as it seems fair to call Russia and the United States—utilize their position on the Security Council not so much for the purpose of enforcing peace and security everywhere as for preventing the other Super Power from winning a strategic advantage in particular localities. In the UN discussions on the creation of an international armed force, for instance, the USSR has strongly opposed the American proposal that armed forces be stationed in territories to which the United States has access by treaty.[7]

[7] Report of the Military Staff Committee, April 30, 1947. For supporting statements, see UN Document S/336, pp. 66-69.

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A case typical of the problem of enforcing peace and security is that of Greece. In response to an application by the Greek government alleging that Greek guerrillas were being furnished with aid from her northern neighbors, the Council appointed a Commission of Investigation. The latter subsequently produced a majority report by the Western Powers upholding the Greek assertions; and a minority report from the Communist group contradicting them. No action could be taken by the UN since this required a unanimous decision on the part of the permanent members of the Security Council. The guerrilla warfare continued until 1947, when the United States began furnishing the Greek government with considerable aid and Yugoslavia defected from the Communist group.

There are two disputes, however, which the Council did bring to a successful conclusion; and they are worth examining if only to contradict the popular belief that the UN can never be made to work in a cold war. In the dispute between the Netherlands and its colony of Indonesia, the Council was unanimous in persuading the Dutch government to allow Indonesia to attain its independence, though for curiously contradictory reasons. The Soviet Union championed the Indonesian Republic as part of the anti-imperialist offensive against the West. The United States was in principle anti-imperialist. The United Kingdom was reluctant to take a course which might jeopardize the methods by which she was transferring power in India, Burma, and Ceylon. France was the least cooperative, fearing a repetition of this process in her own colony of Indochina. But the line-up was such that the Dutch government had no alternative to the grant of self-government, albeit she granted it with not altogether good grace.

In the Palestine case the Council may have been responsible, through a series of progressively stronger actions, for finally bringing the Jewish and Arab parties to accept a cease-fire. The final order was based explicitly on Chapter 7 of the Charter and declared that failure to comply with the order would require immediate consideration with a view to further action. It is an open question, however, whether the Council could have agreed

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on actual enforcement proceedings if subsequent developments in Palestine had called for them. The unity of the members of the Council was again based on contradictory considerations. The Soviet Union's support of the state of Israel was derived from the belief that she could win a new ally in an important strategic area. The United States was already committed to its support by a Zionist pressure group. And the United Kingdom deliberately chose to allow the contending parties to reach a settlement on the spot. With the rout of the Arab armies, it became increasingly urgent for the Western Powers to stop the fighting and prevent the disintegration of the Arab security system.

III. Some Cures

It was suggested, in my introduction, that an excess of contradictory advice about the UN is being offered by people who are not interested in giving the organization a careful appraisal. This advice ranges from abandonment—in the direction either of a "world government" or of policies which frankly avow the "national interest"—to proposals for strengthening the Charter. Some of the more cogent and moderate of these arguments will here be adduced, together with an analysis of recent developments in the structure of the UN.

A lot of attention has been paid to the need for defining things legally and precisely. It is argued that "uncertainty as to where the immediate interests of any particular state will lie" is at the root of the difficulties of collective security and that "states should declare beforehand what they will do in future circumstances."[8] But of what use is it to a state to define its interests precisely? International relations, unfortunately, are very much a game of bluff. Each state is engaged in minimizing its weaknesses and in exaggerating its strength in order to deter potential enemies from attacking areas which are useful, though not absolutely essential, to its security program. Had the United States, for example, openly declared that its strength was not sufficient to

[8] J. L. Brierly, *The Outlook for International Law*, Oxford, 1944, p. 83.

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justify its going to the help of South Korea in the event of an attack, this would have constituted an open invitation to a potential enemy. Actually, former Secretary of State Acheson said something very much along these lines with the support of his military advisers.[9] This may have encouraged the North Koreans to attack. Had the whole attitude of the United States been left in the air, this might have been a sufficient deterrent to the potential enemy. One should not deduce, of course, that bluff will not lead to war. Bluff can be called. Nevertheless, one should not expect states to define their future course of action in a precise and rigid manner.

Criticism of the course pursued in meeting the assault in Korea may profitably be concerned not with the fact that the United States took a military stand, but with the fact that there was very little understanding of the objectives that the military action was supposed to achieve. During the "MacArthur phase" of operations, for instance, a conflict arose between the General's desire for an all-out war, summarized by his slogan "There is no substitute for victory,"[10] and the cautionary warnings of Nehru and Attlee that an all-out war on the Chinese mainland spelled World War III.[11] The initial UN objective, following the North Korean invasion of June 25, 1950, was merely a call to North Korea to withdraw to the Thirty-eighth Parallel and to UN members "to render every assistance to the UN in the execution of this Resolution."[12] But when US troops had retaken Seoul, the objective was widened, in accordance with the UN Resolution of October 7, 1950, to include the elimination of the Commu-

[9] See *New York Times*, September 23, 1952, p. 16, for Eisenhower's criticisms of Acheson's statement to the National Press Club in Washington on January 12, 1950; and Acheson's reply in *New York Times*, September 27, 1952, p. 8.

[10] The widely quoted expression, "There is no substitute for victory," comes from MacArthur's letter, read to the House of Representatives by Joseph W. Martin, Jr., April 5, 1951. The same letter advocated the use of Chiang Kai-shek's troops on the Chinese mainland (*New York Times*, April 6, 1951, p. 5). On December 2, 1950, MacArthur had pleaded for permission to bomb Manchurian bases. Early in April 1951 he declared, "It is time for the politicians to face up to realities, and to take the wraps off" (*ibid.*, April 8, 1951, p. E.1).

[11] This attitude was based largely on the realization that under the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, February 14, 1950, either country would be obliged to aid the other in the event of an enemy invasion.

[12] Security Council Resolution proposed by the United States on June 25, 1950.

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nists in North Korea.[13] It was a corollary of the traditional concept of collective security, which believed not only in repelling, but also in "punishing," the aggressor. The Chinese invasion of November 26 led the UN to reverse hastily its ideas on punishing the aggressor. The new objective was declared by UN Secretary-General Lie to be "to keep the war localized, and to diminish, not to increase, the danger of the conflict's spreading."[14] This thesis was recognized when the truce was signed on July 27, 1953, along a line not very far from the original Thirty-eighth Parallel.

It is clear that there were two important factors which contributed to the success of the UN action in Korea. The first was the presence in Japan of American armed forces that could be pressed into action pending the arrival of further reinforcements. A useful lesson for a future occasion is that national contingents might be earmarked for action and distributed at strategic points throughout the world. This lesson has already been taken to heart under the terms of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution.[15] The second factor was the absence of the Soviet Union from, and the anomalous representation of China on, the Security Council at the time that action was taken in Korea. If the Soviet Union had been present and if China had been represented by her real government, either of them could, and in all probability would, have used the right of veto against the UN action. The lesson from this for a future occasion is that some attempt should be made to get around the veto. If this is not done, the prospect of UN action may be seriously impaired.

Proposals to amend the Charter by means of legal procedures are useless, to begin with, since an amendment under Article 108 requires the concurring vote of the permanent members, i.e., the acquiescence of the chief stumbling block, the USSR. This will be the insuperable difficulty of the General Assembly when it meets to consider the revision of the Charter at its tenth annual session in 1955. The main possibility for amend-

[13] The UN Commander was authorized "to take all appropriate steps to ensure stability throughout the peninsula."

[14] *New York Times*, April 7, 1951.

[15] Resolution of the General Assembly, November 3, 1950.

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ment lies in using the existing Charter with a change of emphasis. This process of adaptation has already begun. With the stultification of the Security Council by the repeated use of the veto by the Soviet Union, the General Assembly was strengthened in 1947 by the setting-up of an Interim Committee, or "Little Assembly," in order that the Assembly should be able to function continuously. Under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, the General Assembly began to assume the character of an organ very different from that envisaged at San Francisco. The Resolution allowed for something like an appeal from a veto-bound Security Council to the General Assembly if the former failed to act with regard to a breach of the peace within twenty-four hours; to forestall such an event, members were asked to earmark armed forces for disposal by the Assembly; lastly, a Peace Observation Commission, or "security patrol," was set up to investigate disputes on behalf of the Assembly. On more minor matters the veto has been gotten around. Practice has tended to circumvent theory by acceptance of the thesis that matters can be transferred from the agenda of the Council to the Assembly by a procedural vote. The Assembly has originally or by reference dealt with political controversies to a greater extent even than the Council.[16] The Assembly has, in fact, transformed itself into a "workshop" for action as opposed to its intended role as a "talking shop" for the passing of resolutions which would in every important way be subordinate to the Council.

Another aspect of the Charter that has been developed to meet the challenge of the cold war is the making of treaties for collective and regional defense under Articles 51 and 53. Limited security arrangements or alliances are dictated by a number of considerations other than the exigencies of the cold war. National capacity to exercise power effectively is obviously determined, for instance, by geographical location and natural barriers, even in an

[16] In 1946 the Security Council considered nine political controversies, while the General Assembly handled only six. By 1952 the relative importance of the two organs had been reversed. The General Assembly dealt with seventeen political issues in 1952, while the corresponding number handled by the Security Council declined to seven (United Nations, Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization).

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air age, and by the fact that states are far less interested in and less capable of influencing the course of events in some parts of the world than in others. Alliances are also a reflection of the doctrine of "spheres of interest." Thus, by the Hemispheric Pact of 1947, the United States gave practical effect to the Monroe Doctrine. By the Brussels Pact of 1948, the United Kingdom asserted its protective rights in Western Europe. Then there are the Atlantic Pact of 1949 and the Pacific Pact of 1951. This is paralleled on the other side of the ideological fence by a vast network of treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and her satellites and by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950.

These efforts to circumvent the veto are inevitable responses to the challenge of the cold war. However, it would be naïve to suppose that these changes have occurred without altering radically the basic character of the entire organization. The general drift in the United States, for instance, toward the view that the UN should become an out-and-out opponent of Communism and, hence, expendable in a cold war is the direct antithesis of the premises of universality and unanimity which were entertained at San Francisco. Hence, to regard these changes as the *core* of the Charter instead of the aberrations that they are, and to talk at the same time of the implementation of collective security, is a not very profitable attempt to deceive ourselves as to the basic limitations of either the Charter or collective security. The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution is defective insofar as it transfers the right and duty to act from the strong to the weak, creates the illusion of security where none exists, and exposes the Assembly to a challenge which it cannot meet. Although the Assembly can make a decision, it still cannot put it into operation without the backing of a Great Power. Finally, emphasis on Article 51 merely recreates the vicious circle of alliances and counteralliances which the Charter, as a whole, seeks to escape.

Everything that has been said may be construed as an argument for abandoning the UN. But within the severe limitations imposed by a cold war some very important things can be achieved. An outstanding fact which is often overlooked is that

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both North Korea and Communist China were denied the easy fruits of aggression. While this may seem to be a small thing, it is one of the purposes which the Charter tries to fulfill and is a warning to potential aggressors anywhere.

The impact of the UN on Soviet policy probably stands for something. The USSR has not mistaken the purport of the various proposals to get around the veto. It has frequently protested that it would walk out of the organization if deprived of the veto privilege. It has energetically denied the legality of the proposals under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution. Indeed, according to the text of the Charter, the Assembly cannot delegate more power than it possesses itself and, under Articles 12, 24, and 25, that is precious little.

De facto reform has not yet, however, precipitated the departure of the Soviet Union from the organization. When we recall that Germany left the League of Nations because of dissatisfaction with the Second World Disarmament Conference which made far-reaching concessions to her, perhaps we should ask, rather, why the Soviet Union has remained in the organization so long. The particular advantages which the Soviet Union derives from membership in the UN depend on the relative weight that we attach to the role of ideology as an explanation of official Soviet conduct. Since, according to Leninist-Stalinist doctrine, the Soviet Union stands in imminent danger of aggression, the UN should, from a doctrinal point of view, minister to Soviet security by providing points of observation and contact in the capitalist camp. This contact ought to reveal the enemy's order of battle, as it were, and his tactical methods in the state of undeclared war which is supposed to be just as conscious and systematic on the capitalist as on the Communist side. That the Soviet leaders have regarded the UN from this viewpoint is indicated by a number of considerations. The Soviet Union has, for instance, insisted on representation on the Peace Observation Commission, an entity whose legal standing she has repeatedly denounced. She has used the UN as a propaganda forum for weaning the masses of the world away from bourgeois loyalties. The Soviet Union is not interested in any of the spe-

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cialized agencies except two of the most technical ones, which are virtually indispensable to her.[17] She appears to regard FAO as the "commissariat" of a potential military line-up of nations and UNESCO as an anti-Marxist forum. If our premise were correct—that Soviet conduct can be explained solely in terms of doctrine—then it could be argued that as the General Assembly looks increasingly like an anti-Communist alliance, so the advantages to the Soviet Union of remaining in the organization will inevitably increase. In actual fact, however, the Soviet government is under no illusion as to the long-term nature of its doctrinal goals or as to the necessity of conducting relations with non-Communist states according to the realities of the situation. Since the UN, from a non-doctrinal point of view, serves the Soviet Union in enabling her to thwart by means of the veto any military plans that might be made against her, it could also be argued that as the General Assembly succeeds in by-passing the veto, so a major *raison d'être* of the Soviet Union for remaining in the organization will disappear. The Soviet government, like other governments, is by no means unamenable to questions of prestige, and threatening moves by other governments in the UN may oblige her to walk out. All this is an indication of how little we really know about the nature of Soviet policy.

On the whole, the reasons against deliberately trying to shed the Soviet Union are overwhelming. Firstly, the expulsion of one of the "Big Five" could hardly be done legally. It could probably only be done by a dissolution of the UN and its reconstitution on a new basis. If this is attempted, the UN will probably lose many valuable members who are eager to play their part in a universal world organization but do not want to join one of the two camps in the cold war. The organization, thus reduced, would inevitably change its character. It would become little more than a grand alliance or coalition directed against Russia; it would lose that imponderable, still tenuous, but not negligible authority which is derived from its solemn aspiration to universality and permanence. Finally, removing the last common meeting-place of Communists and non-Com-

[17] The Universal Postal Union and the International Telecommunications Union.

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munists would almost amount to an admission that a world war is inevitable.

It is argued that the shedding of the Soviet Union would mean the shedding of hypocrisy. This is the question formulated by Lord Swinton: "Is it really useful or practicable, or indeed possible, that with the world divided into two armed camps, we should seek to preserve a façade and camouflage of unity where no unity exists?"[18] The question has been answered in part above. To the charge of hypocrisy it is not easy to formulate a rejoinder. Two maxims are not, however, inappropriate. According to La Rochefoucauld, "Hypocrisy is the homage which vice pays to virtue." As the philosopher Julien Benda has put the matter, mankind has always betrayed its obligations, but so long as it continues to acknowledge and believe in them, the crack is kept open through which civilization can creep.

So long as the Soviet Union remains in the UN, it is made aware of the moral authority of the organization. However, one should not overemphasize this fact or expect that it can work miracles, particularly with the Soviet Union. The moral authority of the old League proved inadequate to deter Japan and Italy from embarking upon aggression. It is not altogether easy to say what is meant by "moral authority" or to define the precise ways it which it can be expressed. The most obvious way is in the shape of a resolution or recommendation endorsed by a majority vote. The Assembly has made recommendations to the Council with regard to the admission of new members and has even sought to bolster its authority by requesting advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice. It has made recommendations with a view to the reform of the voting procedure in the Council. But to no effect. On the other hand, moral authority is not a nebulous concept. The Assembly represents an international outlook and stands for an idealism and cooperation in which public opinion is profoundly interested. It possesses a number of devoted and outstanding statesmen. What it says or does is not lost on mankind. And what men think is not without effect on governments, as the zealous efforts of totali-

[18] House of Lords, January 19, 1949.

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tarian governments to mold the minds of men to their purposes bear witness.

Talk of creating an international police force and of "sticking teeth" into the Charter is not altogether well informed. The Military Staff Committee, composed of representatives of the five permanent members of the Council, started work in 1946. It took as its first task the drawing-up of a set of basic principles which would govern the organization of the UN forces. A report emerged in 1947 which showed the Committee to be deadlocked.[19] Out of forty-one Articles on "basic principles" there was disagreement on sixteen. Under any circumstances, it would prove difficult for high military leaders to compromise and agree. The meetings take on an air of unreality, however, when these military men are asked to agree on how to combine some part of their forces against an unknown aggressor who is already in their midst. In a domestic society the police force is composed of citizens who would not dream of disobeying their employers. Even if a Military Staff Committee were to create an international police force, it would be composed of national contingents whose loyalties would be correspondingly sectional. In the event of a war involving a Great Power, the police force would be torn apart by conflicting national loyalties.

What can the UN achieve as a center for negotiation? The essence of the Charter is cooperation, and it is one of the hopes of the Charter that if you put a lot of men around a table and hold a conference, an "agreement" will somehow emerge. The UN is a valuable institution in that it affords each representative an opportunity to get to know the minds and fears of others and an opportunity to dispel those fears. Even in the disarmament proposals which have been carried on intermittently since 1946 one can see a continual accommodation going on between Russia and the Western Powers, until there is at the present time what is usually called a "bridgeable" gap. On the other hand, one of the dangers of this procedure is that too much is expected of it. People seem to suppose—or at least they used to

[19] Report of the Military Staff Committee, April 30, 1947. For supporting statements, see UN Document S/336.

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—that any Chinese puzzle can be disposed of by reference to the UN. Against these specialists in wishful thinking it must be asserted that, in the absence of certain favorable conditions, a conference may bring differences into view rather than make them disappear; the problem may then be left even more intractable than it was before.

The difficulty of negotiation is illustrated by a consideration of the attitude of the different Powers toward disarmament. How far can disagreement resolve the security conflict between East and West? The answer was contained in the UN *Bulletin* for 1948 relating to international control of atomic energy: "Agreement on international control is dependent on cooperation in broader fields of policy, and failure to achieve it arises from a situation beyond the Commission's control." It is doubtful that the repeated Soviet proposals for a 100 per cent ban on atomic weapons and for a one-third disarmament of conventional weapons represent a sincere program. From the point of view of security, of course, a totalitarian state can only gain by international adoption of radical disarmament obligations without concession of complete rights of international inspection. Not only can such a state rearm more speedily in case of emergency, but it is in fact able to avoid obligations of disarmament owing to the absence of the check of free internal investigation and published comment such as exists in a conventional democracy. Whether or not this evasion was practiced, the possibility of it would be a continual source of suspicion and tension in other countries. The intentions of the Western Powers, on the other hand, are not devoid of ambiguity. The Atlantic Pact demands a large measure of rearmament from its members. American foreign policy is still based upon the dictum of "total diplomacy" advocated by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, which states that agreements with the Soviet Union are useful only when they are based on a rival force of equal or greater strength. Until rearmament is completed, in other words, any attempt to work out an agreement with the Soviet Union is a waste of time. Have the Western Powers told their publics that all talk of

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disarmament and banning the bomb and top-level discussions are useless?

Because there is a growing conviction among the peoples that the statesmen who make disarmament proposals are not sincere, it is all the more necessary to have a look at the conference system that the different organs of the UN postulate in order to see if there is anything intractable about it which makes statesmen so often look as though they are addressing a brick wall. The first important consideration is that the idea of putting proposals to a vote is essentially parliamentary in origin. As such, it presupposes an ability and willingness to compromise on certain points of issue and an agreement on "fundamentals." While the Great Powers may be united on the fundamental abstract issue of peace, they are evidently not united on those conditions under which peace is supposed to operate. The difficulty is multiplied since in all the organs of the UN there is a continuous contention between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union over the nature and significance of the assumptions underlying the organization. The Charter is the projection of nineteenth-century democratic beliefs of which the United States is the leading exponent. But the Soviet Union maintains that nothing less momentous than a classless world society is at stake. The Charter therefore is caught in the cross-fire, and the democratic assumptions underlying the Charter cease to act as constitutional buffers. Communist policies are based on the Leninist assumption that peace is only war prosecuted by other means, and that the art of negotiation is merely a variety of the art of warfare.

A second consideration—and this follows from the first—is a change in the traditional characteristics of diplomacy. For the Soviet Union the "accommodation" of Communist to capitalist points of view is inherently impossible as a long-term solution. The task of negotiation has ceased therefore to be the really important work of the Russian diplomat—his work is reverting almost to that of the Greek or Roman herald or messenger who went abroad merely to announce his government's point of view. Whenever a new problem arises in the UN the Russian representative has to cable home for fresh instructions, and those who

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have attended the sessions of the UN know how frequently this occurs. The compensatory factor from the Russian point of view is that the UN serves as an admirable propaganda forum. This advantage is denied to the Western Powers, since all news relayed from the outside world to Russia must pass through the sieve of the Russian "security" system.

The third consideration—and this follows from the second—is that there is, on the whole, an excess of "open" diplomacy. M. Spaak has summed up the problem admirably: "I have often wondered if we have not pushed open diplomacy a little too far. It is not a question of returning to secret diplomacy. It is like this. I understand quite well that we must describe the dish to the public and the menu that we want them to eat. But is it absolutely necessary that the diplomatic cook should also explain in public how it is made? I wish the public would stay in the dining room and let us stay in the kitchen."[20] With the radio microphone only a few feet away, there is every temptation for a speaker to win debating points. When a statesman has the public gazing over his shoulder via the television or movie camera, his freedom to act is circumscribed by the necessity of maintaining prestige and not conceding a single point. It is significant that the most fruitful negotiations which have taken place between the Western Powers and the Russians since the war have been in secret. The classic example of secret diplomacy is still the settlement of the Berlin blockade. Negotiations to this end began with an informal personal contact in the delegates' lounge at Lake Success between Dr. Jessup and Mr. Malik. Similarly, a great deal of detailed spadework on the original Indian plan for a Korean truce was done behind the scenes. Indeed, it is not too much to say that results have been good in cases where the purpose of the negotiation has been clear, the policy firmly laid down and approved by public opinion, the press held at arm's length, and security enforced on delegates and officials.

[20] Paul Henri Spaak, "The Role of the General Assembly," *International Conciliation*, No. 445 (November 1948), p. 612.

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IV. Some Conclusions

It is impossible to abstract a "thesis" or "message" from all the foregoing or to condense into a sentence certain conclusions that may already have been drawn. But if one impression remains stronger than any other, it is this: The failures of the UN to cope with the kind of world we live in are the reflection of a much more insuperable element for which the UN serves both as dramatist and apologist—the failure of man to apprehend and, hence, to control his international environment. The contrast between the heart-felt appeals of statesmen for peace and the sterility of the diplomatic setting might almost serve as an epitaph. It is all the more incumbent upon us, therefore, to exercise our imagination to the limit, and to shed the whole load of shibboleths that we carry around with us and apply to every situation.

Once we begin to peel away our passionate convictions, there gradually comes into view a hard diplomatic kernel that would seem to exist irrespective of our ideological beliefs. Even if Malenkov and his colleagues were as virtuous and well intentioned as the statesmen of the Western world, a predicament would still confront Europe and Asia simply because the Soviet Union has control of such a vast area that its very existence constitutes a standing threat to our peace and safety. Of course, if the Russians happen to be Communist scoundrels as well, then that is the extra advantage which Providence, so to speak, throws into the lap of the Western Powers. But we should not forget that the basic problem might exist independent of ideologies.

The basic problem, then, is how to maintain peace while there is an irreconcilable difference between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union about the distribution of power in the world today. We have seen how this irreconcilable conflict is at work in Germany today. It embitters the relations between the Powers and leads them to credit one another with completely malevolent intentions. What is the solution? The short-term answer is that there is no "solution" short of a final transmutation of political pluralism—which the UN is not designed to

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accomplish. There are only temporary adjustments and expedients. This might be called the "boat-hook" policy, which aims at drifting with the stream and putting out the boat-hook every so often to stop the boat from drifting on to the sandbank. Intractable situations can be postponed and postponed so that in a generation or two they will, with luck, disappear. The kind of situation we have today is very similar to that which faced Bismarck—how to maintain peace between two irreconcilable Powers, Russia and Austria. It is often forgotten that he managed to postpone war for thirty years. He exercised restraint; and yet made himself powerful enough to make an attacker think twice. If the Western Powers can, as a first step, do something along these lines and stop worrying about "solutions," they will achieve quite a good working arrangement. They are already strengthening themselves and making arrangements for mutual defense, regardless of the Charter, and this policy is only wise. But, in the short run, we should not let our ideological convictions carry us away. Firstly, we should not provoke the Soviets, beset with fears, to the point of desperation. Secondly, in order to inspire mutual cooperation, we should not convince ourselves of the absolute rightness of our own way of life and the absolute error of any other. Great achievement demands great faith, but the latter leads easily to fanaticism and thence to conflict. If we could cut down the great volume of ideological cross-talk in the UN, what a victory it would be!

The "boat-hook" policy is not, however, a very happy permanent solution. The problem can only be solved by lifting it onto an altogether higher plane. It is the great virtue of the UN that it recognizes the imperfections and cruelties that are inherent in a system of power politics. It is an attempt to subdue the asperities of political pluralism by the development of a cooperative spirit. At the moment, the equation "UN = Control over international environment" does not hold good, since the cooperative spirit has been unable to transmute the sterility of the diplomatic setting and the clash of ideologies stands in its way.

In the long run, there seem to be two distinct problems that must be overcome—the conflict of ideology, and the conflict of

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power. Let us consider the former. It is the essence of an international constitution, as of a national system of law and order, that it can only develop in a sound ideological climate. Until we get it, all talk of a successful, universal, international organization is a chimera. We can only hope that one day the passionate convictions which sustain the Communist ideology will be dispelled and that we, in our turn, can look upon it as something to be put up with rather than fiercely hated. This was the only "solution" to the Catholic-Protestant struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. And so far as can be seen, putting up with one another is the only conceivable outcome to the present struggle. The present machinery of the UN can be used to bring certain obvious realities before the eyes of the Communist representatives—that we in the West are not behaving as Marxist theory predicts. To sow the seeds of doubt is the first step toward the destruction of any ideology. The UN can be used to display to our Communist opponents the earnestness of our intentions. This calls for a toning-down in the use of the UN as a propaganda forum. Once a congenial ideological climate is attained, the UN should postulate a sane internationalism grounded in an accurate sense of the place of a given country as a unit of international society and an appreciation of just how much and how little the scheme requires of the participating states. Such an appreciation already exists within the group of nations known as the British Commonwealth. A widening of the bonds of social consciousness is a marked feature of the present century and we can expect this trend to continue.

But what about the diplomatic problem, the fact that Russia is so large and powerful that everyone stands in fear of her, whatever intentions she professes? The ultimate answer is that the cooperative spirit must be cultivated so strongly that it reduces the power conflict to a problem which is seen to be directly related to the psychology of conflict. An attempt should be made to modify the absurd psychology of nationalism which regards its own interests as sacred and the interests of others as inimical. How is this to be attained? Much is made of the difficulty of cooperation between people whose interests conflict.

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But interests are not fixed and immutable attributes. The UN, by the introduction of specific cooperative techniques, is continually creating new interests. People develop mutual interests by sharing the same experiences; and the way to create a psychology of cooperation is not to preach it, but to cooperate. This is the particular significance of the specialized agencies of the UN: the fact that states cooperate to dispense positive material good to all nations in need. One must not be too hopeful about the future. Our potential enemies may not be won over by our benevolent intentions. In that case, the UN would fail even if it were the most beautiful piece of machinery ever constructed.

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Review Articles

GOVERNMENTS VS. PEOPLES

By P. E. CORBETT

F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1952, 2 vols., pp. 826. $11.50.

FOR anyone concerned about the potentialities of the United Nations, and not handicapped by a congenital or occupational contempt for history, the record of the League of Nations is full of instruction. More than one distinguished member of the former Secretariat has complained of general indifference to his experience; but the attention paid to Geneva precedents in the drafting of the San Francisco Charter is clear to every student of international organization. And now, over the whole broad field of their work, officials of the UN who are not content with intuition and improvisation turn naturally to the archives of the League.

Those archives are terrifyingly voluminous. Though by no means so numerous, the delegations that visited Geneva were hardly less loquacious than those that flock to the United Nations; and, though the League's activity was neither so intensive nor so widespread, it was, after all, sustained over a period of more than twenty years against the UN's seven. Many competent studies have been published covering particular aspects of that activity. Nothing approaching an adequate survey of the whole was available until F. P. Walters completed *A History of the League of Nations.* Sponsorship of the work is another of the distinguished services for which students must thank the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

It was not only in the United States that opinion was sharply and permanently divided on the League. In the member countries, too, most discussion fell into one of two categories, undiscriminating eulogy or utter condemnation. In truth, even the prominent features of the "Geneva experiment" have seldom or

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never been brought into one focus. The task was historically unique in kind as in scope; it called for and evoked heroic qualities of mind and spirit; for its performance new and ingenious procedures were devised that have since come into common use; it encountered difficulties more deeply imbedded in human nature than men of good will have been ready to admit; the success achieved in some fields brought new life to thousands of men and women; and even in its failures there were moments of galvanizing hope that may still point the way to that victory over war which was the goal of all servants of the Covenant. Here surely are the makings of a great chronicle, with a promise of wisdom to those who can weigh victories and defeats with detachment.

For the intimate story of the whole enterprise from the point of view of the international civil servant, no other writer could have been found with the qualifications of Frank Walters. From beginning to end, he was at the center of the League's life. Now, after years of reflection upon his experience, controlled and amplified by documentary research, he has told that part of the tale with grace and finality. Presumably he did not set out to explain the whole course of world politics from 1920 to 1939, though some passages suggest that he believed himself to be doing so. No scales with less than that capacity will ever weigh with accuracy the League's total performance. Meanwhile, however, the rise and fall of a profoundly important institution demanded recording by one who shared the aspirations of its foundation, the exaltation of its growth, and the heartbreak of its decay. Later historians, to whom must fall the complete and balanced assessment, will find in these two volumes the authentic spirit which for a time informed the "atmosphere of Geneva."

The very qualities which won esteem for the author in his official roles have left some negative marks on his book. Deep attachment to the institution and its personnel and champions here and there displaces cool analysis. The League is good and the opposition is bad. There is a petulant insistence upon the sabotage of new methods by "traditional diplomacy," and virtue tends everywhere to be identified with belief in a new society of

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the nations. Moral indignation over the shortsightedness and poltroonery of politicians blacks out the average human animal's share of responsibility for failure.

Clearly Walters, like many more of us who turned enthusiastically from the First World War to work at Geneva, overrated the sense of community among the world's peoples and the power of machinery to iron out their conflicts. It would not have seemed so patent to me then as it now does that he exaggerates the gap between electorates and their political and diplomatic representatives. Cabinets, foreign offices, and diplomatic services are the villains of his piece. Honest and competent statesmanship, he is confident, could have made the Covenant in reality that "cornerstone of foreign policy" which won so much lip-service from vote-seeking orators of the period. Absence of the United States would not have been an insuperable obstacle for the vision and boldness that he believes nations have a right to expect of their leaders. The League was killed, and with it the peace, by the knavery of a few brigands and the stupidity and cowardice of those whose duty it was to thwart them. Mankind was betrayed. The author's hope for a new era is summed up in the paraphrase of Cecil on the last page of his text—"The peoples had always understood: surely the governments must now have learnt their lesson."

Not to accept so simple an explanation is not to say that the author is necessarily mistaken in his manifest belief that a loyal use of League machinery, and a more courageous insistence upon League principle, would have saved humanity from the catastrophe of World War II. The point rather is that such judgments look culpably summary without more penetrating enquiry into the whole complex of pressures operating upon the governments of the day. If the "great mass of opinion" which the author constantly cites (without always revealing his authorities) was so unmistakable, how could it happen that democratic governments could scuttle the Covenant and yet remain in power? True, a phenomenon like the British peace ballot of 1935 is mentioned for its paper content. But no attention is paid to the equally noteworthy transition from the staunch attitude struck

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on the abstract question to the quiet abandonment of sanctions once it was seen that they could not be made effective without military risks. Is it only since 1935 that we have learned what an abyss may stretch between sample answers to large hypothetical questions and the positions taken when their concrete implications threaten to pinch?[1]

It was perhaps inevitable that a devoted servant of the League should also exaggerate Geneva's approach to the center of gravity in international affairs. The record presented here bears witness, in contradiction to the author's marginal comment, that the institution whose life and death he depicts with such restrained drama never even momentarily attained the position of controlling influence which Wilson and Smuts believed it would permanently hold. Always there were moving in the jungle of world politics forces unswayed by any transaction celebrated in the *Palais des Nations*. Surely this was as truly the meaning of Vilna in the early twenties as of Manchuria a decade later. And if, in between, the League seemed to be becoming the hub of things, was not the process reversed as early as Locarno? From that point on, the most important decisions, halting and confused as they were, tended to be taken, not in the Council or Assembly, nor "in the spirit of the Covenant," but in closed conclaves of the Locarno Powers, or in other small groupings of the great and near-great, deliberating in the age-old terms of a balance of power.

The last is a matter that calls for more study in the interests of the United Nations. The Charter had not been in effect for three years when we were compelled to construct or reinforce major regional organizations to shore up the security which it was becoming clear the universal agency would not be able to safeguard. It is true that the Charter, unlike the Covenant, had

[1] The late Sir Harold Butler, who, as Deputy Director and then Director of the International Labor Office, also had excellent opportunity to observe and weigh the League's work, formed a totally different judgment of the reasons for its failure. In his view, the reluctance of most members to commit themselves to an effective system of collective security "largely reflected the existing state of public opinion. No country, when it came to the point, was ready to pledge the lives of its soldiers and sailors 'in other nations' quarrels.' . . . That then was the root trouble of the League. Public opinion was not educated to its necessity" (*The Lost Peace*, New York, 1942, pp. 29-30).

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foreseen this contingency. But, though Articles 51-54 prescribe a general subordination of regional organizations to the Security Council, their provisions are far from adequate to guarantee the harmonious integration of universal and limited agencies. The argument is heard that the latter should permanently monopolize the security function constitutionally assigned to the former. This is an alternative once more to be weighed.

Long before the League folded its hands in sad confession of helplessness, many believers in international organization were urging that it leave sanctions to regional associations and confine itself to consultation and moral suasion. The arguments then advanced for and against a reconstruction of the Covenant along these lines are reviewed by Mr. Walters in passages that should be pondered by all who desire to see the Charter revised.[2]

How regional and universal agencies may get in each other's way is illustrated in *A History of the League of Nations* not only by the usurpations of authority practiced by the Locarno Powers, but by the stumbling confusion of the procedures brought to bear on the Chaco War.[3] Considering the weak organization of the Union of American Republics at that time, the relative effectiveness of the League in the latter case, though it bolsters the author's obvious preference for universality, can hardly be taken as a decisive precedent.

In any event, with the record at their disposal, if not before them, the constitution-makers assembled at San Francisco made their choice and gave more paper powers to the universal agency, only to find it incapable of exercising them. In practice the consultative and advisory powers of the General Assembly and its committees have proved more efficacious than the compulsory authority of the Security Council. Nor is it by any means clear that this is due to anything so simple as what we have dubbed "abuse of the veto."

In the most elaborately worked-out federal systems, the relations between the whole and its units are a matter of such constant controversy that, without authoritative and powerful agen-

[2] *Op.cit.*, pp. 712-20, 784-88, and *passim.*
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 318-25, 341-46, 393-95, and 525-36.

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cies to adjudicate between them, the structure either falls apart or gives way to unqualified centralization. It will be a long time before "world-society" attains the underlying cohesion to support agencies of such *de jure* and *de facto* competence. In the meanwhile, we can perhaps do no better than leave regional and universal institutions to develop by trial and error without any attempt at sharp *a priori* demarcation.

That there is a part for universal organization in the security function seems indicated by two features of the present position in world politics. One is that several Powers have, in all or most of the principal areas, important interests supporting their demand for participation in regional decisions. The other is the near-certainty that if security is to be maintained in these areas, external assistance will in most cases be sought from Powers whose claims to inclusion in a regional association would now be disputed. But the unanticipated strains that have revealed themselves since 1945, plus the bitter and costly experience of the Korean War, may mean that, if military action is to figure among the functions of a universal organization, it had better be made constitutionally what it has become in fact—optional. Such a textual adaptation to realities is perhaps too strong medicine for any amending conference likely to be held in the next two or three years. Eventually, however, it will have to be formally admitted that associations like NATO are not going to operate with the degree of subordination prescribed either in Article 51 of the Charter or in Articles 52-54. To maintain the existing incongruity of text and behavior is to invite incessant legal and moral reproach.

It has already been observed that the story of the League, as told in Mr. Walters' book, unfolds like a drama of saints and sinners. The forces converging at Geneva are vividly personalized. This treatment has merits. For one thing, it makes easy reading. For another, it keeps the reader constantly reminded that the actors in world politics are not bodiless abstractions, but human beings.

In the long period in which international law and classical political science provided the literature on the relations of

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States, the personification of these groupings, legitimate enough as a convenience of thought and communication, transformed them into real though superhuman entities endowed with majestically sovereign wills, claiming the supreme loyalty of the individual, and fixing their policies by cold, mechanical, and usually short-term calculations of power, profit, and prestige. Men conducting the business of these leviathans were their compliant agents, having no wills or consciences of their own and answerable only to that vague something, the State. When moral issues were raised, reasons of State cut short the argument on right and wrong.

This convention bore some resemblance to what went on in world politics, but afforded little clue to the complex forces and processes which shaped the decisions of governments. It could therefore teach us nothing of ways and means, other than material power, of influencing those decisions from outside. The very legal theory which fostered the convention found itself confronted with paralyzing contradictions when it tried to subject States to law. Only the less publicized activities of diplomacy penetrated to the realities under the façade and found the spots of human vulnerability.

The actors appearing on Mr. Walters' Geneva stage are not France, Britain, Germany, Italy, but Briand and Laval, Cecil, Austen Chamberlain and Simon, Stresemann and von Neurath, Attolico and Aloisi. Behind them, directing them, are not States, but other identified individuals forming alone or in cabinets the governments of their countries. Delegates or the higher-ranking ministers from whom they take instructions determine the line to be taken in Council, Assembly, and Committees, and to them personally the author attributes responsibility for fulfillment or violation of the Covenant. There is indeed some reference to conditions at home or abroad that influence decision one way or the other; but identified persons or groups evaluate those conditions and make policy choices. We are made conscious of the dilemmas confronting these decision-makers, and of the predispositions which incline them toward or away from the League's procedures.

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All this brings us close to what actually happens in the formation of policy. There is, however, a danger which the author does not wholly escape in this graphic treatment. He shows some mercy toward delegates with a good League record who continue to represent governments that despise the Covenant; but he has a general tendency to assign credit or blame as though the individual making or swaying decisions for his nation enjoyed the same simple liberty of moral choice as if he were handling his private affairs.

This tendency is nowhere more clear than in the excoriation of delegates and governments who, in their devotion to national interest, slight the League's claims as the organized society of mankind. Nothing will ever be gained for world-society by thus dividing national and supranational interests and condemning the statesman who sets the first above the second. It may be a wearying truism to say that the prospect of a stably organized world order must depend upon the degree in which governments come to find in such an order the best chance of satisfying the highly subjective notions of national interest which they serve. The author of this *History* would probably insist that this is what he means. But, if so, his dichotomy of interests, and the moral judgments that go with it, help to perpetuate a confusion that impedes progress toward his goal.

At the beginning of this article reference was made to the clear influence of Geneva precedents on the Charter of the United Nations. At least two general lessons from League experience had been apprehended by those who wrote the constitution of its successor. One was that without adequate force available at the call of a central agency there could be no assurance that covenants would be kept. The other was that peace would not be secure without broad-scale economic and social cooperation to mitigate wants that might otherwise explode in violence.

But how was force to be organized, and how was its use to be decided? The San Francisco Conference resisted unofficial pressure to create supranational land, naval, and air forces. The delegations of the principal countries represented did not interpret their mandates as calling for a world government with

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such power at its direct disposal. They compromised with a plan whereby the Security Council would at need summon from each member forces determined by previous special agreement. These agreements have never been made and, save in the optional form adopted for the Korean War, the plan has not advanced beyond the paper stage.

Everything that has happened since indicates that the limits of international consensus were not higher than the dominant view at San Francisco placed them. Again, when it came to the point of deciding what kind of vote would be required to launch any measures of enforcement, the Five-Power unanimity demanded by the text is not to be ascribed to ultraconservatism on the part of Messrs. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. No collectivity without overwhelming power at its direct disposal could hope to enforce a majority will against such a nation as the Soviet Union or the United States, and the cost then would in all probability be general war. The statesmen who made the voting-rules for the Security Council at Yalta were far from planning for any such eventuality. Even a weak world-State was beyond their horizons. Nor has anything happened to show that in this they were lagging behind "mass opinion."

The error (or deception) came when the Charter was presented to the peoples as an instrument making substantial provision for the enforcement of peace. Leaving all previous history aside, the experience of the League should have taught us that conflicts break out into major wars only when the government of at least one great Power wills it so, and accordingly that no organization incapable of imposing peaceful settlement upon a great Power has control over the principal dangers to world peace. It may indeed provide improved procedures of bargaining, persuasion, conciliation; but it cannot be counted upon to prevent or stop violence. This raises the question whether, if it was politically impossible to create at San Francisco an all-powerful super-State, it was worth while to plan obligatory enforcement measures which were bound to prove not only inadequate but inapplicable in the conjunctures where they would be most needed. Perhaps Geneva's greatest lesson had after all

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been missed. The meaning of that disillusioning experiment in collective security might be that, until the probably remote day when the peoples want a powerful world-State, we should attach most importance and most hope to an international attack upon wants that at San Francisco were believed to be among the causes of war. Out of a sustained enterprise with that object might grow a sense of community strong enough eventually to support an effective peace-keeping organization.

What then of the United Nations in Korea? Those three years of indecisive struggle are perforce being hailed on our side as a victory for collective security. History may indeed account them the beginning of victory for the free world, less as an example of effective joint action than as the necessary stimulant of re-mobilization in the democracies. Or they may figure as a salutory demonstration that the well-known difficulties of improvised military cooperation without unified political direction are not reduced by the fact that it proceeds in the name of a permanent agency dedicated to world peace. As evidence that the United Nations is, or is on its way to becoming, an efficient instrument of general security, they are sadly wanting.

A History of the League of Nations shows how the agencies centered at Geneva, defeated in long and patient efforts to control the political designs and economic policies of sovereign States, turned to the international service of the individual in the hope of reducing the strains that made States unmanageable. In the League the new approach was hardly more than a shift from the impossible to the feasible. By 1945 so many statesmen had come to suspect an intimate connection between peace and welfare that the San Francisco Charter gave almost as much prominence to the social and economic advancement of the individual as to the prevention of national aggression. Yet once more practice has outrun design. The promise shown by voluntary economic and social cooperation is having again to console us for the failures of political compulsion. Does this repeated experience mean that the Charter adopts the wrong order of priority? Possibly collaboration for improved standards of living and the promotion of human rights should be recognized as the

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primary and feasible object of international organization. Facilities of conciliation and adjudication would still be offered, and provision might even be made for the sort of optional collective intervention that is now being planned under the General Assembly's Uniting for Peace Resolution of December 1950. But enforcement in general would be regarded as in an early and tentative stage of development, not as a perfected function to be claimed as of right from the organization and its members. This view would correspond to the growing realization that the outlook for collective enforcement is, if anything, more inauspicious now than it was in the League period. Shifting combinations among half a dozen Powers of more or less the same order of magnitude then offered a fair chance of peacefully overcoming even a great State by sheer preponderance of war potential. Now all the more serious conflicts divide the world around two States, each so powerful that it will presumably fight rather than bow to external decision in any matter of large interest. The larger expectations based upon the Charter have proved groundless, and the proof has destroyed some of the popular support that is indispensable to successful international administration.

The Covenant of the League and the Charter of the United Nations were both drawn up in sharp and immediate revulsion from war. In neither case was the mood one appropriate to profound enquiry or dispassionate deliberation. Nothing less than the swift promise of a vigorous check upon violence in world politics would have satisfied the emotional demands of the time. The experience of the second organization has now confirmed the evidence provided by the first. The kind of international machinery which the peoples were ready to create and uphold cannot provide the security demanded of it. Soon now we may have the chance for calm and searching reconsideration. It has been broadly recognized that our inchoate world-society lacks the cohesion necessary to sustain an effective system of law enforcement. There will be no lack of utopians urging us to impose the cohesion by strait-jacket. They are not likely to prevail. Change in the opposite direction has much to recommend it—a shifting of our sights to less spectacular activities calculated

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to strengthen what is now a lamentably weak sense of community.

The failure of the League gave rise in the thirties to a new literature of world politics. One part of it was devoted to the theme—federate or perish. The other sought to prove that the Covenant had already far outstripped the practical possibilities of international collaboration. It was this latter genre that took strongest hold upon the advanced study of world politics in American universities. There the skeptical approach to universal organization came like too welcome acid after a surfeit of sweetness. The effect has been at least partly good, for many curricula have introduced a vastly more penetrating type of research into the conduct of national groups and their representatives. But the extreme form of the early reaction travestied the League of Nations and made simpletons of the men who had tried to put the Covenant into practice. A job of historical justice was left to be done, and Mr. Walters' book, despite some faults of partisanship, provides a wholesome corrective. His heroes were not visionaries on the fringe of lunacy. They were able and experienced statesmen groping in a radically changed environment for new methods of handling problems that defied traditional treatment.

We know now that profound psychological adaptations are a necessary preparation for the new institutions which our age seems rationally to demand. Perhaps nothing but the fumbling and ill-fated experiments at Geneva could have pointed to the nature of these adaptations or demonstrated that they had not accompanied the fundamental changes from the economic, social, and political environment of the nineteenth century to that of the twentieth. It is worth some emphasis that the change in the theoretical literature from utopia to scientific skepticism, referred to above, did not precede but followed the decline of the League. The disdained work of the vanguard at Geneva may yet be honored as a stage (not less indispensable because somewhat unedifying) in man's discovery of himself.

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EASTERN NATIONALISM AND WESTERN POLICY

By LUCIAN W. PYE

William L. Holland, ed., *Asian Nationalism and the West*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1953, 449 pp. $5.00.

W. Macmahon Ball, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia*, Melbourne University Press: New York, Cambridge University Press, 1953, 210 pp. $4.50.

Maurice Zinkin, *Asia and the West*, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 304 pp. $3.50.

George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1953, 490 pp. $6.00.

I

MOST students of the Far East aspire to make their researches meaningful for decisions of public policy, and the authors of the works under consideration are no exception. All of them discuss contemporary Asian problems and all of them suggest how the United States can contribute to their resolution. It may be appropriate, therefore, to ask to what extent their approaches and analyses are helpful to those charged with formulating and executing American policy in the Far East.

That the American policy-maker needs all the help he can get, particularly in regard to Asia, has by now become quite obvious. Not only have recent changes in Asia created problems of the utmost seriousness; statesmen have also discovered that most of the old assumptions underlying Western policy no longer are very meaningful. Once basic objectives had been defined, it used to be possible to leave the Far East to a few specialists who could adjust relations with the area largely according to their private views. Issues generally were of such a character that, regardless of the validity of the assumptions behind either the basic objectives or the personal preferences of the specialists, the consequences of choosing one alternative of action rather than some other were not likely to be serious.

The Second World War and subsequent international developments have changed all that. They have also raised ques-

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tions in the minds of many people as to the types of knowledge necessary for those who will have to determine future policies. Meanwhile, the process of new hypothesizing for policy has hardly extended beyond the recognition that traditional sources and types of danger have been replaced with new ones and that areas which previously had required little attention now demand complex evaluations.

Both a symptom of these difficulties and a source of further frustration for statesmen have been the strong criticisms leveled at almost every policy that has been proposed concerning relations with Asia. Popular protests have been aroused by charges that policy-makers have failed to comprehend the nature of developments in Asia and that they have confused the superficial with the fundamental, ignored the relevant, and violated most values, whether Western or Eastern. There is a common demand for a greater appreciation of the situation in Asia and in particular of the phenomenon of "Asian nationalism." By failing to recognize the significance of these developments, our policy, according to its critics, has degenerated to mere acts of expediency, and in the constant coping with the exigencies of daily diplomacy the possibilities of "constructive" and "consistent" relationships have been overlooked.

It may be questioned whether it is realistic to expect "consistent" policies toward societies involved in rapid but uncertain political and social transformations. It is not just that prediction is more complicated and that what appears probable today becomes impossible tomorrow. In organization and practice the conduct of foreign affairs is such that even under ideal conditions limits are placed on the operational flexibility necessary for a rational conduct of policy. When the area toward which policy is being formed refuses to remain reasonably stable, even a minimum consensus among those involved in the decision process becomes difficult. Moreover, the very rapidity with which particular problems arise encourages the already strong tendency in foreign offices toward *ad hoc* solutions and diminishes the likelihood of more explicit examination of the assumptions and hypotheses upon which decisions are being based. The rate at

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which these decisions must be made results in an accumulation of small and large policy commitments, among which logical contradictions are likely to appear. Thus, any attempt at outlining a new framework for policy is compromised before it can be started. It hardly seems necessary to cite particular examples of these developments in our relations from Seoul to Teheran.

Scholars, unlike policy-makers, are not usually bothered by the need to make, or the responsibility for, such day-to-day decisions. As a consequence, one might expect that they would devote greater effort to a discussion of the basic requirements for more effective Western policies in the Far East. One might also expect that in their analyses of Asian societies they would provide data that are useful to those charged with the conduct of everyday affairs. But have they, with all their advantages, actually succeeded in doing so?

Any answer must be preceded, in all justice, by the admission that the Far East presents problems for students as well as for statesmen. The specialist is faced with difficulties in communicating with an audience capable of sophisticated reasoning about politics in general but lacking in factual information about Eastern affairs. As a consequence, he is likely to confuse ignorance of data with an inability to conceptualize, and to present all of his ideas in a relatively simple form. The result can lead to an impression that Far Eastern specialists are more politically naïve than in fact they are. This impression is strengthened by writers who believe that only emotional appeals can capture an audience which has little intellectual interest in the problems of Asian societies. Exposition is colored by this sensed need to dramatize the issues, and the result is often overstatement and a shrill note of urgency that belies otherwise sound reasoning.

The problem of communication is further complicated by the fact that many of the popular conceptions of Asia take the form of strongly held stereotypes which scholars at times find easier to utilize than to destroy. In particular, the West has generally been uncertain about what to make of social change in the East because of conflicting images of a "Changeless East" and a "Revolutionary East." There is the concept of an Asia which

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is timeless and in which change is slow and likely to be swallowed up by tradition. At the same time, there is the image of an Asia which has broken with its past and is rising anew. Events are made to fit into one or the other of the stereotypes, with the result that it becomes difficult to appraise the significance of new developments and to decide whether progress or chaos should be predicted. With respect to China, some of those scholars most energetic in developing the image of the "Revolutionary East" before the advent of Communist power have now felt it necessary to strengthen the assumptions about a "Changeless East" in order to hold out hope for a less than Bolshevik China. At the same time, others in the face of the same developments have utilized the same stereotypes, but in the opposite order.

A more basic problem is that, quite legitimately, most research is not oriented to policy questions. The student, respecting the traditions of scholarship, is guided in his selection of questions and his approach to analysis by developments in the academic disciplines. Nevertheless, he cannot help but be aware of another responsibility, that of contributing to public policy. When the area is the Far East, he may be especially sensitive to this responsibility because he realizes that few others are interested in the general subject. Thus, driven by two taskmasters, he finds it hard to satisfy either. He often ends up by grafting onto his study a few generalizations which are felt to have some policy implications. But since the fundamental approach has not been one of exploring alternatives of action, the policy suggestions are not likely to be up to the standards of the main analysis. When the caliber of the general study is impressive, it becomes difficult to recognize that the policy proposals are not of equal cogency.

This problem arises in particularly acute form in the studies of such subjects as "Asian nationalism." The researcher is all too aware of the difficulties of explaining by means of such an ambiguous term the complex changes in Asia and the emergence of a new pattern of relationships between this area and the West. But since the problem seems related to that of nineteenth-century "imperialism," there has been an understandable tend-

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ency to simplify and analyze it along the lines which scholars have used to explain that phenomenon. Thus, it has not seemed unreasonable to contend that, as the previous century has been characterized as the age of imperialism, this century can be identified with "Asian nationalism." When the problem is cast at this level of generality, there is even less likelihood that analysis will have fruitful results for policy purposes or that questions will be examined in terms of their relevance for decision-makers. For, if developments are explained by reference to the broad powers of history in which changes in technology, economic organization, the balance of the power in the West, and the like dominate, little is left to rational choice and decision.

Given these problems, it must be recognized that when works of Far Eastern specialists are criticized from the particular point of view of facilitating policy-thinking, it does not mean that they lack merit by other standards of evaluation. If it were not for the fact that most current works on Asia profess to make contributions for policy, it would be less necessary to raise the question of how relevant they have been in this respect.

II

The authors of the books which occasion this article are in agreement that the phenomenon covered by the phrase "Asian nationalism" is one that presents major problems for the West and that it must be fully understood if policies toward Far Eastern countries are to be effective. None of the authors attempts a working definition of "Asian nationalism" or indicates precisely what he thinks should be included under such a heading. Nor do any of the authors find it necessary to treat "Asian nationalism" as a phenomenon which requires a carefully developed framework of analysis. In *Asian Nationalism and the West,* a symposium which came out of the deliberations of the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference at Lucknow on the subject, there is evidence that the delegates did attempt to define the phenomenon, but in all of the substantive papers presented, the definitions were generally ignored. Indeed, it appears

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that the Conference might have saved itself some trouble if it had heeded Prime Minister Nehru when in his opening address he questioned the validity and usefulness of such a concept as "Asian nationalism."

Actually, the authors of the four works have little faith in the usefulness of abstract discussions of "nationalism," with or without its Oriental modifications. They tend instead to employ the term to cover a multitude of social changes which have been taking place in Asia. However, none of them is able to escape from making a few generalizations on what is popularly considered to be a peculiar form of nationalism. The results of these efforts too often appear to be little more than truistic statements or not always appropriate moralistic generalizations. There is in fact a danger that Westerners, out of a sense of shame for the past history of relations with the Far East, will tend to sentimentalize such subjects as "Asian nationalism." When this occurs, the analysis of the problem is inclined to lose its precision and it becomes difficult to avoid a patronizing attitude toward Asians. True, the ethical dilemmas of policy-making do require serious analysis, but this task is not undertaken in any of the books. Nor is it clearly indicated why "Asian nationalism" should alter appreciably the moral considerations involved in formulating policy. The generalizations that are made about the need for understanding and sympathy in Western diplomacy, where valid, could just as well apply to all cases of foreign policy. When should a foreign policy not evaluate the attitudes and demands of the people toward which the policy is being directed? On the other hand, if it is suggested—and in a few instances this seems dangerously near being the case—that "Asian nationalism" is a phenomenon of such a nature that it requires the West to drop its own values and accept those of the Asian people—which Asian peoples, the Nehrus, the Rhees, or the peasants, is not too clear—then the case is not well made, and it is doubtful that it ever could be.

Once the various authors proceed to more empirical analysis, it becomes evident that much of their concern over "Asian nationalism" has to do with changing patterns of political be-

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havior, and generally it is assumed that these changes are manifestations of social and economic developments within the various countries of Asia. Thus the study of "Asian nationalism" becomes very general economic and social analysis from which direct inferences are made about political behavior. Not only does the concept of a unique form of nationalism remain highly elusive; it becomes unnecessary. It is specific social and economic problems which are seen as critical and as dominating the political life of the various countries.

In terms of solving the problems of policy-makers, the question now is this: how helpful has this social and economic analysis been in producing inferences about political behavior in Asia which are relevant to Western policy?

III

The study of Professor W. Macmahon Ball, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia,* and that of Mr. Maurice Zinkin, *Asia and the West,* concern themselves with the socio-economic problems of Asia. To the extent that these works are based on a formal approach or systematic methodology, it is that of attempting to delineate the general social and economic frameworks of Asian societies. Hypotheses are formulated about the general configurations of these societies, and inferences are then drawn about the course of political activities in this broad setting. Finally, policy recommendations are made in terms of these inferences.

Mr. Ball's analysis is based on the assumption that there is a general social revolution taking place in East Asia which is the product of three main forces: (1) anti-colonialism, (2) a socio-economic revolt against poverty, and (3) a racial revolt of Asians against Europeans. In his detailed analysis he neglects this last hypothesis and thus fails to make what might have been a unique contribution to our understanding of modern Asia. His treatment of anti-colonialism is also very brief, and at such a general level that it is impossible for him to indicate some of the subtle variations in the heritage of colonialism among different levels in Asian society and different countries.

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In much of the literature on the newly sovereign Asian nations there appears a line of reasoning which attributes to nations a pattern of development similar to that of an individual. With this rather unfortunate analogy in mind, the newly independent states have been viewed as passing through a stage of "adolescence," out of which, given more experience, they will grow into healthy "adulthood." Since it is Westerners who employ the analogy, its use also suggests the connotation of a "parent" with guilt feelings about an earlier period of "child care." In Mr. Ball's pages we find the suggestion that the West must be understanding and sympathetic despite Asia's acts of apparent irresponsibility or even hostility toward the West and the "older generation." Unfortunately there is no guarantee that time will produce "maturity" and a more stable and happy situation; the signs of social disintegration are all too deep-rooted in many parts of Asia to pass them off as the pains of youth. One wonders in fact whether Mr. Ball would prescribe the same formula for relations with all the newly independent countries, and ask for the same degree of tolerance toward the "young nationalism" of President Syngman Rhee, Prime Minister Nehru, and President Soekarno. If not, what are the criteria of differentiation, and do they have anything to do with relative degrees of "newness" or "inexperience"?

The bulk of Mr. Ball's study is concerned with the general social and economic problems of East Asia. The limited scope of the work prevents him from engaging in detailed discussion of these matters, but he does succeed remarkably well in stressing forcefully and succinctly most of the well-recognized problems of each of the countries with which he deals. Mr. Zinkin's book, which is a more detailed survey of these same problems, serves as a complement to that of Mr. Ball. In both books, but more explicitly so in Mr. Zinkin's, we are presented with the broad socio-economic frameworks of Asian societies and the features which differentiate them from those of the West.

Both works remind us that in spite of all the self-recrimination in the West about not understanding the peoples of Asia, a fairly impressive tradition of scholarship on the general sociology

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of Asia has been built up. Theories about the nature of peasant and agrarian societies, bureaucratic organization, lack of capitalistic and rationalistic development, and the like have been advanced and supported with relatively detailed analyses. The general configurations of these societies have been described in more than a superficial manner by numerous Western scholars, not only specialists on the area, but also such general students as Max Weber, Tawney, and even Marx.

No doubt, one of the reasons for the disproportionate sophistication of the general socio-economic aspects of these studies, as compared with their treatment of political behavior, is that the majority of these societies are relatively simple in their gross form and organization. The broad sociological outline of most Asian societies can be charted without the need for as detailed knowledge of specific institutions as is required for an understanding of the more complex and industrialized Western societies. Also, it has been traditional from the time of the earliest Western visitors, such as Marco Polo and the Jesuits, to attempt general descriptions of the unique societies found in Asia. Although in methodology these reports leave much to be desired, they did introduce the custom of making broad and daring generalizations. That many of these generalizations now appear to be incorrect is of less importance than that they served to raise questions about and interest in the general features of Asian societies. In the process of refuting the more absurd observations, more accurate general statements have been made.

Mr. Zinkin continues in this tradition, but he adds much that is original, especially in his analysis of the relationship between social organization and economic development. Particular attention is given to the "bankruptcy" of Asian economies, with the well-recognized problems of overpopulation, lack of capital accumulation, and inadequate technical skill fully examined and documented. Mr. Zinkin is especially good in his coverage of India, a country he knows well from personal experience and study, and since his treatment of the other countries of Asia must be so brief, one wishes that he might have concentrated even more on this nation and its problems. He has succeeded in

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bringing together many data on India which are not generally available and which help to explain many isolated social phenomena. It is only possible to cite here as an example his argument that Indians did not reject legalistic solutions of problems because of any metaphysical interpretation of human affairs, as has been suggested by some. Originally, the Indians were all too enthusiastic about accepting the device of law courts—"in 1900 one Bengali in 74 was engaged in a law suit." In time, however, the strain on the courts became very great, corruption followed and, more important, the people came to realize that the legal code was premised on the strengthening of the aristocracy and not on giving justice to the humble.

Insofar as both of these studies seek to explain developments in Asia in the context of the historical evolution of social orders, one can take little issue with the presentations. Some points might be questioned and differences in stress and emphasis might be called for by critics who have sought to cover the same problems. But these objections would be irrelevant for the purposes of most readers and of interest only to the more specialized students of Asian societies. More elaborate and detailed studies have been made of the social structures of the various Asian societies, but for general coverage of most of the countries of Asia both of these volumes, and especially Mr. Zinkin's, rank among the best. For reasons which are hard to understand but which obviously affect the tone of his work, Mr. Ball has chosen to premise his study on the situation as it existed in about 1951 for all the countries of Asia except China. Developments in China are viewed as ending with the first flush of Communist victory on the mainland, and the Korean War is treated only as it affected other countries and not China itself.

It is at the point where these studies turn to policy recommendations for the West that they appear to be weakest. It must therefore be asked whether an analytical approach which is based on broad socio-economic hypothesizing is useful for the policy-maker. The question is particularly relevant since both authors are at their best when they ignore their more formal approach and introduce insights which are not apparently de-

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rived from their general analysis. Unfortunately, however, this is also where they are least systematic.

In large part, the difficulty seems to be that in making such "background" studies the tendency is to strive to formulate hypotheses at the highest level of generality, in which time units become decades, generations, and even centuries. Generalization which seeks to cover as many phenomena as possible reaches a point where the broad historical dimensions dominate. More particular events and developments within the general sociological framework are examined only as isolated data selected to test, by way of example, the main hypotheses. It is from this imposing framework of analysis that inferences have to be drawn about choice and action at the group and individual level.

In terms of policy-thinking this raises several problems. Once events and trends are cast in such a broad perspective of history, they begin to assume a quality of inevitability. What is taking place or is about to take place is made to depend upon such tremendous social forces that policy choice seems pointless. Careful planning, based upon the calculation of the consequences of alternative actions, seems ineffectual before the developmental forces, which appear to be uninfluenced by human action and can only play themselves out according to their own independent laws.

For example, Mr. Zinkin traces in great detail the social and economic forces which have led to the "bankruptcy of Asian economies." These forces include the traditional organization of the societies and a sequence of developments starting with the first impact of the West and the role of the early joint stock companies. But when he comes to his final suggestions for American policy, they seem unrelated to his general analysis, especially when he makes the rather optimistic forecast that "£100 to £200 million a year from the outside would be enough to bring life to a stagnating Indian economy and hope to the frustrated Indian electorate." This may be true, and we certainly would like to hope so, but his analysis has not been sufficiently detailed to suggest what would be the effects of injecting such sums of money annually into the Indian economy. In viewing

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the problem from such a lofty perspective it is difficult not to treat capital in absolute terms and assume that it has the same effect in one economy as another. Although Mr. Zinkin may observe that in theory the effectiveness of injections of capital into an economy depends upon numerous variables, such as the patterns of consumption, habits of saving, types of investment opportunities, the propensities of entrepreneurs, and the like, in practice his approach is not designed to give specific data about these variables.

For quite some time now, developments in theory have awaited information about the precise operations of such variables in Asian and other "underdeveloped" economies. We have, in fact, been treated to the spectacle of writers showing uncommon respect for the traditional divisions of the social sciences: economists call upon the sociologists and anthropologists to examine these questions empirically, while the practitioners of the latter disciplines maintain that the problem can best be understood by the economists themselves. And, in the meantime, economic historians and general students of the Far East continue to ignore the problem and retreat to discussions of the far more general social and economic features of these societies. The result is that those responsible for carrying out programs to assist these economic systems receive little guidance at the level where they need it most.

Far more serious difficulties are encountered in employing such broad socio-economic studies for a detailed understanding of Asian political problems. The process by which the general socio-economic hypotheses are arrived at carries such studies so far above the political arena that when the attempt is finally made to draw conclusions about immediate political developments, the gap is so great that it usually is not bridged by systematic analysis. There is a tendency rather to assume that the validity and neatness of the analysis of the society's general framework in itself guarantees the correctness of the inferences drawn from it. The result often is to suggest that in Asian societies there is no area of political life outside of direct and immediate responses to the most elemental social forces.

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There is no question that the socio-economic setting of a society conditions its political life, but an understanding of how this is done requires sophisticated hypotheses and many data that are not usually found in an examination of the general features of the society. Overpopulation, lack of capital, limited technological development, and the like are all factors which shape the political life of Asian countries, but in precisely what manner remains far from clear. How do these people and their elites perceive these problems? What is the pattern of their reactions to them? What role do they give to rational choice? What do they consider to be rational? Questions such as these must be asked if we are to bridge the gap between hypotheses about the general structure of these societies and their political life. Viewed as a task in analysis, the problem becomes one of determining the relationships in a series of propositions which begin at the outer socio-economic configurations of the societies and lead in to the level of political behavior. These intermediate propositions become the key to an understanding of political developments. They also suggest the relationships that are critical for policy-thinking, since they involve statements about the political response that can be expected to follow from alternative policy choices.

For example, a theme that runs through most of Professor Ball's work is that poverty, measured in terms of monetary income, causes political revolt. This may be the case in Asia, but again there are many propositions about the relationship of poverty to political behavior which must be tested before we can be sure of the nature of the relationship or what can be done about it. Under what conditions may poverty lead to political apathy rather than revolt? Is it the absolute standards of living that produce political revolt, or is it the sense of insecurity which comes from fluctuations in income coupled with social mobility and frustrations over the inability of societies to absorb those who have achieved new standards of education? What are the expectations of welfare held by the people of Asia? Poverty and welfare again are not too meaningful when measured solely by monetary income. Armed with a careful collection of statistics, Mr.

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Zinkin can show us how in these terms one country is "better off" than another, but this demonstration actually tells us little about what political developments to expect in these countries. How do the peoples and the elites of Asia actually view the relationship between poverty and political action? Without more accurate knowledge about these attitudes and reasoning patterns we can hardly learn much about political behavior, and increasingly precise evaluations of the "objective" standards of living in the area will certainly provide no substitute for such knowledge.

That the weakest point in these two works appears when the attempt is made to draw political inferences would not necessarily be an important criticism except that they both seek to contribute to policy-thinking. And they seem to assume that such thinking can be safely based on general "background" studies of broad historical sweep centering on sociological, economic, and technological developments. This opinion is hardly unique with these authors; it is certainly common to many students of Asia and also appears in many of the intelligence studies upon which policy is supposedly based. That such studies are not well suited for thinking about policy questions may help to explain some aspects of recent Western policy toward Asia. Since it is so difficult for even the expert on the area to draw deductions about political developments from such studies, it certainly is likely that policy-makers, given their general backgrounds, would have even greater difficulties. As a result, one might expect either that policy-makers would reject such studies as "academic" (i.e., irrelevant to the problems of decision-making) or that they might feel that they are interesting reading which can make one more "sensitive" to the problems of Asia, but that when it comes to policy decisions it is necessary to follow "hunches." (These hunches are, in fact, often only a little less systematically arrived at than the political inferences of the authors of such studies.)

It is true that Asian societies do not possess as distinctly organized or as explicitly recognized methods of expressing political forces as are found in the West. The functions which in the West are performed by political parties and pressure groups

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have traditionally been fulfilled in Asia by far more informal methods, with the result that the political process is less conspicuous to the Western eye. The more tradition-bound attitudes common to Asian peoples have made them appear more prepared to accept the dispositions of fate—that is, of the socio-economic forces. Moreover, since these cultures have not developed to the same extent the relatively explicit approaches toward rational thought found in the West, they have tended less to view choice-making in terms of logical alternatives. They have thus felt a less compelling need to organize institutions which could be clearly identified as foci for political pressures and as having responsibilities for political decisions. Political arenas, functioning as semi-autonomous institutions in which men engage in activities based on their conception of how events can be influenced by human effort, have remained relatively obscure in Asian societies.

The difficulty of perceiving clearly the pattern of day-to-day political activities in Asia strengthens the impression that these countries in fact do not have politics, but only histories of social and economic trends. Asian societies are thus frequently considered to be organized without benefit of those arrangements by which men seek to control the social world about them, and through which they are in turn conditioned by their social environment. What there is of political life becomes a matter of irrational and automatic responses to the dumb forces of social and political change. Since they are simply the agents of such forces, the Asian peoples and their leaders are viewed as incapable of all the complex responses and choices, both rational and prejudicial, which are the essentials of politics and which bring out both the dignity and the meanness of man. With the political scene left unstructured and nearly void, any Asian leader who assumes a strong political posture merely seems to be acting out of individual cussedness or isolated utopianism and not in response to the types of political pressures with which Western politicians are confronted. To discuss the "awakening" of Asia without reference to details of political relationships is to risk leaving the impression that until recent times

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Asians were political dullards and hardly social beings, while now they are still less than rational as they seek to solve their problems in a fit of passion, be it Communist or nationalist.

IV

It would be going too far afield to introduce a discussion of the various kinds of political behavior studies which might be most valuable for policy-thinking. However, it may be pointed out that a case-study approach such as Professor Kahin's *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* can reveal some of the more subtle dynamics of politics in an Eastern setting. The bulk of Mr. Kahin's work constitutes a detailed coverage of the events which led to the transformation of the Dutch East Indies into the Republic of Indonesia, and he gives particular attention to the negotiations with the Dutch and the roles of the United States and the United Nations. However, he introduces many of the actual political problems faced by the aspiring Indonesian nationalists, both as they responded to the general pressures of social change and as they engaged in the tasks of political organization and decision. By injecting life into the operation of politics in Indonesia, Mr. Kahin indicates many of the attitudes of both the people and their leaders which produced unity in action as well as numerous divisions and conflicts. It is possible to perceive, however unsurely, some of the ways by which Indonesian leaders have approached political problems and how they have conceived of the political process. Indirectly many hypotheses suggest themselves as to the roles and expectations which Indonesian leaders adopt when engaged in political activities.

Many important aspects of Indonesian political behavior are slighted, however, since Mr. Kahin's work is a case study, confined to Indonesia's struggle for independence. The political arena he analyzes was in a sense artificially structured by the decisions of such international actors as the United States, the United Nations and, of course, the Dutch; it assumed far less of its form from the independent behavior of Indonesian politicians. Although the Indonesian leaders were fairly consistent in their agreement over ends, they had relatively little oppor-

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tunity to disagree on means since these were generally determined for them by the attitudes of the other participants. The result is that many of the dominant features of recent Indonesian politics can hardly be discerned in his study, and Mr. Kahin arrived at what now appear to be somewhat overly optimistic forecasts about the stability of Indonesian politics.

Moreover, there is a tendency in the analysis to judge all political acts in terms of the single value of legal independence. At times the actions of the participants, both Indonesian and Western, are examined only as they affect this value and their behavior is treated as being rational or irrational, moral or immoral, with reference to this issue alone. When this occurs, the account takes on several of the less happy qualities of some traditional diplomatic histories, in which simplification is carried to the point where nations are treated as having only a few specific foreign-policy objectives and the essence of the analysis becomes an account of how successful each is in realizing them. Such an approach can result in obscuring the very differences in orientation toward politics which are critical in policy considerations.

These limitations, if they deserve to be called such, stem more from the scope of the study than from its analytical approach; and they suggest that what is needed is more case studies. When these are compiled, we will be better able to perceive the complexities of the interaction between political behavior and the general framework of Asian societies. There is little question that, as we analyze more closely the pattern of political behavior found in Asian societies, we will discover much that is irrational and much that is the heritage of tradition. It may also remain true that in the East the impact of general social and economic forces is more direct and immediate than in the West. However, we will be better able to understand the attitudes of Asians and the system of logic they employ in attempting to solve problems as they perceive them. Particular aspects of nationalism in Asia will become intelligible; short-run developments will more likely be foreseen; and the area in which Western policy can perform effective functions more clearly understood. We will be

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less prone, on the one hand, to underestimate the freedom for rational choice of Western policy-makers, and on the other hand, to ignore the role of rational calculation in Asian politics. Policy choice will remain difficult for the West, but better evaluation of alternative courses of action will become possible.

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ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE POLITICAL SCIENTIST

By WILLIAM J. BAUMOL

Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1953, pp. xxvi, 557. $5.00.

I

ANY valid piece of economic analysis is, of course, potentially interesting to the political scientist, just as his results are of interest to the economist. However, especially since the time when "economics" superseded "political economy" as standard nomenclature, most of the economist's work has been kept "pure" of direct political application. Many of his theorems are essentially designed to be descriptive and their implications either for policy or for political theory are seldom stressed—indeed, they are sometimes not even discernible. Nevertheless, some lines of economic thought have produced, or sought to produce, results which are of direct interest to the political scientist. Some of this work seems to have landed in the border territories which separate the two disciplines.

Noteworthy in this respect is the field of welfare economics. In it are examined the effects of economic actions and decisions on the welfare of the individuals who compose the economy or, more generally, on the welfare of any group to which the analyst chooses to direct his attention. In short, it might be described as the theory of economic policy. In practice, work in welfare economics has been considerably narrower than this suggests, but at least some of it has been produced in this spirit, being concerned primarily with the composition of output—the amounts produced of each of the different commodities. The effects on output composition of the price mechanism, of the presence of monopolistic elements, and of different policies for the operation of nationalized industries have been examined and evaluated in terms of the preferences of the public. In other words, these economic forms have been considered as control

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instruments which sometimes can give effect to the public's wishes on output composition.

II

Professors Dahl and Lindblom, a political scientist and an economist respectively, have combined their knowledge to produce *Politics, Economics and Welfare,* a voluminous work on control and control instruments. They have wisely chosen not to press the distinction between political and economic controls.

They classify control systems into four basic types: hierarchy (control by leaders), polyarchy (control of leaders by non-leaders—roughly, democracy), bargaining (compromise among leaders), and price systems. Analysis of the last of these four categories has ordinarily been left to the economists while the other three have more usually been classified under political science, but the distinction is surely an artificial one. Any real economy is to some extent a mixed system, partly controlled by government, partly subject to consumer and workingmen's pressures. Even the most tyrannical dictatorship cannot completely disregard consumer desires and needs, lest the people's efficiency in serving the dictator's wishes be impaired, or lest the public become restive and unmanageable. Even if the rulers wanted to keep all decision-making hierarchical, they could not do so because of the magnitude of the task. Totalitarian governments have for these reasons been forced to grant some decision-making power to the public, partly by the establishment of a more or less rigged and artificial price system in some sectors of the economy. Similarly, the most *laissez-faire* of free enterprise systems has always involved control by leaders. Some minimal authority (over the composition of military production, if nothing else) is always left to the government. In addition, hierarchical control is exercised by powerful leaders outside the government, by businessmen, union leaders, and others.

How the price system acts as a control device is perhaps at first glance less obvious than the operation of a system which falls under one of the other three headings. As Dahl and Lindblom point out, it involves control both of and by leaders. It is a mix-

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ture of hierarchy and polyarchy. The influence of the big businessman over production—in particular, the control exercised by monopoly and monopolistic elements in a free enterprise economy—has been adequately emphasized. But economists have often preferred to emphasize the power which the price system gives to the public, especially under competitive conditions. Businessmen cannot sell goods which consumers do not want, nor can they hire people if they do not provide working conditions as attractive as those offered by rival bidders for the labor supply. If the public's preference switches from one product to another, the producers' output *must* follow suit whether in response to the carrot (profits) or the stick (losses and bankruptcy).

III

In discussing these types of control systems, Professors Dahl and Lindblom make good use of the findings of welfare economics. The virtues and shortcomings of a price system have been examined extensively in this literature, as have the economic problems of socialism and centralized and decentralized planning. These studies are therefore eminently suitable for the purposes of the book, and the authors know how to use them.

Few economists would, for example, quarrel with their appraisal of the price system. They point out that it simplifies the operation of the economy—it reduces the number of variables with which any one decision-maker must deal. The authors also point out that it gives the public considerable control over the composition of output, and that competitive pressures tend to make it conform with the desires of the individuals who make up the economy. In addition, competition and the profit motive provide incentives for productive efficiency. They induce the businessman to keep his costs low and to search for and adopt innovations.

The price system's shortcomings are equally well described. Its inability to provide for communal wants like defense, roads, and lighthouses because of the high costs to any one individual of providing such shareable goods and services, the tendency toward economic instability—depression and inflation, the will-

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ingness of businessmen to incur social costs like deforestation, stream pollution, etc., provided these are not reflected in their private costs—are among the standard criticisms of the free enterprise economy which the authors call to the reader's attention.

These examples are illustrative of the economic analysis to be found in the volume. By and large, it is relevant, thorough, and unoriginal. This is no doubt as it should be, for the authors' contribution here consists in recognizing the relevance of these materials for their problem, not in producing path-breaking work in welfare economics.

I do not mean to deny that the authors take some debatable positions. One of their central themes, the disappearance of the grand alternatives—planning and the free market, socialism and capitalism—might well be questioned. Certainly there is neither perfect black nor white. Central control over free enterprise economies has tended to increase, while the degree of centralization of economic control in Russia is considerably smaller than some of the earlier Communists might have foreseen. Nevertheless, the contrast is very real and the alternatives grand enough, as the partisans of either side are most anxious to point out. No doubt the viewpoint of the authors is valuable at the very least as an antidote to the widespread and rather naïve idea that there is a complete break between the alternatives. The fact that all systems are mixed and that there exists a range of possibilities, rather than just two poles, is well worth emphasis. But we can still wonder whether Dahl and Lindblom do not look too much at the middle ground and accept the convergence of the views of some right-wing socialists and some left-wing free-enterprisers as indications of a trend.

There are other points that can be disputed. For example, freedom is defined as the absence of frustrations: if people are convinced that they do not want the alternatives of which they are deprived, then on this view they are free. Any definition of this elusive concept must probably be somewhat unsatisfactory. But it should be noted that the one suggested in this volume is consistent with the assertion that the most extreme totalitarian state—the bravest of new worlds—is completely free. For if ef-

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fective propaganda can convince the subject peoples, as it tries to do, that they are not deprived of any desirable alternatives, these peoples are living in freedom on the definition proposed.

But these possible sources of disagreement are certainly not evidence of weakness in the volume. Little of the discussion is affected by them, and in any event, unless the book is intended as a text, "playing it safe" is not so great a virtue. Rather, our criticism must take a different tack. For one thing, the purpose of the volume is not clear. Is it meant to be read primarily by scholars or by students? It does not seem entirely satisfactory for either purpose. As an original work it spends too much time repeating results which can be found elsewhere, and in such places the authors might better have confined themselves to a brief summary and a set of references. The researcher who has done work in any of the areas involved is likely to find that he has heard much of the material before. As a text the volume also leaves something to be desired because it is relatively heavy going. The highly taxonomic bent of the work tends to make the whole rather tedious, though its individual sections are often very fine pieces of exposition. For either purpose some abbreviation might have been desirable.

For the most part, then, objections to the volume must be directed to its exposition. Certainly the competence of the authors and the quality of the work is beyond question. If little of the book is startling or original, it has an important contribution to offer in actually bringing together relevant materials from political science and economics, an endeavor which previously has sometimes gotten little further than a reassertion of belief in virtue.

IV

There are, of course, materials other than those contained in this book which may be relevant to the work of political scientists and economists looking to each other's literature for rewarding knowledge. As an economist, I can only suggest contributions from my own discipline which may be of interest to practitioners of the other. And it seems appropriate to supple-

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ment the discussion of *Politics, Economics and Welfare* with an effort to describe some of these. Naturally, such a selection is bound to be colored by personal interests and the abbreviated exposition will of necessity be of little value to those who have already read some of the writing in these areas. Yet political theorists who have not had these materials called to their attention may find them helpful. It is worth mentioning, in addition, that several of these analyses have been formulated in mathematical terms. This suggests that mathematics may yet come to play a part in political theory, as it does in economics.

Of particular interest are the input-output studies associated with Professor Leontief.[1] While they are less clearly on the borderline of politics than some of the other contributions, I discuss them first because, perhaps more than any of the other items, they could have been used to advantage by Professors Dahl and Lindblom in their analysis of the problems of central planning.

Input-output analysis is implicitly or explicitly an indispensable tool for the central economic planner. From that viewpoint, this analysis may be described as the process whereby the various output decisions can be coordinated. The need for coordination arises out of the mutual interdependence of production decisions. Transport facilities are used by the lumber industry and the planner cannot make a rational decision on how much of these facilities to provide until a decision on lumber output has been reached. But lumber is used by the transport industry and so lumber output in turn must be geared to the magnitude of transportation facilities. Such mutual interdependence characterizes many sectors of the economy.

This relationship considerably complicates the problems of the central planner. Input-output analysis enables us to take account of this interdependence under certain simplifying assumptions, and provided no very great detail is required in our answers. The analysis employs a system of simultaneous equa-

[1] See, e.g., W. W. Leontief, *The Structure of American Economy*, 2nd ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 1951. J. Ryan, "The Leontief System," *Southern Economic Journal*, XIX (April 1953), provides a fairly elementary exposition.

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tions which require that the output of any industry be adequate to meet the needs of other industries for its products. This permits the computation of output plans for the various industries which are geared to the achievement of any feasible targets adopted by the planning board. If, for example, the planning board decides on how much steel, fuel, etc., it wants for consumers and military purposes, input-output analysis can tell us, at least conceptually, how much of each of these products must be made available for use in the production process by other industries.

But, for the present at any rate, this procedure has not solved the problems which must be met in comprehensive and over-all central planning. To be useful, such planning cannot deal simply with broad categories. Meeting an over-all target for nuts and bolts is of little use if they are not of the right size, and an error of this variety can result in machinery and equipment piling up unfinished and unusable. In other words, every item must be considered in the plan—every size and description of every part of every machine. The number of such items in our economy totals well into the millions. Completely centralized planning must then involve an overwhelmingly large number of acts of decision-making. But the mutual interdependence of output decisions causes these problems to multiply rapidly as the number of items dealt with increases. It has been shown that the amount of statistical information required by the planner—data on the technical requirements of the various industries—increases as the square of the number of items considered. And the computations he must undertake in solving the relevant simultaneous equations increases roughly as the cube of the number of items. Thus, even with severely simplified models and the use of electronic calculation equipment, input-output computations have so far been largely confined to less than two hundred items.

For our purposes, the significance of the approach lies in indicating the nature and magnitude of some of the problems which confront the central planner. It shows that completely centralized planning is not possible, at least for the present. This does not mean that a planned economy must soon break down—

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experience teaches us only too well that it can work. But it works only by making a variety of compromises. The planning agency cannot attempt to centralize all its decisions; some discretion must be left to managers and subordinate officials, with supervision from above confined either to occasional checking or to an appraisal of over-all results. The central plans must usually consist of fairly broad targets, with many details not specified. Some decisions must even be left to the operation of a price system which can, of course, be rigged by the planner. In a word, then, the problems and limitations of input-output analysis are relevant for any examination of the experiences we have had in centralized economic control, and for any discussion of the political and economic theory of hierarchical systems.

V

Several economists have recently devoted considerable attention to the relationship between individual and social choice. Though directed in the first instance to economists, much of the work seems of at least as much moment to political theory.

The discussion has received its greatest impetus in the work of Kenneth J. Arrow.[2] Professor Arrow has discussed the problem of formulating group (governmental) decisions which will consistently reflect the preferences of the individuals who compose society. His procedure is to list some plausible desiderata for social decisions and to examine their implications. He originally proposed the following four minimal conditions which social choices must meet in order to reflect these preferences: (1) they must be consistent (transitive) in the sense that if A will be decided in preference to B, and B in preference to C, then C will not be decided in preference to A; (2) these decisions must not be dictated by anyone outside the community or by any one individual in the community; (3) an alternative which would otherwise have been chosen must not be rejected when, *ceteris*

[2] See, particularly, his *Social Choice and Individual Values*, Cowles Commission monograph No. 12, New York, Wiley, 1951. See also Duncan Black and R. A. Newing, *Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation*, London, Hodge, 1951, and the references to Black's work in Arrow, *op.cit.*

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paribus, some individual comes to regard it more favorably; and (4) a social decision as between two alternatives must not change so long as no individual in the community changes the order in which he ranks these alternatives in accord with his preferences.

At first glance, these requirements for social choice may seem rather appropriate as a basis for the formalization of the requirements of democratic decision-making. However, Arrow has shown that the matter is not so simple. He has demonstrated that it is impossible to choose among all possible sets of alternatives without violating at least one of his four criteria. In other words, it would appear that social choice must be in a sense inconsistent or undemocratic. The well-known paradox of voting which shows that majority decision can lead to violation of the first of Arrow's requirements is an example of this difficulty.[3]

Later examination of the problem has shown, however, that inconsistent or "undemocratic" social choice-making are not the only alternatives.[4] The difficulty pointed out by Arrow's research can be ascribed to the fact that his fourth condition is considerably more restrictive than first appears and is not merely the postulate of popular sovereignty that it seems. First, it implies that in deciding as between two alternatives the public's preferences as among still other alternatives be treated as irrelevant. Suppose, for example, that half the public prefers the erection of a bridge to the digging of a tunnel under a river at comparable cost, while the other half ranks the projects the other way. The fourth condition requires that the government's decision be uninfluenced by the fact that the tunnel advocates feel this to be the most important of the public works projects currently under discussion, while those who want the bridge really think almost any other project of greater significance.

In addition, Arrow's fourth condition requires that only *rankings* be considered. This means that no weight be given to the intensity of desires. For example, if 50 per cent of the public

[3] See, e.g., Arrow, *op.cit.*, pp. 2-3.

[4] See Clifford Hildreth, "Alternative Conditions for Social Orderings," *Econometrica*, XXI (January 1953); and Leo A. Goodman and Harry Markowitz, "Social Welfare Functions Based on Individual Rankings," *American Journal of Sociology*, LVIII (November 1952).

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demands the tunnel with considerable emotion because it feels that the bridge will deface the beauty of the area, while the other half of the public has a slight preference for the bridge because of its slightly lower cost, the difference in intensity of these preferences must, on this fourth condition, be disregarded.

Of course, we do not know how to measure intensity of feeling. Still there are cases where there would be consensus on this and where in fact a choice in accord with the Arrow condition would be unacceptable in principle to most of us. For example, in deciding whether to allocate labor to the production of some drug needed to treat a rare but dangerous disease or to the manufacture of Scrabble sets, we may recognize that, compassion aside, more people will want the Scrabble sets than the medicine. Yet on the crudest sort of interpersonal comparison of benefits, we may decide that the public as a whole will gain more from the production of the medicine because its potential users feel much more strongly about their preference than do the others.

To those who come across this material for the first time the whole question may well appear rather pedantic. However, much more important than the discussion of the way in which Arrow's desiderata can be reformulated to make them consistent is the approach employed by the analysis. The mathematical treatment of the relationships in the problem of group decisions provides tools which may well be of considerable use in future research.

VI

I shall not resist the temptation to mention my own work as a further example of research in the field of political economy.[5] The inquiry examines the rationale of the coercive functions of government. The problem can be put in the form of a paradox. If the public approves of an extension of government interference, people must in some sense feel themselves better off as a result of being forced to change their behavior. People must want to be prevented from doing what they do! This paradox

[5] *Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1952.

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is part and parcel of any referendum which approves of taxation to support public works or military preparation, of any movement for conscription or stricter traffic laws, indeed, of any popular movement which supports legislation whose effects are widely diffused and mandatory upon those affected.

How then can this paradox be explained? If they want their behavior modified, why do not people *voluntarily* change it so as to make governmental intervention unnecessary? The point is significant because it is at the heart of the anarchist and much of the extreme *laissez-faire* position, where it is argued that government coercion can never (or hardly ever) benefit the public since coercion must prevent the restrained individual from doing what he wants.

Several explanations, each with some validity, are possible. First, some of us may want to be coerced because we have no confidence in our own ability to conduct our affairs. The drunkard may in his sober moments ask that the bottle be locked away, or the rest of us may decide to do it for him. The advocates of *laissez-faire* have always recognized this relatively unimportant case and have argued that it calls for interference with the behavior of minors and the mentally incompetent.

A second reason why most people might want government interference is as protection against the anti-social acts of a minority. Crime prevention and regulation of monopoly might be examples. This is, of course, an important case in practice—here the individual wants coercion because it is not he but the other fellow who is interfered with.

But there is a third important case where people will approve of government activities which interfere with their own acts (*as well as with those of others*). This is the case where goals can be achieved only by the combined support of large groups of people, sometimes of the public as a whole. In this category fall what Dahl and Lindblom call the shareable goods. We may each want public parks, military protection from aggression, flood control, and large-scale soil conservation activity, yet none of us can finance these things by himself. All these items can be used by many of us jointly and can only be financed by us jointly. Yet

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in many cases there is no way in which the price of these services can be extracted from us by private enterprise. If, then, the government does not intervene and use its coercive powers to collect taxes, the services may not be provided at all.

There are also the cases which Dahl and Lindblom refer to as "Third Party effects." By rapid spending in times of rising prices, I prevent my money from losing its value, but I do not have to consider the adverse third-party effects—the contribution to further inflation which can be harmful to others. But no one person can do much about inflation by cutting down his own spending; only by getting the government to reduce his expenditure simultaneously with that of every other individual can an effective disinflationary program be instituted. A similar analysis applies to many other important problems, tariff wars, international relations, unemployment and depression, etc. In such cases, the public may want to be coerced because its goals can be achieved only by everyone's behaving appropriately at once.

This analysis at the same time suggests some limitations of the price mechanism and indicates the nature of the cases where state interference is called for.

In sum, then, Professors Dahl and Lindblom have shown that there is much to be gained from a revival of work in the area of political economy, and have themselves made a promising beginning. If this review is of any help in suggesting further possibilities of insight and analysis in the field, it will have served its purpose.

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Research Note

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS RESEARCH:

The SSRC Committee and Its Research Survey

By WILLIAM T. R. FOX

IN June 1952 a Social Science Research Council committee was established to take stock of research on civil-military relations and make proposals with respect to the further development of research in this area.[1] The members of the committee were not entirely satisfied with the phrase "civil-military relations" as describing the focus of their attention, but it was understood that the committee's interest lay in research bearing upon those problems of public policy which were posed by the prospect of a continuing high mobilization even in peace time, and by the continuing necessity for a careful coordination of military, diplomatic, and industrialization policy.

The initial stock-taking took the form of a compilation, under the committee's general supervision, of a bibliography of work done in this area from 1940 to the end of 1952.[2] A parallel inventory was undertaken of research in progress, the results of which are appended to this research note. The committee has further devoted its sessions to considering ways in which some obvious gaps in current research could best be filled. There is, for example, no generally satisfactory history of American mili-

[1] This committee has consisted of McGeorge Bundy, Gordon A. Craig, John P. Miller, Harold Stein, and William T. R. Fox as chairman. Bryce Wood has been the Social Science Research Council's staff member; and the Council's president, Pendleton Herring, has been a regular participant in these discussions. Mr. Bundy resigned from the committee in August 1953.

[2] The bibliography, entitled "Civil-Military Relations: An Annotated Bibliography, 1940-1952," will be published shortly by Columbia University Press, New York. For publications prior to 1940, see the bibliography prepared for the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council, *Civil-Military Relations: Bibliographical Notes on Civilian Mobilization*, Chicago, Ill., Public Administration Service, 1940.

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tary policy. Furthermore, many of the monographic studies whose completion ought to precede the writing of such a general history have not yet been made.[3] There is also a dearth of studies contributing to the formulation of public policy designed to reduce vulnerability to atomic attack.[4] These two quite disparate examples are mentioned to indicate the wide range of the committee's interest.

It was to be expected that fifteen years of world war and postwar tension, with problems of national security continually at the center of public and governmental interest, would shape the research activities of social scientists generally. Some social scientists have found in the national mobilization effort new types of raw materials to process. The war and postwar mobilization changed somewhat the focus of their investigations, and the spectacular success of the atomic scientists greatly increased government willingness to subsidize even "pure" research in the social sciences. Thus the war and its aftermath have not always swerved even the social scientist on the payroll of federal agencies concerned with national security from what may usually be called pure research toward applied research. Government research facilities instead permitted for many scholars data collecting and empirical testing of research hypotheses on a scale previously unimagined and a further refining of theoretical generalizations peculiar to the discipline of the particular investigator. The monumental four-volume study, *The American Soldier*,[5] is perhaps a case in point.

Other social scientists have found it necessary to orient their

[3] A volume of readings prepared by Gordon Turner of Princeton University in connection with the offering of an experimental course in the history of military affairs has just been published under the title, *A History of Military Affairs* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1953). It is not only an important teaching aid, but a useful contribution to defining the scope of a military history which seeks to be more than battle history.

[4] Ansley J. Coale, *The Problem of Reducing Vulnerability to Atomic Bombs* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1953), is a notable exception. See also Carl Kaysen, "The Vulnerability of the United States to Enemy Attack," in this issue of *World Politics*.

[5] Samuel A. Stouffer, *et al.*, eds., *The American Soldier*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1949. The studies were based on data collected during World War II by the Research Branch, Information and Education Division of the United States War Department.

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research (or some of it) completely to the direct satisfaction of a specific governmental need. This has happened in some cases because the researchers have been absorbed into the civil or military bureaucracy of the government; in others, it has occurred because they were engaged in contract research quite different from that which they would have undertaken in the absence of the contract. The researcher who agrees to carry out a given "applied" research project may, of course, discover no conflict between the needs of government and the needs of social science in his particular case, but any basic contribution to theoretical social science is a by-product of an activity initiated for an essentially non-scientific purpose.[6]

A further group of social scientists has had, since the beginning of World War II, practical experience in the management of the national mobilization effort. On the basis of their wartime or postwar experience as participant-observers, they have shaped their research to take advantage of the new insights which that experience has given them in their social science disciplines. Many of the studies of war mobilization agencies produced by political scientists are examples of research of this character. A very large percentage of the items listed in the forthcoming bibliography, to which reference has already been made,[7] are analyses by participant-observers.

The pages of *World Politics* since its inception in 1948 are testimony to the impact which the war and postwar experience have had upon the focus of interest of academic specialists in international relations. Both the utopian-internationalists and the "realist"-isolationists of the 1930's have been forced to reconsider their doctrinaire positions regarding the motivations of state behavior and to concern themselves instead with policy-oriented research. The relation of force to policy has thus almost automatically come under a more intensive scrutiny than in an earlier period, and there has been a corresponding growth of

[6] Social scientists on the staff of the RAND Corporation are among those who have demonstrated that scholarly research and publication are by no means necessarily incompatible with employment by an organization whose *raison d'être* is to meet needs of a federal government agency.

[7] Cf. note 2 above.

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interest in the way in which the specialists in the use of force and specialists in the elaboration of policy have worked together.

Not only the international relations researchers but other students of American political institutions have had to grapple with the new problems which arose out of the admitted necessity for maintaining a mammoth military establishment. The Committee on Civil-Military Relations Research was organized to help identify these problems more clearly and to suggest ways in which they might become "researchable." It has been concerned lest research energies in this area be allocated primarily in terms of new data which an enlarged military establishment makes possible to collect, in terms of job opportunities which result from the expanded government requirements for applied research, or in terms of the accidental government experience of the particular researcher. Although these provide valid bases for selecting a research problem, it does not follow that taken together they will result in a research program which is balanced in terms of the adaptation of social science to meet the needs of a reluctantly militarized democracy determined to protect both its independence and its democracy.

Perhaps at no time since the great cathedral-building period in twelfth- and thirteenth-century France has so large a proportion of a free society's effort been devoted in peace time to the support of a public enterprise as has that of the United States in building up and maintaining its present huge military establishment. Finding ways of gearing its activities to the possibilities of the American economy, on the one hand, and to the necessities of American foreign policy, on the other, has thus become a central preoccupation of men in and out of government service.

Some of the academic work in this area has been generated by a concern for protecting the integrity of the principle of civilian control. Louis Smith's *American Democracy and Military Power*[8] is an example. Other academic specialists have been concerned with perfecting procedures and attitudes for developing "sound" policy—sound because they take due account of the considera-

[8] Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1951. Dean Smith's book has as its subtitle "A Study of Civil Control of the Military Power in the United States."

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tions of diplomacy, defense, and industrial mobilization. The problem of orchestrating these sometimes superficially dissonant elements into what Arthur W. Macmahon calls a "concert of judgment" is discussed in his *Administration in Foreign Affairs.*[9] Whatever the focus of the individual investigator, there is a generally recognized need for developing in the field of military affairs a degree of civilian competence which would make it safe for the principle of civilian control to be maintained unimpaired.[10]

During the eighteen months since the establishment of the Social Science Research Council committee, there have been a number of other developments which indicate the widespread concern with research in this area.[11] The scheduling of a round table on civil-military relations at the 1953 meeting of the American Political Science Association is one such development. The Twentieth Century Fund, to cite another example, appointed an *ad hoc* committee to report on needed research on emerging patterns of civil-military relations as they affect the making of national policies. Pursuant to that committee's recommendations, Harold Stein was appointed to direct a research program planned on a three-year basis and located at Princeton University, where there are an unusually large number of scholars working in closely related fields. Formerly staff director of the Inter-University Case Program, Dr. Stein is planning a series of case studies in civil-military relations.[12] He also plans to trace the development in recent decades of new governmental institutions for formulating and implementing national security policy. The program is expected to lead to the publication of a

[9] University, Ala., University of Alabama Press, 1953.

[10] The interest in analyzing and shaping the impact of high mobilization on American political institutions is by no means fully reflected in introductory survey volumes in American government. It is still the rule, rather than the exception, for a general survey volume to devote a few pages out of several hundred to the national defense activities of the federal government, which consume 80 per cent of the nation's budget, 20 per cent of the national income, and a good many years of the lives of most of the male readers of these general works.

[11] Not only in the universities but in the field of journalism has there been a growing interest. See, for example, the syndicated column of Walter Millis, "Arms and Men," which began to appear in the *New York Herald Tribune* in 1952.

[12] For the studies in the Inter-University Case Program, see Harold Stein, ed., *Public Administration and Policy Development*, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1952.

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general volume so written as to be of interest to the technical and non-technical reader alike.

A second somewhat more specialized program was initiated early in 1953 at Dartmouth College. Supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation, Professors John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway are investigating the education of military officers who have participated, or may be expected to participate, in the formulation of national policies. They are interested in the present role and utilization of such officers, the skills and attitudes which appear to contribute to the efficient performance of such officers in political-military positions, and the extent to which a cultivation of such skills and aptitudes is an objective in military training and in selecting the assignments of such officers. This program is planned on a two-year basis.

Under the leadership of Morris Janowitz of the Department of Sociology and the Institute of Public Administration at the University of Michigan, a conference was convened in June 1953, at Ann Arbor, to plan a program of comparative studies of changing patterns of civil-military relations in various Western countries. In this program, the focus is to be on the professional soldier, his social characteristics, ideology, and motivations, and on some of the implications of this type of data for locating the soldier in the political power structure of his own country. Such a program rests on the twin assumptions that the research design must necessarily involve comparative analysis as a prerequisite to drawing any conclusions about the American military establishment, and that civil-military relations can only be studied meaningfully after the military itself has been subjected to a type of political and social analysis comparable to that already made of some non-military groups.[13] The program is planned as a long-term undertaking and is expected to proceed on the basis of informal cooperation among interested scholars, rather than

[13] The June 1953 conference was attended by a group of junior faculty and advanced graduate students from five institutions, which included Samuel Huntington (Harvard), Kurt Lang (Chicago), Maury Feld (Columbia), and Elizabeth Marvick (Michigan). This group reviewed a document prepared by Professor Janowitz, "A Working Paper on the Professional Soldier and Political Power" (Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan, Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, 1953; mimeographed).

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as a hierarchically organized research team working in a single institution with the research to be completed in a fixed period.

Still another center of growing interest in civil-military relations is the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Following the lead given by President Eisenhower while at Columbia, the Institute was organized and a research program planned which gave high priority to the study of political-military affairs.[14] The first study planned under this program was the analysis by Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., of the role of Congress in military policy, with special emphasis on the postwar period. A second study by the Institute's director, the author of this research note, has been made possible by a Carnegie Corporation grant. It will be an investigation of the characteristics of those civilians and soldiers whose activities have to be related to each other at policy-making levels. It has as a working title, "Civilian and Military Perspectives on National Security Policy." By an analysis of the verbal output in memoirs, public speeches, and Congressional testimony, as well as by interview, it is hoped to describe some of the distinctive predispositions, beliefs, intellectual skills, and problem-solving techniques of statesmen, diplomats, soldiers, and industrial mobilizers. This initial formulation is then to be tested by a series of case studies designed to show which of the distinctive characteristics are operationally significant.

The Council on Foreign Relations has also sponsored discussion and investigation of the role of the military in making national policy. Again with Carnegie Corporation support, a discussion group met during 1952-1953 to exchange views on the subject, and its chairman, Charles Spofford, former deputy United States representative in the North Atlantic Council, is now bringing to completion a volume embodying his findings.

[14] Coincidentally, a massive study tentatively entitled "Diplomacy and Defense: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations in the Cycle of Peace and War" has been brought almost to completion by Alfred Vagts as part of a program of "Topical Studies in International Relations" planned by Grayson Kirk in 1947-1948. The author of this research note is now sharing with Dr. Kirk editorial responsibility for this series of manuscripts, of which Dr. Vagts's study is to be one. For a description of the Topical Studies program, see Grayson Kirk, "Materials for the Study of International Relations," *World Politics*, 1 (April 1949), pp. 426-30.

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A survey of current research made by Bryce Wood as staff member of the Social Science Research Council Committee on Civil-Military Relations Research showed the following studies to be under way during 1953. (The items marked with an asterisk are described more fully in preceding paragraphs.)

C. J. Bernardo and Eugene Bacon, University of Maryland	"The Military Policy of the United States" (textbook).
Alvin Brown, New York City	*The Armor of Organization* (published: New York, Hibbert, 1953). A historical account of military organization, a criticism of existing organizational practices, and a rational plan of organization for the armed forces of the United States. Deals also with civil-military relations, such as means of civilian control and of making military life more attractive.
Otto Butz, Center of International Studies, Princeton University	A study of the position and role of the military in American society and politics.
Committee on Civil-Military Relations Research, Social Science Research Council	*"Civil-Military Relations: An Annotated Bibliography, 1940-1952" (in press: New York, Columbia University Press, 1954).
Robert H. Connery, Duke University	"The North Atlantic Treaty: A Study in International Regionalism." A monograph on the history, organization, and operations of NATO; part of a larger Brookings Institution study on UN and international organization since World War II.
Kurt DeWitt, George Washington University	"The Wehrmacht and the Nazi Party, 1933-1945: The Relationship Between Civilian and Military Power in a Totalitarian Dictatorship."
Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., American University	"The Civilian and the Military: A History of the Antimilitarist Tradition in the United States."

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WILLIAM T. R. FOX, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University	*"Civilian and Military Perspectives on National Security Policy."
KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army	"History of the United States Army in the World Wars" (a multi-volume series being published under Dr. Greenfield's editorship).
REAR ADM. JOHN B. HEFFERNAN, USN (Ret.), Director of Naval History, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	The Director of Naval History is supervising the preparation of several studies of naval administration in World War II.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, Harvard University	A study of defense policy and expenditures. Part of a larger research project sponsored by the Brookings Institution.
MORRIS JANOWITZ, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan	*(1) A comparative study of changing patterns of civilian-military relations in the United States and various European countries, from the point of view of the professional soldier, his social characteristics, ideology, motivations, and their consequences for political power. (2) An analysis of institutional factors in the operation of large-scale military organizations.
FRANKLYN A. JOHNSON, Rollins College	A study of the British Committee of Imperial Defence, especially as related to the maintenance of civil control, the most effective machinery and organization of the armed forces, and the improvement of the place of the armed forces in the state.
DELMAR KARLEN, New York University	Studies in the field of military justice.
EDWARD L. KATZENBACH, JR., Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University	*"Congress and Military Policy."

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Louis E. Leopold, Jr., Altoona, Pa.	A study of political and strategic aspects of establishment and operation of US military bases in non-self-governing and semi-self-governing areas.
Richard W. Leopold, Northwestern University	(1) A short, interpretive biography of Elihu Root. One chapter will be devoted to his work as Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904. (2) A multi-volume study of the US as a world power since 1898. Considerable attention will be given to the role of the armed forces in the shaping of American foreign policy.
Col. G. A. Lincoln, USA, and Associates, United States Military Academy	"Economics of National Security: Managing America's Resources for Defense" (2nd edition of a textbook; in press).
Arthur W. Macmahon, Columbia University	**Administration in Foreign Affairs* (published: University, Ala., University of Alabama Press, 1953).
John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Dartmouth College	*A study of (a) the utilization of military officers in positions in which they participate in the formulation of national policies; (b) the skills and attitudes that appear to be desirable in officers who hold such positions; and (c) the extent to which cultivation of these skills and attitudes appears to be an objective in military training and assignment processes.
John D. Montgomery, Babson Institute	Studies of militarism in Germany and Japan, with particular reference to denazification and demilitarization programs of American occupation authorities.
Philip Monypenny, University of Illinois	The position of the General Staff in US military organization.

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JOHN D. MILLETT, Miami University	A study of the War Department and civilian procurement agencies in World War II.
JOHN D. PALFREY, Law School, Columbia University	"A Political Analysis of Atomic Secrecy." An examination of the political factors and events which have contributed to the way in which atomic energy information has been controlled by the government since World War II.
HERBERT ROSENBERG, Washington, D.C.	"History of the Office of Defense Mobilization."
PHILIP SELZNICK, University of California, Berkeley	A study of institutional leadership, with special reference to problems of political-military policy integration.
HERMAN M. SOMERS, Haverford College	The administration of Mutual Security Programs. A study with special reference to overlapping interests, responsibility, and authority between civil and military aspects of the programs. The materials center upon European operations.
CHARLES M. SPOFFORD, Council on Foreign Relations	*The influence of the military in the making of national policy.
HAROLD STEIN (Twentieth Century Fund Study), Princeton University	*A three-year study of civil-military relations with emphasis on the effect of military considerations in the formulation of foreign and other national policies, and the developing interrelationships of civil and military officers in our national government.
ALFRED VAGTS, Sherman, Conn.	*"Diplomacy and Defense," a historical survey of the relations, in peace and war, of civilian and military personnel, ideas, and institutions.
PAUL P. VAN RIPER, Cornell University	An annotated bibliography of military organization, administration, and management; concerned mainly with problems within the military establishment.

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